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The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, 
Environmental Law, and Democracy 
abstract .  Legal scholars’ discussions of climate change assume that the issue is one mainly 
of engineering incentives, and that “environmental values” are too weak, vague, or both to spur 
political action to address the emerging crisis. This Article gives reason to believe otherwise. The 
major natural resource and environmental statutes, from the acts creating national forests and 
parks to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, have emerged from precisely the activity that 
discussions of climate change neglect: democratic argument over the value of the natural world 
and its role in competing ideas of citizenship, national purpose, and the role and scale of 
government. This Article traces several major episodes in those developments: the rise of a 
Romantic attachment to spectacular landscapes, a utilitarian ideal of rational management of 
resources, the legal and cultural concept of “wilderness,” and the innovation of “the 
environment” as a centerpiece of public debate at the end of the 1960s. The Article connects each 
development to changes in background culture and values and the social movements and 
political actors that brought them into public debate and, eventually, legislation. The result is 
both a set of specific studies and the outline of an account of the ways that the political struggles 
of a democratic community have created new, and always contested, ideas of “nature” 
throughout American history. The Article then shows how past episodes cast light on the 
present: today’s climate politics, including the seemingly anomalous (even “irrational”) choices 
by municipalities to adopt the Kyoto carbon-emissions goals, makes most sense when 
understood as an extension of a long tradition of political argument about nature, which does 
not simply take “interests” as fixed, but changes both interests and values by changing how 
citizens understand themselves, the country, and the natural world. 
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introduction 
Environmental crises are defining challenges for the next few decades and 
probably well beyond. Yet legal scholars approach these issues in a way that 
encourages pessimism and needlessly narrows the legal and political 
imagination. This is especially true of climate change, probably today’s signal 
environmental question. Most scholarship envisions environmental politics as 
the pursuit of already fixed interests. That approach ignores the power of 
political communities to change both their values and their interests through 
the self-interpreting activity of democratic politics. In that politics, new forms 
of normative identity—who we take ourselves to be and what matters most to 
us—arise from reciprocal efforts at persuasion, arguments about the meaning 
of shared ideas and commitments. The medium of this persuasion is public 
language, the repertoire of arguments and appeals that make up the ongoing 
conversation of a polity. Nature, like liberty and equality, is a centerpiece of 
public language, one of the always-contested terms around which Americans 
orient individual identity and dispute the terms of common life. 
The aim of this Article is to challenge the narrowing assumptions of the 
conventional approach to climate change, and environmental issues at large, by 
giving an account of nature’s role in American public language. Doing so 
means challenging two widespread assumptions. The first is that, although 
people sometimes act on moral and civic motives,1 such motives apply to 
 
1.  For a discussion of moral identity as a source of motivation, see JONATHAN GLOVER, 
HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 26-30 (Yale Univ. Press 2000) 
(1999). For a particularly rich account of its action in an episode long assumed to be 
governed by conventional economic self-interest, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN 
BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 231-49 (2006), which argues 
that free-labor ideology and an attendant conception of civic dignity motivated laboring and 
middle classes to demand abolition of slavery at recognized and substantial economic cost to 
the British Empire. For a partisan but careful account of the character of motives inseparable 
from membership in a political or other community, see CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL 
ARGUMENTS 127-45 (1995). For rich considerations of how citizens actually use one class of 
such arguments, see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006), which describes the role of social movements in 
opening up settled points of interpretation in constitutional culture and bringing new 
commitments to previously closed debates; and Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
1323, 1350-66 (2006), which sets out an account of the role of social movements in 
contesting and contributing to the meaning of basic but underspecified public values. See 
also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 427 (2007) (“So long as groups continue to argue about the 
meaning of our common Constitution, so long do they remain committed to a common 
constitutional enterprise. . . . [O]ur constitutional system consists of ‘an historically 
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environmental problems in a way that is vague in content and motivationally 
weak.2 The second conventional assumption is that “environmentalism,” which 
 
extended tradition of argument’ whose ‘integrity and coherence . . . are to be found in, not 
apart from, controversy.’”). 
2.  See RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: 
BEYOND KYOTO (2003) (concentrating on an interest-mediating structure of prospective 
global climate architecture); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State 
and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 129-30 (2008) (lumping 
moral and otherwise other-regarding motives into a residual category); Eric A. Posner & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. 
L. REV. 51, 86-92 (2009) [hereinafter Posner & Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas] (arguing 
that the incentives of self-interested nation-states should be regarded as an intractable 
constraint on distributive policies of any global climate agreement but not discussing 
domestic politics); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, A Tale of Two Protocols] 
(acknowledging the possibility that public opinion is not fixed and might respond to 
leadership, but analyzing the failure of Kyoto as overwhelmingly a matter of national-
interest calculations relative to the Montreal Protocol); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent 
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, On the Divergent Reactions] (discussing rational, boundedly rational, 
and extrarational motives for assessing the two threats, but not engaging the development 
of normative culture as other than an explanandum); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the 
United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas 
Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Complex Climate Change 
Incentives] (concentrating analysis on respective national self-interests, then arguing that 
political action depends on a combination of diffuse moral sentiment and confusion about 
the inefficacy of local action, which might together push along a norms cascade); Jonathan 
B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1812-16 
(2008) [hereinafter Wiener, Climate Change Policy] (setting aside “constructivist persuasion” 
in international climate negotiations as fraught with threats of “moralizing,” too weak to 
overcome economic interests, carrying the potential to backfire or cause unintended 
consequences, and too slow); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007) (using interest-based analysis to argue 
that state and local climate initiatives are likely to be ineffective at best and 
counterproductive at worst); Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008,  
§ 6 (Magazine), at 32, 58 (“[N]owhere is moralization more of a hazard than in our greatest 
global challenge. . . . Our habit of moralizing problems, merging them with intuitions of 
purity and contamination, and resting content when we feel the right feelings, can get in the 
way of doing the right thing.”). These scholars are not ethical nihilists: indeed, they conduct 
normative analysis in the manner of normative realists, that is, those who believe moral 
assertions are unproblematic. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008) (conducting a normative analysis of distributive considerations in 
climate change remedies); Posner & Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas, supra, at 71-86 
(conducting “welfarist” and “fairness” analyses of the per capita principle). What they do 
not do is connect their political and normative analyses to an understanding of values as 
political motives, potentially in more than a weak and secondary role, and as products of 
political and cultural contest. It is worth noting that divisions of individual scholars, rather 
than arguments, into camps is inevitably somewhat artificial. Jonathan Wiener, in 
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might otherwise furnish such values, is unhelpful in significant ways. In one 
account, environmentalism is an essentially negative politics: suspicious of 
human agency, always on the defensive against incursions into natural systems, 
and temperamentally associated with sacrifice, austerity, and guilt.3 It is hostile 
to, or at best apart from, the projects of progress and justice.4 In another, 
frequently overlapping view, environmentalism is nostalgic and ontologically 
naïve, inseparably attached to an essential “nature” which environmentalists 
insistently contrast with the intruding human species.5 A negative and 
 
particular, has written thoughtfully on the role of changing ideas of the natural world in 
informing (or failing to inform) the goals and methods of environmental regulation. See 
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1996); 
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995). My focus here is not on what important scholars know or find 
interesting in general, but on the tools they adopt in the face of large and emergent issues 
such as climate change. 
3.  See GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
OPTIMISM (1995) (arguing that environmentalism has been defined by pessimism about 
human agency, technology, and their effects on nature); LUC FERRY, THE NEW ECOLOGICAL 
ORDER 57-126 (Carol Volk trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1995) (1992) (arguing that both 
European and American environmentalism are characterized by nostalgic hostility to the 
Enlightenment projects of humanism and reason); TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL 
SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE 
POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 5-6 (2007) (arguing that environmentalism as presently constituted 
is narrow and elitist, indifferent to progress and justice, and hostile to the human appetite 
for hope); id. at 120 (“[E]nvironmentalists have long defined their politics in the 
negative.”); id. at 154 (characterizing environmentalism as “the ethics born of . . . living in a 
fallen world pervaded by fears of the eco-apocalypse to come”); William Cronon, The 
Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: 
RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69 (William Cronon ed., 1995) (arguing that a 
fixation on wilderness values has made environmentalists indifferent to the justice and 
grace, or otherwise, of most of the human environment); Wiener, Climate Change Policy, 
supra note 2, at 1813 (warning against “moralizing” as counterproductive); Pinker, supra 
note 2 (characterizing environmentalist attitudes to climate change as “moralizing” about 
allegedly excessive consumption and calling for a “post-moralism era” to address climate 
issues). 
4.  See FERRY, supra note 3; NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 3; Cronon, supra note 3. 
5.  See EASTERBROOK, supra note 3 (stating that progress in relation to the natural world will 
mean reengineering it to satisfy human aims, including such humanitarian considerations as 
averting predation among wild animals, all in opposition to environmentalists’ static 
conception of nature); BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 47-55 (2d ed. 2006) (claiming 
that environmentalism depends on an idea of undisturbed and permanent nature, which 
climate change renders infeasible); NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 3, at 105-29 
(arguing that environmentalism is defined by a “pollution paradigm” in which unspoiled 
nature is invaded by harmful human activity); id. at 216-40 (arguing that environmentalism 
is committed to a philosophically discredited and practically counterproductive “essentialist” 
divide between humanity and nature); Cronon, supra note 3, at 69-70, 80-88 (maintaining 
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defensive stance, the argument goes, cannot mobilize a political response to 
problems as big as climate change.6 Similarly, a politics premised on a nostalgic 
contrast between human beings and the natural world is conceptually 
rudderless in a time when human action and natural systems have joined in 
irreversible symbiosis, most markedly in climate change, in which the global 
atmosphere stands revealed as substantially a human artifact.7 
Of course, the ideal types conceal variety and disagreement. Nonetheless, 
they form a dominant attitude in which the only realistic, hence responsible, 
approach to climate change and other environmental problems is one of 
instrumentally rational resource management constrained by interest-based 
politics. In this attitude, interests that are regarded as effectively immutable  
(1) guide ideal public policy and (2) constrain public policy practice through 
politics.8 This attitude is so incomplete as to be seriously mistaken. Moreover, 
it is mistaken in ways that underwrite exaggerated pessimism about an issue 
where a realistic sense of hope is essential. 
A “realistic” focus on interests can never be the whole story because 
interests are themselves creations of democratic activity. Interests arise from a 
history of persuasion and experimentation in which new aims and experiences 
become central to the value of our lives.9 Environmental language and ideas 
have been deeply involved in this history. They contain themes that can help 
organize our understanding of the pastincluding the history of interests, 
interwoven as it is with that of valuesand illuminate prospects for the future. 
 
that environmentalism has been defined by the idealization of a “wilderness” radically 
opposed to and unsullied by human activity). 
6.  Those who make this claim usually offer to cure the defect with a more “positive” agenda, 
such as Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s “politics of possibility” or McKibben’s remark that 
“[i]f [the effort to address climate change has] success, it won’t be environmentalism 
anymore. It will be something much more important.” Bill McKibben, An Atom of 
Difference: Just Give Us That Old-Time Pollution, ORION, July-Aug. 2005, at 14-15. Near the 
heart of this Article’s argument is that the offer of radical remedial breaks with a caricatured 
“environmentalism” mistakes the situation almost entirely: environmental public language 
has always been connected with ideas of progress, civic dignity, and national purpose. 
7.  See NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 3; Cronon, supra note 3. For an application of 
this idea to legal scholarship, see Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the 
Preservation of Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 573 (2004), which argues that a 
favorite legal tool of environmentalists, the perpetual conservation easement, is based on a 
naïve conception of nature as static. 
8.  See supra note 2. 
9.  See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004) (outlining and 
recounting the rise of distinctively modern ways of understanding the legitimate interests of 
individuals and states in political and social relations). 
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A minority strand of commentators assumes what this Article argues: that 
environmental public language is more coherent and important than is 
conventionally recognized.10 This Article begins where they leave off.11 Its 
central argument is that environmental public language has been involved 
throughout American history in contests over the nature of progress, the role 
and scale of government, and the meaning of national identity, social 
membership, and civic dignity. Environmental language has taken shape from 
these contests, and it has lent its shape to them. Such language has not, mainly, 
been attached to any naïve contrast between humanity and nature, but has 
instead been the vehicle for exploring the complex ways in which interaction 
 
10.  See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47-50 (2004) (noting 
diverse ideas in the early 1970s of the directions in which environmental law might 
develop); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, 
THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY (2008) (arguing that the 
only prospect for successfully engaging the current panoply of global environmental 
problems is to engage basic questions about human purposes, sources of satisfaction, and 
moral obligations); Cronon, supra note 3, at 88-90 (using criticism of the wilderness idea to 
urge a broader engagement with cultural and moral sources, in the hope of correcting the 
defects Cronon ascribes to wilderness-focused environmentalism); Daniel C. Esty, The 
World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 7 (2002) (engaging 
normative questions at the intersection of environmental and economic governance); 
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004) (arguing that moral reflection about environmental 
values may be engaged through cultural transformation, which necessarily draws on the 
existing normative resources of the culture); Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007) [hereinafter Kysar, Discounting] (claiming that a direct 
engagement with substantive normative issues is unavoidable in assessing intergenerational 
allocation of climate change burdens); Douglas A. Kysar, The Consultants’ Republic, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 2041 (2008) (reviewing NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 3) (arguing 
that the book’s characterization of environmentalism, among other defects, overlooks the 
diversity of environmentalists’ institutional strategies and normative conceptions in the 
early 1970s). 
11.  Each of the figures just invoked sets the stage in some way for this project. Doug Kysar’s 
work makes the case that an inquiry like the one this Article undertakes is analytically 
unavoidable and culturally promising, but he has not so far undertaken it himself. Gus 
Speth makes a similar case, but his treatment of the issues he raises includes very little 
engagement with developments before roughly 1970. Lazarus gestures at a connection 
between the environmentalism of the 1970s, public health, and other reformist movements 
of earlier decades, but does not develop it or engage the other themes of this Article. 
Cronon’s landmark essay on wilderness is closest in scope to what this Article attempts, but 
its manner is very much that of the impressionistic and associative essay; Cronon does not 
engage issues such as democratic self-interpretation, the contested question of national 
purpose, or the complex interaction between wilderness and managerial conservationism. 
What one wants is to see the historical and interpretive richness of his earlier work on 
environmental history brought to bear on the themes he beautifully paints in his essay. His 
essay, which I have long admired, is thus a kind of cue for this project. 
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with the natural world can serve, inform, and constitute human purposes. The 
deficiencies that critics identify do exist, but they are hardly touchstones of a 
monolithic environmentalism. On the contrary, more subtle and affirmative 
ideas have been the leading qualities of a richly multifarious tradition of 
argument.12 
Other major areas of public law, such as constitutional law, the statutory 
law of civil rights and employment relations, and criminal law are studied and 
taught as parts of the ongoing self-definition of the political community. 
Nothing commensurate has developed in environmental law. There are at least 
three reasons to begin addressing this lack. For one, legal scholars’ picture of 
American public language is incomplete without an account of the place that 
the natural world has played in it. Second, our understanding of existing 
environmental laws can gain from appreciating how they grow out of, and 
contribute to, changes in public language—that is, by locating them in the 
tradition of argument that they both emerge from and help to shape. Third, 
which is the immediate motivation of this Article, a sense of the resources of 
history can enrich choices for the future. In addressing new environmental 
challenges, such as climate change, a lack of a tractable vocabulary for 
discussing the interplay of values and interests in democratic self-interpretation 
has helped push scholarship toward a narrow variety of political economy that 
neglects the capacity of political communities to achieve basic change in their 
own identities. This omission underestimates our cultural resources and can 
produce a blinkered view of new environmental questions. 
Part I of this Article briefly sets out the pessimistic view of climate change 
as a politically insurmountable problem and the response from the history of 
public language and values: sometimes people use democratic processes to 
change their own reasons for acting. The Article then turns to history to 
develop this idea. Part II describes the prevailing attitude toward the natural 
world in the American politics of the early and middle nineteenth century and 
the rise of new and very different views, which form the basis of much of 
today’s environmental public language. The earlier view valorized the 
productive use of natural resources and honored an individual right to 
expropriate unused or unclaimed lands, a right which was often invoked as a 
mark of membership in the polity. A series of innovations then introduced a 
new mode of valuing the natural world, first in literary expression and personal 
experience, and eventually in public language: the Romantic mode. Beginning 
 
12.  By invoking “tradition,” I do not mean something that befalls us from the past, but instead 
what the living make of the materials available in the world they find. One of the 
suppositions of this Article is that awareness of those inherited materials can enrich the 
forward-looking repertoire of a public, so recollection can stand in support of innovation. 
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in aesthetic theory and literature, it moved, signally through the popularizing 
work of John Muir, into the hands of a social movement, the Sierra Club, 
which created a limited public in which the Romantic valuation of nature was 
common currency, available as an account of the motives for conservation. The 
Romantic mode of valuation interacted with another basis of conservation 
politics, the Progressive mode, which elevated public management of natural 
resources as both utilitarian public policy and a way of rekindling civic virtue in 
an individualistic society. Romantic and Progressive views coincided in 
supporting the public management of natural resources and in opposing the 
perceived individualism and materialism of nineteenth-century America; but 
they also rested on quite distinct views of nature and social life. 
Part III traces one of the most important developments in twentieth-
century conservation: the creation of wilderness as a cultural and legal 
category, which in turn laid the groundwork for much of the environmental 
language of the 1960s and 1970s. Incubated in a relatively small and elite social 
movement, centered on the Wilderness Society, the wilderness idea came into 
its own with the passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act. Wilderness debates 
helped produce new arguments that nature as such, rather than the most 
spectacular places alone, has high and intrinsic value that both enriches human 
experience and demands respect in its own right. These arguments later burst 
into view, seemingly from nowhere, in the efflorescence of environmental 
politics during the years 1968 to 1973. 
Part IV sets out the major developments of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
These include the rise of a new category, the environment, as an organizing 
concept for a set of problems and demands; the valence of this idea as a moral 
account of the perceived failures of technological society and technocratic 
mastery, which could now be cast as departures from ecological principles; and 
an apocalyptic view of the consequences of that departure. These developments 
were in some respects displacements of broader anxieties, which “the 
environment” served to organize and partially reconcile. They also represented 
a new public use of arguments generated, in good part, in the more specialized 
debates of the wilderness movement. The legislative landmarks of that period, 
the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, make most sense when one 
understands that their drafters and sponsors intended them as enactments, not 
just of specific regulatory instruments, but of a new set of defining national 
commitments. Features of the acts that have come in for persistent and cogent 
criticism, notably their embrace of unattainable goals and relative indifference 
to cost-benefit accounting, made sense to those who created them because they 
seemed to fit the statutes’ status as national commitments. 
Part V comes to the present, asking how we might look at today’s 
environmental politics differently if we regarded them as part of the history 
that this Article traces. The superficially mysterious initiatives of local 
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governments to address climate change are one telling example: they make 
most sense when understood as parts of a continuing argument among 
citizens, addressed to the question of what values bear on our relation to the 
natural world. From the anchor of this example, Part V proceeds to consider 
the directions American traditions of environmental values might take in 
addressing climate change. Both the Romantic and Progressive modes remain 
vital as elements of public language, and each might take new shape even as it 
provides parts of an approach to valuing and managing the global atmosphere. 
A final Section of Part V then proposes some ways that teachers of 
environmental law might take account of the arguments of this Article. A brief 
Conclusion follows. 
i .  the special confoundments of climate change 
A. Rational Inhibitions 
The basis of pessimism about climate politics is not elusive. Climate change 
threatens to be the externality that ate the world. Within a year of its release, 
carbon dioxide is dispersed uniformly through the earth’s atmosphere. 
Whoever uses energy derived from fossil fuels gets the full benefit of that 
power while evenly dividing the atmospheric harm with somewhat more than 
6.8 billion others. That is a ratio of benefit to harm all but certain to induce 
overindulgence. 
The standard solution to negative externalities, of course, is to change the 
incentives of individual choices by legally internalizing some of the costs of the 
harms.13 The difficulty is that both the spatial and the temporal scales of 
political choice replicate the basic externalities problem of individual choice. In 
addressing a global problem, a national public must absorb the full cost of any 
measure it adopts, but will receive only a fraction of the globally distributed 
benefit. Climate policy distributes costs and benefits in the pattern of a foreign-
aid project—distributing, in the case of an American action, ninety-five percent 
of its benefits to foreigners.14 
 
13.  This is the basic strategy of many proposals to address climate change, notably the cap-and-
trade mechanisms of most climate legislation introduced last year in Congress, as well as 
deliberately simpler devices such as the partial Pigouvian tax that Thomas Merrill and David 
Schizer have devised to avoid some of the public choice hazards of the more complex 
instruments. See Thomas Merrill & David Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A 
Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 26 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2010). 
14.  This ratio is purely demographic; it would be lower if it assumed that residents of wealthy 
countries have “more to lose” from climate change; but of course, that is not at all clear, as 
PURDY_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 4/27/2010 2:28:01 PM 
the politics of nature 
1133 
 
Making a bad situation worse, the distribution of harms from climate 
change is both uncertain and likely to be highly uneven. On some prominent 
estimates, the United States would have been a massive net loser from 
adopting the Kyoto Protocol, even assuming perfect global compliance, 
because the country is projected to feel relatively light effects from a warming 
world in the next few decades.15 Some countries, notably Russia, might benefit 
from unchecked climate change in the medium term, even excluding the 
savings from forgone mitigation measures.16 One might think it should be 
possible in principle to redistribute the benefits of coordinated mitigation by 
payments to otherwise reluctant participants, but that approach presents 
serious difficulties: strategic misrepresentation of anticipated effects as 
countries jockey to be bought off; pure holdout problems; disputes about 
acceptable distributions of benefits and burdens, including politicized 
arguments about international distributive justice;17 and, closely linked to the 
last, domestic political reluctance to subsidize the interests of foreigners.18 
The problem of temporal scale is as basic as the spatial externalities and 
coordination problems. Each year’s greenhouse gas emissions commit the 
 
vulnerable populations in poor countries may live close to survival or very basic quality-of-
life thresholds vulnerable to climatic disruption, such as exposure to malaria. See U.S. 
Census Bureau, U.S. & World Population Clocks, http://www.census.gov/main/www/ 
popclock.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (offering up-to-the-minute tracking of estimated 
world and United States human populations). 
15.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 71-117 (2007). 
16.  See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Designing Global Climate Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY: A SURVEY 151, 160 (Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz & John O. Niles eds., 
2002). 
17.  See Posner & Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas, supra note 2 (discussing the political barriers 
to redistributing wealth through a global climate regime). 
18.  See Sunstein, A Tale of Two Protocols, supra note 2 (discussing the American reluctance to pay 
for climate mitigation with benefits abroad). These worries are not hypothetical: one has 
only to consider the projections of national costs and arguments about fairness that powered 
the Senate’s 1997 discussion of the Byrd-Hagel resolution denouncing Kyoto for its release 
of poor countries from emissions-reduction obligations and compare this idea of a fair 
distribution of climate burdens (each country must do its part) to that developing in the 
public conversation of countries such as India (each human being should benefit from an 
equal share of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity). See 143 CONG. REC. 15,785 (1997) 
(statement of Sen. Byrd) (“I do not think the Senate should support a treaty that requires 
only half the world—in other words, the developed countries—to endure the economic costs 
of reducing emissions while developing countries are left free to pollute the atmosphere and, 
in so doing, siphon off American industries.”). For an account of developing-country 
perspectives on the question, see LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 216-36 (2006) (describing conflicting ideas of 
fairness among developing and developed countries).  
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global atmosphere to decades of resulting change, and the sum of atmospheric 
changes, arising from interacting natural and anthropogenic influences, may 
emerge over an even longer time.19 This means that the benefits of mitigating 
climate change will accrue to future generations while the living bear the costs. 
Domestic political decisions, particularly in democracies, are tied to electoral 
cycles not generally longer than seven years, and frequently shorter. Within 
any political cycle, it is highly likely that the costs of a serious mitigation effort 
will outweigh the benefits, even setting aside the inevitably speculative 
character of benefits measured in nonevents. Addressing climate change, 
therefore, means sacrifice today to win uncertain advantages for the strangers 
who compose future generations.20 
B. Nonrational Inhibitions 
As if this were not enough discouragement, a set of cognitive biases 
allegedly make political commitment especially elusive around climate change. 
Climate change so far lacks the charismatic or terrifying images that give an 
issue “salience”—centrality and power in the public mind.21 This is in contrast 
to the attacks of September 11, 2001, which gave terrorism great salience for 
years thereafter, and, in environmental politics, visible crises such as the 
burning of the Cuyahoga River and charismatic conservationist images such as 
redwood trees, blue whales, and Yosemite Valley.22 Moreover, the argument 
goes, climate change is a problem of complex systems, while moral motivation 
is keyed to the rights and wrongs of individuals, meaning that the scale of the 
problem tends to overwhelm and numb, rather than spur, motives to 
 
19.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP 
II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4/ar4-wg2-wg1-spm.pdf (forecasting hard-to-predict and 
mutually reinforcing changes including rising global temperatures and sea levels, increased 
frequency of droughts and severe storms, changing regional weather and rainfall patterns, 
and increased desertification, among other effects). 
20.  This entire point supposes a conventional discount rate and relative indifference to the fate 
of future generations. I do not mean to endorse this approach as the right view of climate 
change, and the whole thrust of my argument is that we should not regard these constraints 
as fixed. 
21.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 65-70 (discussing psychological barriers to climate politics); 
Jon Gertner, Why Isn’t the Brain Green?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 36. 
22.  See Sunstein, On the Divergent Reactions, supra note 2 (contrasting terrorism with climate 
change). On the role of salient events in spurring earlier episodes of environmental 
lawmaking, see, for example, NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 3, at 22-24, which 
discusses the impact of the Cuyahoga River Fire. 
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respond.23 Finally, the distance in space and time between the acts that 
contribute to climate change and its final effects is much greater than human 
causal perception and the conjoined sense of responsibility evolved to 
contemplate, meaning instinct draws us toward incomprehension and 
indifference.24 The complexity of climate processes only worsens this 
inhibition.25 To summarize, human beings may be hard-wired not to arrest 
even a catastrophic process if it is diffuse, hard to envision, and delayed in 
time, particularly when the actions that drive it are immediate, conventional, 
and convenient (such as driving). 
C. The Relevance of Democratic Politics 
How much of the grounds for pessimism is in fact hard-wired and how 
much is open to change? On its face, climate change does appear unique in its 
capacity to outstrip the self-correcting resources of human choice. It is, 
therefore, all the more important to appreciate that those resources include the 
power to change the very grounds of our choices. 
This Article approaches that issue by emphasizing an aspect of human 
decisionmaking distinct from our propensity (or failure) to pursue maximum 
satisfaction of our preferences. It begins from the premise that human action 
pervasively responds to the experience of strong and qualitative values. Human 
beings are self-conscious creatures; we experience ourselves as making 
decisions not at random, but for reasons: we act in ways we think more just 
than the alternatives, or more dignified, or more consistent with the ideals of 
our own character.26 That is to say, we act always under descriptions of our 
setting and our alternatives, and these descriptions are not idiosyncratic, but 
are shaped by shared ideas about people, social relations, and the natural 
world.27 Moreover, these descriptions and ideas vary across place and time, 
frequently changing endogenously through human engagement with the very 
 
23.  See Gertner, supra note 21. See generally Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass, I Will Never 
Act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide (Oct. 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
24.  See Gertner, supra note 21. 
25.  See id. 
26.  See 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting Animals [hereinafter TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting 
Animals], in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 45, 45-76 (1985); 1 
CHARLES TAYLOR, What Is Human Agency?, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND 
LANGUAGE 15, 15-44 (1985). 
27.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 25-52 (1989) (theorizing relations between self-
conscious and self-interpreting agents and the questions of value that they confront). 
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experience of value that structures our experience.28 In complement to 
microeconomists’ interest in the formal structure of human choice, and to 
interest-based theorists’ usual assumption that individuals seek wealth and 
power, this approach concentrates on the source and character of the diverse 
substantive ends that people pursue. 
This Article focuses on democratic politics for two reasons. First, 
democracy is one of the arenas in which people can change their own reasons 
for acting: in struggling to persuade one another of the meaning of central but 
overdetermined ideas such as liberty, equality, and nature, democratic citizens 
change the range of potential meanings that these values carry, eliminating 
some and generating new alternatives. Second, values expressed in the register 
of democratic politics carry a special burden, that of justifying to other citizens 
proposed uses of the power of the state and imprimatur of the polity. Because 
the stakes of political argument are high, there is particular motive to make 
basic commitments and urgent innovations intelligible in this register. 
Tracking changes in environmental public language, the language of 
democratic citizens at grips with ideas of nature, means writing not just a 
history of what people have thought and said, but of what they have been able 
to assert to one another in the special business of laying claims on the political 
community. 
Note that the point here is not to oppose high-minded values to low-built 
interests, but to insist on their interpenetration. On the individual level, one’s 
interests are substantially in those things one has come to value: as this Article 
shows, coming to value the natural world in new ways has been a major theme 
of American experience. Moreover, in political argument, those interests one 
can legitimately and persuasively assert are limited by the commitments that 
define the polity. Thus, to anticipate a later argument, the mainly elite 
conservationists of the early Wilderness Society did indeed have an interest in 
preserving large tracts of public land for solitary trekking; but this interest was 
an artifact of more than a half-century of cultural and political ferment, and 
turning it into legislative action required introducing a new way of valuing the 
natural world into the heart of American political debate.29 
A focus on the self-transforming effect of political argument highlights the 
depth of past change and implies that the future, too, might see very different 
governing values. History is full of reforms that were cogently argued to be as 
impossible as addressing climate change can seem today. The abolition of 
 
28.  See 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15, 37 (1985). 
29.  This discussion falls mainly in Section III.A., infra. 
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slavery, sexual equality, and democracy itself are among these.30 Such 
pessimistic arguments have in common that their cogency depends on taking 
“human nature”people’s characteristic motivesas a permanent fact, at least 
for practical purposes. When those arguments have failed, it has been partly 
because “human nature” has changed, not randomly, but as democratic politics 
has drawn people’s motives in a relatively egalitarian direction.31 
Sometimes, then, human nature is as good (or bad) as permanent, and 
sometimes it is not. This is at least partly because one permanent feature of 
that nature is also the basis of its impermanence: people create their own 
reasons for acting by reinterpreting the personalities, communities, traditions, 
and natural world in which they live.32 By doing so in the forum of democratic 
politics, they can expand the set of viable alternatives, the range of paths a 
country might take. There is, of course, no guarantee that Americans will do so 
in connection with climate change. But we might. That act of democratic 
freedom would change the grounds of the debate. 
The rest of this Article examines how earlier Americans have engaged in 
self-transforming self-interpretation around environmental issues, and where 
that practice might move today. 
i i .  the rise of conservation in the nineteenth century 
Previous accounts of the sources of environmental law and politics have 
taken two paths. One is cultural history conducted at a fairly high level of 
abstraction.33 The other is rich in empirical particulars but lacking in theoretical 
 
30.  I discuss some of these developments in JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY 97-160 
(2009). For a particularly illuminating discussion of this issue in connection with slavery, 
see DAVIS, supra note 1, at 231-49. 
31.  See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 231-49; TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting Animals, supra note 26, at 45-76. 
32.  See TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting Animals, supra note 26, at 45-76. 
33.  See LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN 
AMERICA (1964) (tracing the ambivalent American relationship to nature and technology); 
CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION (1980) (arguing that the rise of an instrumentalizing idea of nature arose with, 
and in mutual support of, a male-centered and oppressive version of subjecthood); 3 
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1982) (tracing the idea of 
wilderness through American history); DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY 
OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS (2d ed. 2000) (setting a history of scientific conceptions of nature 
alongside an account of changing practices of use and habitation of the natural world); 
Cronon, supra note 3 (using cultural history to track the idea of wilderness through 
American history, with particular attention to the various human motives it has been 
imagined to serve). 
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ambition and, where it has a theoretical element, generally founded on the 
political economy of interests.34 Some of the most interesting work falls into 
neither category. Exemplified by the scholarship of William Cronon, the third 
strand integrates natural and social history as mutually constitutive processes. 
That work, however, does not engage the topic of this Article: the ways in 
which people create their shared public language by participating in it, by 
seeking to persuade one another.35 
 
34.  See CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION (1982) (tracing primarily 
the legislative and other political processes eventuating in the 1964 Wilderness Act); PHILLIP 
O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
(1960) (setting out the history of grazing policy development); PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968) (providing an extraordinarily rich and informed 
history of the political processes and interests at work in the development and disbursement 
of the United States public domain); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836-1915 (1964) 
(setting out in detail the massive, often illegal lumbering of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries); ROY M. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1776-
1936 (1950) (providing a history of the development from disbursement to retention and 
regulation of the public domain as a story of rationality and progress, albeit fraught with 
politics); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST (1985) (providing a history of Western water policy joined with a 
Marxian-informed account of the power relations attendant on irrigation systems). 
35.  The most impressive of this work is William Cronon’s. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN 
THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (Hill & Wang rev. ed. 
2003) (1983) (describing as ecological practices the Anglo settler and Native American forms 
of life that coexisted in early New England); WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: 
CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST (1991) (setting out the development of a commodity 
economy in the Midwest, with Chicago as its epicenter, as a history of economic systems, 
interests, and ideas). What I do not find in Cronon is a focus on the self-interpretation of 
democratic communities in relation to nature. In that respect, my interests are 
complementary to and, I hope, in the spirit of his. Some more popular but very interesting 
and influential work has taken its cue from Cronon in combining systems theory with 
accounts of culture. See, e.g., JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL 
OR SUCCEED (2005) (providing an account of ecological catastrophe and the conditions for 
averting it in light of both natural systems and cultural judgments); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE 
OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS (2006) (describing food-
production systems and the relation to ideas of food’s purpose and cultural role). Other 
environmental histories have adopted a subaltern concern with the experiences and 
perspectives of those omitted from “traditional” history and often the objects, rather than 
the authors, of environmental management schemes. See, e.g., RAMACHANDRA GUHA, THE 
UNQUIET WOODS: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PEASANT RESISTANCE IN THE HIMALAYA (Univ. 
of Cal. Press expanded ed. 2000) (1989) (describing the political lives and activity of local 
dwellers in the face of harvesting from outside their communities); KARL JACOBY, CRIMES 
AGAINST NATURE: SQUATTERS, POACHERS, THIEVES, AND THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN CONSERVATION (2001) (describing the experiences and perspectives of local 
populations in the Adirondack State Park, Yellowstone National Park, and the Grand 
Canyon). A final class of work treats subaltern environmental history in connection with a 
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This Article sets environmental ideas within democratic self-interpretation 
and action, through two interwoven inquiries. It first asks how environmental 
public language emerges and changes. How have new claims about the value of 
the natural world become intelligible, even authoritative, as parts of a public 
vocabulary? Some of the answer lies in the activity of social movements, some 
in the language of politicians, and some in relatively rarefied domains such as 
literature, spirituality, and science. These rarefied innovations, however, enter 
public language only when social movements and political leaders seize and 
develop them for political persuasion. The intelligibility and authority of 
environmental public language depend on the activity of a democratic 
community. 
Two broad patterns emerge. In one, advocates anchor their arguments in 
an existing or emergent public vocabulary. One such anchor was the 
Progressive ideal of expert management, which was closely tied to the advent 
of permanent resource-management regimes for federal public lands, most 
notably in the National Forests. Another was the perception of technology-
driven crisis, even apocalyptic threat, which helped to inspire the 
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Even in these cases, 
environmental language did more than take the shape of an existing 
conversation. Rather, those who found new ways to articulate environmental 
values contributed to the development of the larger public language of their 
times, making the American relation to the natural world a paradigm of 
broader themes. 
In the other pattern, environmental disputes have added new kinds of 
values to public argument. National parks and wilderness reserves exist in part 
because their advocates developed arguments that certain kinds of aesthetic 
and spiritual experience were uniquely available in spectacular natural settings. 
Romantic and Transcendentalist aesthetics formed a backdrop to these ideas, 
but a new kind of personal encounter with nature became a premise of public 
vocabulary, available for claims on editorial pages, in sermons and public 
hearings, and on the floor of Congress, through the labor of popularizing 
innovators, notably John Muir, and, especially, social-movement practitioners 
of the new language, such as the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society. 
 
critique of modernity as characterized by an imperializing form of instrumental reason and 
hyper-rational technocracy. See, e.g., CAROLYN MERCHANT, ECOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS: 
NATURE, GENDER, AND SCIENCE IN NEW ENGLAND (1989) (arguing that early New England 
settlers enjoyed a relatively ecologically minded, precapitalist relation to the natural world, 
which gave way in time to a market-driven instrumental attitude); JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING 
LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 
11-24 (1998) (describing nineteenth-century “scientific forestry” as an instance of “high 
modern” aesthetics and management). 
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Now it is time to begin somewhere near, if not at, the beginning.36 
A. Early Attitudes 
In 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville perplexed his hosts on the Michigan frontier 
when he asked to see the primeval American forest, not to find acreage for 
timber or land speculation, but to admire an untamed landscape.37 Tocqueville 
wrote, 
To break through almost impenetrable forests, to cross deep rivers, to 
brave pestilential marshes . . . those are exertions that the American 
readily contemplates, if it is a question of earning a guinea; for that is 
the point. But that one should do such things from curiosity is more 
than his mind can take in.38 
 
36.  The discussion that immediately follows is by no means a comprehensive history of 
environmental attitudes before the middle and later decades of the nineteenth century. It is 
most importantly bounded by its exclusive treatment of American and public environmental 
language. Outside the United States, considerable national forest conservation had 
developed in Europe and imperial government in the Caribbean and regions of India had 
produced policies that resembled later domestic conservation legislation. See RICHARD H. 
GROVE, GREEN IMPERIALISM: COLONIAL EXPANSION, TROPICAL ISLAND EDENS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM, 1600-1860, at 168-216 (1995) (describing French colonial 
conservation ideologies and policies in the Caribbean); id. at 380-473 (describing British 
colonial conservation ideologies and policies in India); JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 
337-40 (1901) (surveying national forest regulation in Europe, Japan, and colonial India). 
Outside the political and legal core of public language, Americans took part in the Romantic 
culture of their time, embracing literary declarations of admiration for wild forests and 
sublime landscapes, which often had a fraught connection with the dominant public 
commitment to exploitation and material progress. See HANS HUTH, NATURE AND THE 
AMERICAN: THREE CENTURIES OF CHANGING ATTITUDES 14-29 (1957) (describing the 
Romantic appreciation of nature that some scientists and explorers brought to the American 
landscape in the early nineteenth century); id. at 30-53 (discussing the development of 
Romantic imagery in American landscape art); Angela Miller, The Fate of Wilderness in 
American Landscape Art: The Dilemmas of “Nature’s Nation,” in AMERICAN WILDERNESS: A 
NEW HISTORY 91 (Michael Lewis ed., 2007) (discussing the development of American 
images of wild sublimity). The domestic cultural developments, in particular, belong in any 
thorough history of the backdrop on which Romantic conservationism eventually drew: my 
discussion of the literary and theoretical sources of Romantic nature aesthetics is, I think, 
accurate, but partial. Tocqueville’s frontier anecdote is, of course, not strictly an account of 
public language in the sense this Article addresses. It is here because it was too entertaining 
to exclude. 
37.  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 335 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 
1962) (1959). 
38.  Id. 
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1. The Imperative of Use 
Tocqueville’s frontiersmen may have been indifferent to the aesthetic 
merits of the frontier, but they were intensely attuned to its economic value. 
The belief he attributed to them, that land exists for economically productive 
use, found exemplary expression in congressional debates over forest 
management on federal land. Early Secretaries of the Interior tried to assert 
control over massive timber pirating, an effort which culminated in the 
creation of the National Forest system in 1890. Thrown on the defensive, 
traditionalists indignantly rallied around the rights of individual settlers to 
extract resources from the public lands. In doing so, they set out the basic 
terms of their worldview. 
In 1878, Interior Secretary Carl Schurz invoked an 1831 statute, originally 
intended to ensure the Navy’s shipbuilding wood supply, to stop unauthorized 
timbering on federal land.39 The hostile comments of several senators 
presented a conceptual and rhetorical map of the then-prevalent ideology of 
resource use.40 They aligned clearing and using land with inviolable human 
rights, invoking the Declaration of Independence—always ready at hand when 
nineteenth-century Americans wanted to accuse government of tyranny—
which in its bill of particulars had complained of the 1763 prohibition on 
settlement west of the Alleghenies.41 They argued that timbering was a 
traditional prerogative of settlers and that equitable treatment required 
granting Western settlers the same privileges earlier pioneers had enjoyed on 
Midwestern public lands.42 They further claimed that settlers had earned the 
right to timber by embracing the risks and burdens of developing the West.43 
Finally, they insisted that commercial-scale timbering was practically necessary 
to develop the Western economy; otherwise, each settler household would 
 
39.  See GATES, supra note 34, at 531-61. 
40.  7 CONG. REC. 1719-23, 1861-69 (1878).  
41.  Id. at 1722 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (“I know nothing in the world to parallel it except that 
great assertion in our immortal Declaration of Independence that the King of England ‘has 
erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, 
and eat out their substance.’”). 
42.  Id. (statement of Sen. Teller) (“I claim that nothing is demanded by the people in the 
Territories now that has not been conceded to all settlers in the new Territories.”). 
43.  See id. at 1721 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (“[I]t is a thing which has been conceded by the 
Government, that the hardy pioneer who goes forth and bears the flag of civilization onward 
against difficulties and through dangers that appal stout hearts . . . shall have the air and the 
water and the wood . . . .”). 
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remain in primitive autarky.44 Various senators also denounced restrictions on 
timbering as “spoliation” and “robbery of the poor”;45 as driving settlers into 
“barbarism”;46 and as “depopulat[ing]” the Western lands.47 
To some degree, these arguments were ideological cover for powerful 
interests that had little to do with small settlers. Schurz aimed his enforcement 
at large timber operations, which often claimed timber through fraudulent 
homesteading claims.48 The arguments, though, reveal a good deal about what 
counted as legitimate resource use. By calling on the Declaration of 
Independence, senators linked free citizenship with access to open lands and 
forests: restricting the settlers would make them second-class citizens, as 
American Revolutionaries had claimed that royal and parliamentary 
interference turned them from free subjects into slaves.49 This resource-use 
ideology paralleled contemporary developments in the antimonopoly, open-
market agendas of Jacksonian and Free Labor partisans, for whom free 
participation in markets, including developing open land, was a key mark of 
citizenship.50 Adherents of all these positions contrasted open markets with 
monopolies that favored the politically connected. 
The then-dominant idea of the public domain took the shape of these ideas. 
Public lands were envisioned as being held in trust for use by, and prompt 
disbursement to, the citizens who had the only ultimate and just claim to them. 
In this view, if the federal government retained public lands, it set itself up as 
that bête noire of the era, a monopolist—the worst kind, because it was both 
creator and beneficiary of the monopoly.51 Today’s idea of the public domain as 
permanently reserved federal lands, managed (ideally) in the public interest, is 
 
44.  See id. at 1861 (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
45.  Id. at 1865 (statement of Sen. Eustis). 
46.  Id. at 1867 (statement of Sen. Sargent). 
47.  Id. 
48.  See GATES, supra note 34, at 531-61 (setting out the history of unauthorized timbering on 
public lands). 
49.  See generally AZIZ RANA, FREEDOM WITHOUT EMPIRE: THE PARADOX OF AMERICA’S SETTLER 
LEGACY (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that the Revolutionary American polity rested on an 
ideal of the equality of each male citizen that implied brutal exclusion of racial and religious 
outsiders and exploitation of natural resources). 
50.  See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11-18, 27-29 (1970) (setting forth these ideas). 
51.  See 7 CONG. REC. at 1869 (statement of Sen. Teller) (denying that “there is any law . . . that 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to turn himself into a wood-peddler and to peddle 
out the timber from the public domain”). 
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very nearly the opposite of what these nineteenth-century senators would have 
meant by the term.52 
2. A Limited Exception: “Curiosities and Wonders” in the Early Parks 
An exemplary exception highlights the rule. Congressional discussion of 
Yellowstone National Park, established in 1872, and the 1864 Congressional 
grant of Yosemite Valley to California “for public use, resort, and recreation”53 
involved places that are today’s paradigms of public-minded preservation. In 
the nineteenth-century debates, even defenders of the parks treated them as 
anomalies in a general practice of use and disbursement, and the aesthetic value 
they associated with the parks was much narrower than Romantic ideas. In an 
1883 debate over administration and funding of Yellowstone,54 the threshold 
issue was whether any portion of federal public lands should remain in 
government hands. Senator Ingalls of Kansas argued that the government 
should retain none, insisting, “The best thing that the Government could do 
with the Yellowstone National Park is to survey it and sell it as other public 
lands are sold.”55 Ingalls’s position was a representative fragment of the general 
view that government’s role was to disburse public lands to citizens and 
corporations that would use them productively. 
That view deeply constrained arguments for parks conservation. Senators 
defending the parks described them as bizarre and wondrous, without the 
spiritualized conception of nature that later defined the very concept of 
national parks. Defending Yellowstone, Senator Vest of Missouri sounded 
what could seem, to a carelessly anachronistic eye, a twenty-first century 
argument. The Park was “the great wonder-land of the world,” a “great 
breathing-place for the national lungs,” and a dignifying national project, a 
“republican park” on par with the royal parks of Europe, “free to the people of 
the States, with these great curiosities that exist nowhere else.”56 This appears 
on its face to be the Romantic aesthetic of morally educative nature, John Muir 
 
52.  The narrow exception was that class of semipublic goods traditionally governed by the 
public trust doctrine. That the doctrine in some instances became a principle of 
environmental management in the twentieth century is an ironic development. For an 
introduction to this issue, see DAVID C. SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE & JANE K. STAHL, PUTTING 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2d ed. 1997). 
53.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2300 (1864). 
54.  In its early years, Yellowstone was the scene of poaching massacres and general lawlessness, 
and federal troops oversaw the park for some time. See JACOBY, supra note 35, at 121-46. 
55.  14 CONG. REC. 3488 (1883). 
56.  Id. 
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slightly avant la lettre. A bit earlier in the debate, however, Vest had clarified 
just what he valued in Yellowstone. Addressing the call to dispose of the valley 
to private owners, he declared, “If I had control to-day of 5,000 acres of that 
park, the rest of it could be disposed of . . . . Nobody goes to that park to see 
any of it except the geysers and the falls and the Yellowstone Lake. Take those 
out and the rest of it is simply useless . . . mere leather and prunella.”57 The 
argument, then, was for preserving, and ensuring public access to, the most 
extraordinary features of the American landscape, but Vest’s emphasis on the 
freakishness of that landscape sets his terms, “wonders” and “curiosities,” in a 
revealing light. His Yellowstone was one part spa, two parts circus, and no part 
spiritualized nature. When Vest referred to Yellowstone’s geysers as “the most 
wonderful, the most singular of all the productions of nature upon this 
continent,”58 he intended a sense of the park’s significance that was quite 
compatible with Ingalls’s objection: “I do not understand myself what the 
necessity is for the Government entering into the show business in the 
Yellowstone National Park.”59 
The Senate’s brief discussion of the Yosemite grant to California also 
highlights both the primacy of nature’s use-value and the narrowness of 
aesthetic grounds for preservation. John Conness of California, defending the 
grant, argued that the acres at issue “are for all public purposes worthless, but  
. . . constitute, perhaps, some of the greatest wonders of the world.”60 The 
pairing of worthlessness and uniqueness highlights both the use-based 
meaning of “worth” and the sense in which “wonders” was meant. Conness 
went on to defend the grant with a description of the incredulity that a section 
from one of the valley’s giant sequoias had caused at the London World’s Fair, 
where “[t]he English who saw it declared it to be a Yankee invention, made 
from beginning to end.”61 It was the very oddness of the valley that made the 
special federal grant sui generis and thus compatible with the conventional 
program of privatizing the public domain for productive use. Conness insisted, 
“There is no parallel, and can be no parallel for this measure, for there is not  
. . . on earth just such a condition of things.”62 It was important that the grant 
be unique, for those who opposed reserving land in public hands were ready 
 
57.  Id. at 3487 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to casual Internet research, 
prunella provides an herbal cure for syphilis—an interesting glimpse into the mind of a 
nineteenth-century senator. 
58.  Id. at 3484. 
59.  Id. at 3488 (emphasis added). 
60.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2300 (1864). 
61.  Id. at 2301. 
62.  Id. 
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with Ingalls’s argument that federal administration of Yellowstone was an 
incubus, the demon-seed of bureaucratic management.63 
B. New Ways of Experiencing Nature: From Romantic Aesthetics to the Politics 
of Romanticism 
1. Background Innovations 
For all the instrumentalism of the senators who attacked Schurz’s 
enforcement actions, ideas of nature in mid-nineteenth-century America had 
already come far from the times of the first European settlement. William 
Bradford, governor of the Plymouth colony in many of its earliest years, 
famously described the new land as “a hideous and desolate wilderness” of 
“wild and savage hue.”64 Nearly two centuries later, in 1814, the young William 
Cullen Bryant made a Romantic declaration a world away from Bradford’s: 
“To him who in the love of Nature holds / Communion with her visible forms, 
she speaks / A various language . . . .”65 Bryant would later declare, “The groves 
were God’s first temples.”66 Such sentiments were something new in American 
life. They remained, however, literary delectations, not parts of the public 
language of persuasion and commitment. 
One Romantic innovation formed the conceptual watershed of a new 
public language: the concept of the sublime.67 Sublimity, as Edmund Burke 
described it, arose in response to enormous power, vast size, and profound 
 
63.  14 CONG. REC. 3488 (1883). 
64.  William Bradford, A Hideous and Desolate Wilderness, in ENVIRONMENT: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 282, 283 (Glenn Adelson et al. eds., 2008). It would be a 
mistake to understand Bradford’s view as simple abhorrence of wilderness, as some, notably 
Roderick Nash, have done. See NASH, supra note 33, at 23-25. Much more helpful is William 
Cronon’s recognition that wild nature was associated with biblical ideas of spiritual testing 
and sojourn, which tied into the idea of the settling of North American as a covenantal 
project. See Cronon, supra note 3, at 69-71. This Article essentially begins in the nineteenth 
century and does not engage these themes. 
65.  WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, Thanatopsis, in POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT 24, 
24 (1891). 
66.  WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, A Forest Hymn, in POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, 
supra note 65, at 87, 87. 
67.  As noted in an earlier footnote, a more complete account of the cultural background in 
which the concept of sublimity arose and became associated with particular American 
landscapes would treat the growth of landscape art in the same decades in which Thoreau 
and Emerson were active. See, e.g., HUTH, supra note 36, at 87-104 (describing this 
development); Miller, supra note 36 (same). 
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obscurity—whatever tended toward infinity.68 Arising from innate terror of 
death, it was literally overwhelming, a surrender of mental self-control to the 
power of encounter with nature’s extremes.69 Yet the sublime was, in its terror, 
“delightful,” a kind of recreational awe, an experience of one’s own impending 
obliteration without the dire consummation.70 Immanuel Kant turned Burke’s 
account to a different end, claiming that sublimity’s terror inspired the mind to 
resist panic, an exercise of rational will that provided a symbol of freedom, a 
hint of the noumenal will by which rational beings could choose and legislate 
for themselves.71 Sublimity was edifying because it excited instinctual terror 
but, at the same time, inspired rational freedom. William Wordsworth 
sounded similar themes, describing sublime nature as both source and symbol 
of the potential sublimity of the mind.72 Vitality, moral knowledge, and a spirit 
of beneficence all coursed through nature. Access to them was concentrated in 
the most spectacular places, and to find the mutual consummation of those 
currents with the corresponding forces in one’s own mind “alone is genuine 
liberty: / . . . one perpetual progress smooth and bright . . . .”73 
In the United States, Ralph Waldo Emerson had proposed a view close to 
Kant’s and Wordsworth’s: the human mind and the natural world bodied 
forth the same organizing principles.74 To apprehend nature directly was to 
 
68.  See EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE 
SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL 70 (J. T. Boulton ed., Notre Dame Press 1968) (1757). 
69.  Burke described sublimity as “productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is 
capable of feeling,” the terror of death. Id. at 39-40. 
70.  Id. at 40 (“When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, 
and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may 
be, and they are delightful.”). 
71.  IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 109-14 (James Creed Meredith trans., 
Oxford, Clarendon Press 1952) (1790). 
72.  See WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Book Thirteenth: Imagination and Taste, How Impaired and 
Restored-(Concluded), in THE PRELUDE 484, 504 (Jonathan Wordsworth ed., Penguin Books 
1995) (1850) (“[T]he forms / Of Nature have a passion in themselves / That intermingles 
with the works of man / To which she summons him.”). In the philosophical summation of 
his early poetry, he drew particular attention to the Welsh peak Snowdon: “A deep and 
gloomy breathing-place through which / Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams / 
Innumerable, roaring with one voice!” WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Book Fourteenth: Conclusion 
[hereinafter WORDSWORTH, Book Fourteenth], in THE PRELUDE, supra, at 511, 512. In that 
sublime setting, “I beheld the emblem of a mind / That feeds upon infinity, that broods / 
Over the dark abyss, intent to hear . . . a mind sustained / By recognitions of transcendent 
power . . . .” Id. at 515. 
73.  WORDSWORTH, Book Fourteenth, supra note 72, at 517. 
74.  See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Nature, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON 3, 33 (Brooks Atkinson ed., Modern Library 2000) (“[S]pirit creates . . . behind 
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encounter one’s self in external form.75 That self-knowledge, in turn, enabled 
freedom of a certain sort: life governed only by the constraints indigenous to 
one’s own being.76 In Walden, Henry David Thoreau tried to perform what 
Emerson had urged, setting out a practice of attentiveness to nature’s places 
and processes as a path to self-awareness.77 
These literary and philosophical developments make up the backdrop from 
which John Muir’s popularizing innovations emerged as the lexicon of new 
social movements. All these figures helped to inaugurate and give voice to a 
mode of experience in which religious inspiration was relocated to the natural 
world and recast in terms both aesthetic and vitalist. The touchstone was visual 
and intellectual stimulus that embodied nature’s most vital forces and, in so 
doing, called forth corresponding forces in human observers. 
2. John Muir’s Popular Innovation 
John Muir, a widely influential popular writer and first president of the 
Sierra Club, was the individual most responsible for establishing this set of 
ideas in American public language. Muir, whose acolytes called him without 
 
nature, throughout nature, spirit is present; one and not compound it does not act on us 
from without . . . but spiritually, or through ourselves . . . . The world proceeds from the 
same spirit as the body of man. . . . We are as much strangers in nature as we are aliens from 
God.”). 
75.  See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The American Scholar [hereinafter EMERSON, The American 
Scholar], in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON, supra note 74, at 43, 45 
(“[T]o this schoolboy under the bending dome of day, is suggested that he and it proceed 
from one root; one is leaf and one is flower; relation, sympathy, stirring in every vein. And 
what is that root? Is it not the soul of his soul?”); EMERSON, supra note 74, at 33. (“[M]an 
has access to the entire mind of the Creator, is himself the creator in the finite.”). 
76.  See EMERSON, The American Scholar, supra note 75, at 54 (“[T]he definition of freedom, 
‘without any hindrance that does not arise out of his own constitution.’”); EMERSON, supra 
note 74, at 37-38 (“Man is the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by 
spirit. He filled nature with his overflowing currents. . . . The problem of restoring to the 
world original and eternal beauty is solved by the redemption of the soul. . . . The reason 
why the world lacks unity, and lies broken and in heaps, is because man is disunited with 
himself. He cannot be a naturalist until he satisfies all the demands of the spirit.”). 
77.  See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 149 (Brooks 
Atkinson ed., Modern Library 2000) (1854) (“When my hoe tinkled against the stones, that 
music echoed to the woods and the sky, and was an accompaniment to my labor which 
yielded an instant and immeasurable crop. It was no longer beans that I hoed, nor I that 
hoed beans.”); id. at 176 (“A lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature. It 
is the earth’s eye; looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature.”); 
id. at 290 (concluding upon careful examination of a bank of thawing soil that “[t]he earth 
is not a mere fragment of dead history . . . but living poetry”); id. at 300-12 (arguing that all 
knowledge of the world is only knowledge of one’s self, which is the great goal). 
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irony “John of the Mountains,” was not an innovator—he followed and 
somewhat bowdlerized Romanticism—nor was he a systematic thinker. His 
prose veers among theism, pantheism, and paganism, and between humanism 
and what later generations would come to call biocentrism. He sometimes 
seemed to join the utilitarianism of his intermittent ally, forester and 
conservationist Gifford Pinchot, while at other times he rejected that attitude to 
embrace incommensurable aesthetic or spiritual value in nature.78 His 
deliberate identification with Romantic traditions, however, is unmistakable, 
as is his effort to claim the cachet of the Romantic seer. Muir was schooled in 
the poetry of Wordsworth, to whose grave at Grasmere he made a pilgrimage 
in 1893.79 He sought to present himself as a successor to Emerson in the vein of 
American prophecy, describing the old Concord Transcendentalist as an 
exhausted force who must give way to the new Romanticism of the West.80 
For a man who did much to shape a new social movement, he held vague 
views on the great disputes of his time: labor, industrialism, imperialism, and 
race and gender relations.81 It may have been because of his vagueness, his 
susceptibility to many interpretations, that Muir could become symbol and 
muse of the first generation of American environmental politics. He wrote 
travel narratives which centered on verbal portraits of landscapes, particularly 
those of the Sierra Nevada, with which he grew indelibly identified even in his 
lifetime. At reliable intervals, the prose breaks into soaring evocations of 
delight and a sense of revelation in nature’s beauty. Despite lacking theological 
and metaphysical structure, these passages consistently conveyed a cluster of 
ideas that, together, made up the core perspective of Romantic conservation. 
Everyday life was spilled out in instrumental activity and drab settings, which 
left the eyes bleary and the mind blunt.82 In the most spectacular natural 
settings—mountain peaks, endless vistas, and sheer rock faces—something 
entirely different broke through in the mind. Previous Romantics would have 
 
78.  Muir often referred to animals as “animal people” to emphasize their equal standing with 
his own species, but he also accepted the near-extermination of the American bison as 
progress. See MUIR, supra note 36, at 16-17 (describing “animal people”); id. at 361-62. 
79.  See DONALD WORSTER, A PASSION FOR NATURE: THE LIFE OF JOHN MUIR 160-61, 336-37 
(2008). 
80.  See MUIR, supra note 36, at 131-36 (setting out Muir’s disappointment that the aged 
Emerson could not join him in the high mountains, suggesting that this represented the 
exhaustion of New England transcendentalism as a cultural force, and concluding with a 
recollection of his own visit to Emerson’s grave). 
81.  See WORSTER, supra note 79, at 276-332. 
82.  See, e.g., MUIR, supra note 36, at 1 (proposing outdoor recreation as a tonic for “tired, nerve-
shaken, over-civilized people . . . . [a]wakening from the stupefying effects of the vice of 
over-industry and the deadly apathy of luxury”). 
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called those places sublime, but the sensation Muir linked to them was free of 
the terror of earlier sublimes. Instead, it was a pure dose of wonder, awe, even 
ecstasy. This experience taught a moral lesson: it revealed that both world and 
mind were morally good, formed by harmonies that Muir frequently called 
“divine.” Encounters with nature’s most dramatic landscapes, Muir insisted, 
would restore the proper harmony and vitality of the mind and bring a feeling 
of fraternity with all living things.83 This idea rested on a belief that he shared 
with his literary predecessors, notably Emerson and Wordsworth, that a single, 
benign ordering principle underlay all reality and expressed itself in the 
patterns of both world and mind. 
The sensation was not new, of course, nor had it been altogether restricted 
to literary expression.84 Muir’s widely read books and magazine articles, 
though, provided something new: a manual for experience of a certain type. 
Muir’s writing enacted a journey on foot over extreme and spectacular 
landscapes; a precise, appreciative, even reverent way of seeing the land as one 
moved across it; and a register of overwhelming yet exquisite emotional 
response, with a benign moral interpretation already latent in it. To read Muir 
was to learn to make that experience your own. Muir’s greatest contribution to 
the Sierra Club, the social movement that brought Romantic accounts of 
nature fully into public language, was as publicist of a new type of back-
country tourism and a vocabulary to express its high points. 
3. A Romantic Social Movement: The Language of Experience in the Sierra 
Club 
Those who created the Sierra Club, as well as Muir’s admirers outside it, 
understood him as having inducted readers into a new experience of nature. In 
1916, William Frederic Badè, an archeologist and scholar of Near Eastern 
religion at Berkeley, wrote a typical passage in a memorial issue of the Sierra 
Club Bulletin following Muir’s death. Counting Muir among “prophets and 
interpreters of nature,” he forecast: “Thousands and thousands, hereafter, who 
 
83.  See id. at 74, 98-99 (promising readers “a multitude of still, small voices . . . directing you to 
look through all this transient, shifting show . . . into the truly substantial spiritual world” 
and “everything . . . hospitable and kind, as if planned for your pleasure, ministering to 
every want of body and soul”). For a summary of Muir’s thought, see WORSTER, supra note 
79, at 5-10, 99-102, 366-431. 
84.  In 1851, L.H. Bunnell, a member of a federal military mission to punish California Indians 
who had resisted the incursions of gold miners, reported of entering Yosemite Valley: “As I 
looked, a peculiar exalted sensation seemed to fill my whole being, and I found myself in 
tears with emotion.” ALLIN, supra note 34, at 25. 
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go to the mountains, streams and cañons of California will choose to see them 
through the eyes of John Muir, and they will see more deeply because they see 
with his eyes.”85 A year later, commenting on the posthumous appearance of a 
book drawn from his early journals, the New York Times reflected, “many who 
have sought a vision of truth beneath the surface of nature have found it 
through the eyes of John Muir.”86 Even Muir’s honorary doctorate of laws 
from the University of California picked him out as “uniquely gifted to 
interpret unto other men [nature’s] mind and ways.”87 
Those who adopted this view of nature made it the basis of a community 
and, eventually, a movement, in the Sierra Club. The Club was a crucible of 
public language, an early testing ground for a new way of describing the value 
of nature. Members used the Sierra Club Bulletin to develop and test this 
language. The Bulletin’s many accounts of journeys to the high Sierra echo 
Muir’s style and themes and set them—unlike Muir’s own, mostly solitary 
expeditions—within a mode of sociality defined by shared aesthetics. Marion 
Randall, an early and longtime member of the Club, wrote in 1905 that its 
expeditions restored participants for ordinary life by reconnecting them with 
morally educative beauty: 
For a little while [on an outing] you have dwelt close to the heart of 
things . . . . lived daylong amid the majesty of snowy ranges, and in the 
whispering silences of the forest you have thought to hear the voice of 
Him who “flies upon the wings of the wind.” And these things live with 
you . . . back in the working world, linger even until the growing year 
once more brings around the vacation days, and you are ready to turn 
to the hills again, whence comes, not only your help, but your strength, 
your inspiration.88 
An account of an ascent of Mount Lyell describes “[h]ours pass[ing] like 
moments” in “this sacred spot.”89 The worries and problems of everyday life in 
cities and suburbs fall away, and political division melts into childlike 
appreciation of the landscape. One group of college friends, by their own 
account ideological opponents in the low country (the author is a conservative 
 
85.  William Frederic Badè, To Higher Sierras, 10 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 38, 40 (1916-1919). 
86.  Notable Books in Brief Review: John Muir’s Account of His Historic Thousand-Mile Walk to the 
Gulf and Other Recent Publications, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1917, at BR 4. 
87.  John Muir, Doctor of Laws, University of California, 10 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 24 (1916-1919). 
88.  Marion Randall, Some Aspects of a Sierra Club Outing, 5 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 221, 227-28 
(1904-1905). 
89.  Helen M. Gompertz, A Tramp to Mt. Lyell, 1 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 136, 141 (1893-1896). 
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congressional representative, one companion a sort of socialist), find that in the 
high Sierra “[t]he varnish of civilization was rubbed off, and the true strata of 
individual organism developed. . . . We . . . learned to interpret and love the 
‘various language’ in which nature speaks to the children of men. . . . We were 
acolytes in the grand temple of the eternal.”90 
The Sierra Club’s correspondents propagated a mode of experience and a 
language to match it. The articles were also guides for outdoor spiritual 
seekers, with detailed descriptions of routes, seasons, and appropriate gear. 
Aesthetic rapture became a familiar stage of the journey across spectacular 
landscapes. Drawing on Muir’s language, the movement inaugurated a way of 
experiencing the natural world, as well as a public language expressing that 
experience. The words in which they addressed one another both reinforced 
the shared experience and trained others to feel it themselves. 
C. The New Conservation Politics: Romantics and Progressives 
1. The Sierra Club, Conservation, and “Materialism” 
Elite, professional, and middle-class reformers of the late nineteenth 
century, often labeled “Progressives,” argued that the citizens of industrial, 
democratic America had grown narrowly selfish, debasing themselves and the 
nation.91 They condemned the spoils-driven and often corrupt politics of the 
 
90.  John R. Glascock, A California Outing, 1 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 147, 161 (1893-1896). 
91.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., A Soldier’s Faith, Address at Harvard University 
Graduation (May 30, 1895), reprinted in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 56 (1934) 
(lamenting the rise of materialism over heroic values); William James, The Moral Equivalent 
of War, in MEMORIES AND STUDIES 265 (1924) (praising heroic and warrior-like forms of 
motivation and declaring mere comfort and convenience intolerable as social goals); 
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, Speech at Osawatomie (Aug. 31, 1910) 
[hereinafter Roosevelt, The New Nationalism], reprinted in THE NEW NATIONALISM 3 (1910) 
(arguing that the country needed a new civic spirit); Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous 
Life, Speech before the Hamilton Club (Apr. 10, 1899) [hereinafter Roosevelt, The 
Strenuous Life], reprinted in THE STRENUOUS LIFE: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 1 (1902) 
(warning that selfishness and lassitude threatened to sink the country into severe decline). It 
seems clear that at least some of this criticism reflected the reformist constituencies’ decline 
in civic and economic status and their wish to create a culture in which their values and 
cultural characteristics, their “refinement,” would attract respect. That is not to say, of 
course, that their reformist program was insincere, only that it expressed a complex 
interplay of interests and ideas, in which distinctions between the classes of motivation 
could only be approximate, as status-based interests made certain principles attractive, and 
those principles in turn helped constitute and reinforce status-based interests by articulating 
and justifying them. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYANT TO 
F.D.R. 131-72 (1955) (on status politics and the origins of progressive ideas). 
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post-Civil War era and, in private life, what they saw as wasteful and 
exploitative individualism.92 Progressives called for higher purposes in politics 
and in life generally.93 They hoped to cultivate such purposes by elevating “the 
public interest,” as distinct from individual, class, or sectional interests, and 
designating national government, especially the executive branch, the special 
servant of that interest.94 They regarded the expertise of professionals and 
scientists as particularly suited to the impersonal pursuit of public interest.95 
These ideas were in part responses to the complexity of increasingly urban 
and industrial society, in which issues such as public health and the terms and 
conditions of employment invited systemic understanding and expert 
regulation.96 Indeed, some Progressives adopted public-lands management as 
 
92.  See GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (1910); Roosevelt, The New 
Nationalism, supra note 91. For more general introductions to the development, see SAMUEL 
P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION 
MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1979), which connects an account of Progressive commitments to 
natural resource regulation; HOFSTADTER, supra note 91, which argues in particular for the 
importance of status anxiety among the motives of Progressives; MORTON KELLER, 
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-
1933 (1990) [hereinafter KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY], which surveys the motives 
and programmatic agendas of Progressives, with an emphasis on economic regulation; 
MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1994) [hereinafter KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY], which does 
the same; THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984), which uses portraits of 
Charles Francis Adams, Louis Brandeis, James Landis, and Alfred Kahn as touchstones in 
portraying the diversity and uniting concerns of Progressivism; and DANIEL T. RODGERS, 
ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998), which details the rise 
of Progressive thought with an emphasis on themes uniting British, Continental, and 
American reformers. 
93.  See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 469-
99 (1988) (describing the rise of reformism in the face of massive perceived and actual 
corruption). 
94.  See id. at 469-80 (discussing the rising idea of public interest); HAYS, supra note 92, at 261-
76 (discussing the role of conservation in the Progressive agenda of a regulatory national 
state); KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY, supra note 92, at 7-19 (discussing competing 
ideas of the nature of the industrial economy and the appropriate role of government in its 
management). 
95.  See, e.g., HAYS, supra note 92, at 261-76. 
96.  See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 109-35 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the role of 
public health activists in the development of the conservation movement); HAYS, supra note 
92, at 176 (noting that a conservation “committee of 100” composed of prominent 
individuals in 1908 proposed a federal public health program as part of its agenda, and that 
the National Conservation Congress in 1909 adopted as its purpose “to seek to overcome 
waste in all natural, human, or moral forces” (internal quotation marks omitted)); CHARLES 
R. VAN HISE, THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES 359-79 
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a paradigm of rational, expertise-driven state action in the public interest,97 
drawing on conservation scientists’ image of landscapes as complex systems, in 
which unregulated timber exploitation could cause erosion, downstream 
flooding, siltation, and forest collapse.98 Such new understandings of both 
social and natural problems helped make Progressive responses seem 
inevitable. 
The Progressives’ empirical view of problems found support in their ideals 
of character and society. Conservationist Gifford Pinchot, President Theodore 
Roosevelt, and their allies believed that laissez-faire ideas taught selfishness 
and sapped civic energies. They set out to cultivate civic commitment, urging 
Americans to serve one another and future generations. They insisted that civic 
duty could be satisfying and dignifying, not an unwelcome burden.99 The 
empirical and social-vision elements of Progressivism combined to support a 
 
(1910) (arguing for public-health measures, protective labor law, and eugenics as aspects of 
“the conservation of man”); Declaration of Principles, North American Conservation 
Congress (Feb. 23, 1909), reprinted in VAN HISE, supra, app. 2, at 385-93 (presenting Gifford 
Pinchot’s organization’s “public health” first among its priorities, ahead of forests, waters, 
and “lands”). 
97.  See ANDREWS, supra note 96, at 136-38 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing conceptions of the public 
interest in the Progressive approach to conservation); HAYS, supra note 92, at 3-4, 122-27 
(noting the centrality of the idea of the public interest in Progressive reformers’ self-
understanding and criticizing historians for adopting the idea uncritically); MCCRAW, supra 
note 92, at 302-05 (describing reformers’ ideas of the goals of regulation and of the 
condition of an unregulated economy); RODGERS, supra note 92, at 1-93 (setting out the 
worldview of reformers); Gifford Pinchot, Prosperity, in AMERICAN EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL 
WRITING SINCE THOREAU 173, 173-80 (Bill McKibben ed., 2008) (arguing that appropriate 
regulation and management of natural resources is essential to stopping destructive 
exploitation by individual users and instead serving long-term national interest); Theodore 
Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1901) [hereinafter Roosevelt, First 
Annual Message], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29542 
(stressing throughout the mutual consistency of all legitimate interests in a properly 
regulated economy); Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, supra note 91 (arguing that both 
economic regulation and management of natural resources must favor the public interest, 
not special interests, to secure progress and avert social conflict). 
98.  See GATES, supra note 34, at 548-49 (discussing early American ecologist George Perkins 
Marsh’s influence); HAYS, supra note 92, at 5-26 (noting growing understanding of the 
relation between forest conservation and flood control); GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND 
NATURE (David Lowenthal ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (1864) (setting out complex 
effects of ecological interdependence). 
99.  See VAN HISE, supra note 96, at 378-79 (arguing that conservationism implies, and requires, 
putting the long-term success of humanity over one’s own interests); James, supra note 91 
(arguing for the importance of a view to long-term shared interests as necessary to both 
conservation and national success); Pinchot, supra note 97, at 179-80 (same); Roosevelt, 
The New Nationalism, supra note 91 (arguing for the importance and value of civic spirit); 
Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, supra note 91 (same). 
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new idea of the public domain, as a permanent reserve of publicly managed 
federal land. Expert public management seemed both practically necessary to 
avoid waste and normatively appropriate as an exemplary act of government on 
behalf of the whole community.100 
The early Sierra Club, with its largely professional and elite membership, 
was in part a branch of Progressive culture. The Club’s members defined the 
aesthetic and spiritual values of nature by contrast with “materialism,” which 
they joined other Progressives in denouncing. In a memorial for Muir, William 
Colby, the Club’s first secretary, warned that “Muir will never be fully 
appreciated by those whose minds are filled with money getting and the sordid 
things of modern every-day life” and lamented the indifference of “those . . . 
engaged in making everything within reach ‘dollarable.’”101 Robert Underwood 
Johnson, editor of the Progressive Century magazine, opened his memorial to 
Muir by predicting, “Sometime, in the evolution of America, we shall throw off 
the two shackles that retard our progress as an artistic nation—philistinism and 
commercialism—and advance with freedom toward the love of beauty as a 
principle.”102 He forecast that Muir would be recognized as a prophet of that 
transformation. 
The Bulletin suggests that the Club’s members saw their high-minded 
dissent from “materialism” as essentially linked to the conservation politics that 
they pursued alongside their recreation. The minutes of an 1895 Club meeting 
set out a revealing discussion of the path-breaking proposal to create 
permanent national forests. Joseph Le Conte—Sierra explorer and Berkeley 
professor of geology—opened the meeting with an attack on “individualism . . . 
run mad.”103 He accused “individualism[’s]” adherents of reducing all social 
endeavor to selfishness, “the maxim . . . that society and the government are 
made for the greatest good of the greatest number. True; but the greatest 
 
100.  See HAYS, supra note 92, at 122-25 (arguing that by 1908, “the threads of resource policy had 
become interwoven in a single coherent approach,” an ideal “new world which conscious 
purpose, science, and human reason could create out of the chaos of a laissez-faire 
economy,” ushering in “[t]he Millennium . . . when humanity shall have learned to 
eliminate all useless waste. . . . to apply the common sense and scientific rules of efficiency to 
the care of body and mind and the labors of body and mind” as well as to the natural world 
(internal quotations omitted)); Pinchot, supra note 97, at 173-75 (arguing that “the real 
future of the Nation” depends on overcoming “waste in use” of all resources, natural and 
human). 
101.  William E. Colby, John Muir—President of the Sierra Club, 10 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 2, 2-3 
(1916). 
102.  Robert Underwood Johnson, John Muir as I Knew Him, 10 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 9, 9 (1916). 
103.  Joseph Le Conte, The National Parks and Forest Reservations, Address Before the Sierra 
Club (Nov. 23, 1895), in 1 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 270 (1896). 
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number is Number One!”104 This logical slide from utilitarianism to egoism 
expressed the ambivalence many Progressives, including early conservationists, 
felt about the utilitarian account of social life. On the one hand, they did not 
call it false: its axioms, that human interest was the compass of public policy 
and that each person must count alike, were the cornerstones of principled 
reformism and bulwarks against both traditional aristocracy and corrupt 
democracy. On the other, they doubted that utilitarian values could be self-
sustaining. Without some higher civic or spiritual motive, placing human 
interests at the center of the moral calculus would invite unchecked selfishness. 
For this reason, Club members believed, enlightened public policy 
depended on the personal enlightenment that they cultivated in their journeys 
to the High Sierra. Le Conte argued, “If we compare the cultured man with the 
uncultured man . . . the most striking difference” is that “the uncultured man is 
trying to live for the interests of the ‘now,’ but the cultured man—and in 
proportion as he is cultured—looks to the future as well as to the present.”105 Le 
Conte identified this “cultured” outlook with recognition that individuals are 
part of a “social organism” that ties persons together across space and time, a 
central Progressive idea.106 He concluded with a paean to scientific 
management: “[N]othing can save our timber land except complete reservation 
by the Government. Every particle of it that is yet left should be reserved . . . 
and used in a thoroughly rational way for legitimate uses only . . . removing 
only such as can be steadily replaced by fresh growth.”107 
This path to expert management, as well as the utilitarian rationality that 
justified and guided it, ran through the moral and aesthetic revival that the 
Club’s members sought among themselves and throughout society.108 
 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Pinchot and other utilitarian reformers of the time also emphasized that conservationist 
public policy stood or fell with citizens’ commitment to the health and prosperity of future 
generations in the same polity. See Pinchot, supra note 97, at 173 (“This [marvelous] 
hopefulness of the American is, however, as short-sighted as it is intense.”); id. at 179-80 
(“The vast possibilities of our great future will become realities only if we make ourselves, in 
a sense, responsible for that future.”); see also VAN HISE, supra note 96, at 379 
(“Conservation means the greatest good to the greatest number—and that for the longest 
time.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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2. Conservation and the New Nationalism 
Conservation ideas were central to one of the major Progressive programs, 
Theodore Roosevelt’s “new nationalism.” Aimed at both moral and 
institutional reform, Roosevelt’s project treated conservation as both a master-
metaphor for wise governance and as a source of concrete policies for civic 
improvement. Roosevelt shared a worry with figures as various as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and William James: that the achievements of modern life—
security and prosperity—would erode the qualities of character that made such 
achievements possible in the first place. These included initiative, heroism, 
self-sacrifice, and a taste for danger and adventure.109 Roosevelt believed that a 
society without these qualities would be demeaned, and he warned against a 
future of petty self-seeking and lassitude, in which the American nation would 
“rot by inches, [like China].”110 He called for reinvigorated patriotism as a 
response to this decline and a solution to conflict between economic classes, 
which Roosevelt believed materialistic self-seeking promoted.111 He warned 
that if such conflict prevailed, “tyranny and anarchy were sure to alternate” in a 
collapsed republic.112 Much like the Sierra Club’s mainly elite members, 
Roosevelt believed that utilitarian public policy was not self-sustaining but 
required support from the virtues of patriotism, boldness, and initiative. 
Roosevelt devoted much attention to fostering these civic virtues. Several of 
his favored approaches centered on public lands. One was to promote shared 
cynosures of national imagination, projects and ideas that would make 
American identity stronger than sectional, class, or religious alternatives. This 
idea formed the heart of the patriotic “new nationalism.” Roosevelt sometimes 
 
109.  Holmes, supra note 91 (arguing that spiritual poverty was the result of a world of self-
interest and prudence, without heroic acts of devotion and sacrifice); James, supra note 91 
(arguing both versions—that a lack of heroic commitment is spiritually impoverishing and 
bad for the polity as a practical matter, while seeking to make the arguments compatible 
with pacifist reformism); Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, supra note 91 (arguing that the 
country would decline, not least in the virility of its men and fertility of its women, if its 
self-interested citizens put their own concerns over national well-being and greatness). 
110.  Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, supra note 91, at 6. 
111.  See Theodore Roosevelt, Fellow-Feeling as a Political Factor, CENTURY, Jan. 1900, reprinted in 
THE STRENUOUS LIFE: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 65, 74-75 (“[M]en are pitted 
against one another in accordance with the blind and selfish interests of the moment. Each 
is thus placed over against his neighbor in an attitude of greedy class hostility, which 
becomes the mainspring of his conduct, instead of each basing his political action upon . . . 
his own disinterested sense of devotion to the interests of the whole community as he sees 
them.”). 
112.  Id. at 75. 
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proposed that war113 and imperialism114 could be unifying national missions. 
Conservation could also unite a divided polity. Land management for the 
“public interest,” in contrast to the wishes of the extractive industries, was a 
visible act of commonality transcending faction.115 In other areas of policy, 
Roosevelt struggled mightily to portray Progressive regulation of the private 
economy as reconciling the interests of labor and capital in a higher public 
interest. The public lands seemed to present a far easier case. In declaring that 
“natural resources must be used for the benefit of all our people, and not 
monopolized for the benefit of the few,” Roosevelt could even call the ideal of 
reconciling economic interests in a regime of fair opportunity and fair reward, 
“a necessary result of the principle of conservation widely applied.”116 
Conservation was thus a set-piece of the ideal of a transcendent public interest 
pursued by national power, “set apart forever for the use and benefit of our 
people as a whole and not sacrificed to the short-sighted greed of a few.”117 
This thought seems to have motivated Roosevelt to declare, “Conservation is a 
great moral issue for it involves the patriotic duty of ensuring the safety and 
continuance of the nation.”118 
Second, Roosevelt aimed to create settings where Americans could mingle 
and share projects across class and other divisions, developing patriotic 
“fellow-feeling.”119 Forest reserves and parks created civic commons in which 
 
113.  Id. at 66 (“The war with Spain was the most absolutely righteous foreign war in which any 
nation has engaged during the nineteenth century, and not the least of its many good 
features was the unity it brought about between the sons of the men who wore the blue and 
of those who wore the gray.”). 
114.  Roosevelt praised “the mighty lift that thrills ‘stern men with empires in their brains’” and 
scorned those who “shrink from seeing us do our share of the world’s work, by bringing 
order out of chaos in the great, fair tropic islands from which the valor of our soldiers and 
sailors has driven the Spanish flag.” Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, supra note 91, at 7. 
115.  See HAYS, supra note 92, at 122-27 (setting out conservationists’ view that their program 
promoted a national interest in contrast to factional interests, such as those of capital and 
labor). 
116.  Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, supra note 91, at 21, 26. 
117.  Roosevelt, First Annual Message, supra note 97. 
118.  Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, supra note 91, at 22. 
119.  Roosevelt said, 
The only way to avoid the growth of these evils is, so far as may be, to help in the 
creation of conditions which will permit mutual understanding and fellow-feeling 
between the members of the different classes. . . . if the men can be mixed 
together in some way that will loosen the class or caste bonds and put each on his 
merits as an individual man, there is certain to be a regrouping independent of 
caste lines. 
Roosevelt, supra note 111, at 79-80. Even more important, 
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Americans could escape the class segregation that Roosevelt feared was 
especially pervasive in urban and industrial America120: they provided “free 
camping grounds for the ever-increasing numbers of men and women who 
have learned to find rest, health, and recreation in the splendid forests and 
flower-clad meadows of our mountains.”121 
A third policy was to encourage vigorous character, the kind that would 
embrace challenge and overcome enervation and selfishness. Ways of making 
Americans vigorous ranged from spirit-rallying national projects to raising 
children (always “boys” for Roosevelt) into brave and energetic citizens.122 
Open lands were the ideal training ground for the masculine virtues that 
Roosevelt set against the lassitude that he associated with industrial-era 
democracy. He had remade himself as an adult to his own satisfaction by 
adventuring and ranching in the Dakotas, and he saw the greatest prospect for 
“a good American man” in “boys who live under such fortunate conditions that 
they have to do either a good deal of outdoor work or a good deal of what 
 
men who work together for the achievement of a common result in which they 
are intensely interested are very soon certain to disregard, and, indeed, to forget, 
the creed or race origin or antecedent social standing or class occupation of the 
man who is either their friend or their foe. They get down to the naked bed-rock 
of character and capacity. 
Id. at 81. 
120.  [In] the larger cities . . . the conditions of life are so complicated that there has 
been an extreme differentiation and specialization in every species of occupation, 
whether of business or pleasure. The people of a certain degree of wealth and of a 
certain occupation may never come into any real contact with the people of 
another occupation, of another social standing. . . . This produces the thoroughly 
unhealthy belief that it is for the interest of one class as against another to have its 
class representatives dominant in public life. 
Id. at 78. 
121.  Id. 
122.  In public writing and addresses, Roosevelt urged American parents to raise rugged and 
virtuous men. “If you are rich and are worth your salt, you will teach your sons that though 
they may have leisure, it is not to be spent in idleness . . . .” Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, 
supra note 91. 
Of course, what we have a right to expect of the American boy is that he shall turn 
out to be a good American man. . . . He must not be a coward or a weakling, a 
bully, a shirk, or a prig. He must work hard and play hard. He must be clean-
minded and clean-lived, and able to hold his own under all circumstances and 
against all comers. It is only on these conditions that he will grow into the kind of 
American man of whom America can be really proud. 
Theodore Roosevelt, What We Can Expect of the American Boy, ST. NICHOLAS: AN 
ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE FOR YOUNG FOLKS, May 1900, at 571, 571 [hereinafter Roosevelt, 
What We Can Expect]. 
PURDY_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 4/27/2010 2:28:01 PM 
the politics of nature 
1159 
 
might be called natural outdoor play.”123 The best assurance that the strenuous 
life would remain available and attractive was to keep open lands where all 
Americans could test themselves against the elements. 
The strands of environmental public language that emerged in the Sierra 
Club and Roosevelt’s new nationalism were both like and unlike each other. 
Adherents to both rejected what they saw as the materialism, selfish 
individualism, and lack of high principle in American life at the close of the 
nineteenth century. They also shared an ambivalent relationship to utilitarian 
public policy, seeing it as on the one hand essential for conservation of public 
lands, but on the other hand deeply implicated in the same values they decried. 
Most pointedly, they saw utilitarian policy as unable to produce or sustain the 
commitments necessary for its own political viability—a view that was of a 
piece with their conviction that higher values were necessary to preserve and 
advance American nationhood. Both looked to the natural world, and the 
public lands in particular, as a source of those higher values. 
Here the two strands diverged. In Roosevelt’s nationalism, the American 
landscape contributed to a this-worldly project of civic virtue, promoting 
deeper engagement in the concrete projects of national life. In the language 
that Sierra Club members developed and propagated, encounters with the 
natural world freed the mind from transient, mundane entanglements in favor 
of the other-worldly indifference that was typical of Muir’s attitude to political 
reform outside his immediate concerns. The high-country pilgrim returned to 
work and city renewed, but the transformation ultimately sought was inward, 
and political engagement was mainly instrumental to preserving that 
possibility by preserving beautiful places. The new nationalism was spiritually 
conservative, basically instrumental in its view of nature, and enthusiastically 
engaged in the politics of institution building and reform. The Club’s way of 
meeting nature was spiritually radical, inclined to suggest that nature had 
noninstrumental value, and, outside of the specific problems of lands 
preservation, politically vague. The two approaches were unmistakably 
products of the same era and overlapping milieus. Roosevelt, a sometimes 
brilliant politician, sensed as much when he recruited Muir for a two-man 
Yosemite expedition, tying his own persona as a progressive civic prophet to 
that of the prophet of American nature.124 They produced, however, distinct 
ways for Americans to understand and dispute their relation to the natural 
world: as civic and utilitarian res publica and as a domesticated sublime, an 
accessible portion of divinity in an otherwise fallen world. 
 
123.  Roosevelt, What We Can Expect, supra note 122, at 572. 
124.  See WORSTER, supra note 79, at 276-331. 
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i i i .  wilderness:  from conservation to environmentalism 
The themes and episodes discussed in the last Part are conventionally 
described as “conservationist,” in contrast to the “environmentalism” that 
developed in the 1960s and inspired statutes such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act, Clean Air Act, and Clean Water Act.125 It is true that 
the 1960s brought a new set of themes to the heart of public engagement with 
the natural world: an “ecological” awareness of natural and human phenomena 
as pervasively interconnected; concern with the public-health effects of 
pollution; and an emphasis on the value of nature as such, not restricted to 
spectacular places or charismatic species.126 Because of its sudden appearance 
and novelty, some commentators have called environmentalism “a movement 
without a history,” a characterization that lends support to suspicion of 
superficiality and faddishness.127 Others aptly emphasize environmentalism’s 
roots in earlier public-health and good-government campaigns such as those of 
the League of Women Voters, but fail to account for its distinctiveness.128  
The argument of this Part is that the wilderness movement formed an 
essential and underappreciated bridge between the two eras. This network of 
outdoor enthusiasts and professional conservationists, centered in the 
Wilderness Society and including Aldo Leopold, author of A Sand County 
Almanac, worked mainly to preserve large tracts of undeveloped public land. In 
 
125.  See ANDREWS, supra note 96, at 201-26 (discussing “the rise of modern environmentalism” 
in the 1960s and 1970s, in contrast to earlier modes of conservation); SAMUEL P. HAYS, 
BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1955-1985, at 13-39 (1987) (detailing a transition “from conservation to environment”); cf. 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47-54 (2004) (noting the 
conventional contrast and arguing that the role of public-health activists in both movements 
forms a continuity that somewhat confounds the distinction). 
126.  See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 81-114 (1993) (locating the roots of modern political 
environmentalism in “the search for a new politics” of awareness and interconnection); 
HAYS, supra note 125, at 527-43 (discussing the transformation of new environmental 
values); SPETH, supra note 10, at 199-216 (arguing that this change represents the beginning 
of an unfinished revolution in human values). 
127.  GOTTLIEB, supra note 126, at 113 (“Ultimately, the environmental issue and the newly 
defined environmental movement was [sic] afforded instant recognition by a media 
suddenly discovering the issue for the first time. Environmentalism became a movement 
without a history, with an amorphous social base . . . .”). But see LAZARUS, supra note 125, at 
49 (contesting the claim, but on thinner grounds than argued for in this Article). 
128.  See LAZARUS, supra note 125, at 49-52. On the League of Women Voters in particular, see 
LOUISE M. YOUNG, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, 1920-1970, at 
174-77 (1989) (detailing the League’s involvement in clean-water advocacy). 
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doing so, they shaped new arguments for the special value of that land and, in 
time, for the value of the natural world as such. Beginning as a purifying 
offshoot of public-lands efforts such as the Sierra Club’s, the Wilderness 
Society became an incubator of public language that entered the political 
mainstream in the 1960s, first in debates over wilderness preservation, then in 
the larger rise of environmentalism. Although by no means the whole story, its 
bridging role reveals some of environmentalism’s allegedly missing history and 
highlights the interaction of continuity and innovation in environmental 
language across the twentieth century. 
At the outset, wilderness advocates made arguments primarily from the 
point of view of utilitarian resource management and, awkwardly related, 
liberal perfectionism. The initial arguments they offered were essentially 
borrowed from those developed around national parks and other accessible 
recreational spaces: that they would invigorate the body and relieve the mind. 
But as these arguments came to seem like special pleading for elite tastes, or 
simply ill-suited to vindicating large tracts of inaccessible space, wilderness 
advocates began to develop new accounts of the moral significance and 
educative power of nature. Instead of another version of spectacular Yosemite, 
wilderness came to be a synecdoche for nature itself, in the full range of its 
processes. 
In this argument, nature invited a distinctive consciousness: neither the 
extreme spiritual elevation of the sublime nor the simple restfulness of the 
beautiful (aesthetic categories which Muir and others had confounded in their 
case for the parks),129 but ecological awareness, knowledge of one’s place in 
schemes of interconnection and interdependence. Although premised on a 
 
129.  Olmsted was of course well aware of the distinction and described Yosemite as representing 
a “union of the deepest sublimity with the deepest beauty of nature,” a claim he supported 
with descriptions of soaring cliffs and plunging waterfalls alongside gentle streams and 
meadows. See FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, THE YOSEMITE VALLEY AND THE MARIPOSA BIG 
TREE GROVE (1865), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL 
DOCUMENTS, at 12 (Larry M. Dilsaver ed., 1994). It is less clear whether Muir was in firm 
control of the theoretical distinction, but he made just the same sort of claims as Olmsted, 
writing of Yosemite that “[n]owhere will you see the majestic operations of nature more 
clearly revealed beside the frailest, most gentle and peaceful things,” MUIR, supra note 36, at 
78, and that, while “[n]early all the park is a profound solitude,” it was also “full of 
charming company . . . a place of peace and safety,” id. The radically benign and reassuring 
character of the aesthetic and emotional experience that Muir associated with nature makes 
it fair to say, I think, that he drew the sting of fear from sublimity. That spur of feeling was 
so essential to the founding accounts of the sublime that, if there is any integrity to those 
accounts, one might wonder whether Muir’s concern to divinize nature in a thoroughly 
human-friendly form did not leave it a feeble God. Perhaps it was this—the power of a wild 
experience to induce disruption, novelty, and fear—that wilderness advocates sought in their 
wild places, which Muir’s casual pilgrims could not enter. 
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physical and conceptual boundary between human and natural activity, 
wilderness came to stand for, and wilderness advocates pioneered the 
argument for, integration of ecological awareness into human consciousness. 
Much of the Wilderness Society’s early advocacy grew out of, and sought to 
continue, both Progressive and Romantic strands of earlier conservation 
efforts. Wilderness advocates ascribed to wild places many of the experiential 
values that Sierra Club members associated with the most spectacular 
landscapes. At the same time, they followed Progressives in seeking to integrate 
these values into a broadly utilitarian account of the preconditions of mental 
health and personal development in industrial modernity. This synthesis did 
not seem entirely satisfactory even to its proponents. By 1948, Leopold 
impatiently rejected utilitarian defenses of preservation as evasions that 
obscured the real commitments of the movement: the idea of nature’s intrinsic 
value and a human obligation to preserve it that went well beyond 
instrumental considerations.130 Debates memorialized in Living Wilderness, the 
journal of the Wilderness Society, suggest that Leopold’s judgment arose from 
a larger conversation about nature’s value and its place in public language. By 
1960, when the Wilderness Society was at the heart of the multi-year effort to 
write wilderness conservation into federal statutes (culminating in the 1964 
Wilderness Act), a view akin to Leopold’s had come to the fore. Advocates, 
including senators, emphasized the spiritual and aesthetic significance of wild 
nature, contending that knowledge of the undisturbed natural order had 
restorative power for a complex and confused society. The politics of 
wilderness incubated a view of nature’s importance that would come to the 
center of environmental language in the later 1960s and afterward. 
A. From Muir’s Wilderness to the Wilderness Society 
1. Thoreau’s Ambiguity and Muir’s Ambivalence 
John Muir’s 1901 classic, Our National Parks, was organized around two 
Sierra Club values that soon came to seem mutually contradictory: 
preservation of beautiful places and public access to them for recreation. The 
 
130.  See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 246 (Ballantine Books 1970) (1949) (“No 
important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our 
intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions.”); id. at 251 (“[A] system of 
conservation based solely on economic self-interest . . . tends to ignore, and thus eventually 
to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are 
(as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning.”). 
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book promised readers a “profound solitude . . . full of God’s thoughts,”131 and 
assured them that thanks to highways and railroads, “in a few minutes you will 
find yourself in the midst of . . . the best care-killing scenery on the 
continent.”132 Muir’s was already a house divided. 
There was always ambiguity in Thoreau’s “in wildness is the preservation 
of the world,”133 a phrase included in an essay concerned with a quality of mind 
and imagination available anywhere, and only symbolically connected with 
literal wilderness.134 Writing from Glacier Bay, Alaska, in 1890, Muir 
committed a semiplagiarizing equivocation that perfectly expressed the relation 
of his writing to Thoreau’s ideas: “In God’s wildness lies the hope of the 
world—the great fresh unblighted, unredeemed wilderness.”135 Muir and the 
movement of rugged aesthetes that followed him located Thoreau’s spiritual 
principle uniquely in the spectacular places of the natural world. In the opening 
passage of Our National Parks, Muir identified the insight of the age as this: 
 
131.  MUIR, supra note 36, at 78. 
132.  Id. at 17. Accessibility was a major theme of the book. Muir wrote, “All the Western 
mountains are still rich in wildness, and by means of good roads are being brought nearer 
civilization every year.” Id. at 2. He promised that the best destinations were “easily and 
quickly reached by the Great Northern Railroad,” id. at 17, and noted of Yosemite’s appeal 
that “it is . . . the most accessible portion” of the Sierra, connected to San Francisco by 
railways and roads that Muir listed for the tourist’s convenience, id. at 79. 
133.  HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walking, reprinted in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 
77, at 627, 644. 
134.  See id. at 644-63, in which Thoreau presents “the wild” as a literary principle associated 
with Shakespeare and Homer, id. at 649; as the pathos of mythology, id. at 649-51; as a 
principle of virtue (“all good things are wild and free”), id. at 652; as childlike playfulness, 
id. at 656; and as an epistemic principle connected with the revelation of one’s true nature 
by intuition and symbol rather than proposition claim, id. at 657. It seems unavoidable that 
in these passages, we are in the same terrain as the closing passages of Walden, HENRY 
DAVID THOREAU, Walden, reprinted in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITING, supra note 77, at 3, 
300-12, in which Thoreau makes clear his allegiance to the Transcendentalist principle that 
exploring the world is a way of exploring one’s self, and nature a master metaphor for 
consciousness, while both nature and conscious body put forth a universal design. On this 
principle, see the discussion of EMERSON, supra note 74. All this being said, Thoreau did call 
for the conservation of primitive forests in each New England town, a proposal that does 
not seem to have been metaphoric. See Henry David Thoreau, Huckleberries, in AMERICAN 
EARTH 26, 35 (Bill McKibbon ed., 2008) (“I think that each town should have a park, or 
rather a primitive forest, of five hundred or a thousand acres, either in one body or several—
where a stick should never be cut for fuel—nor for the navy, nor to make wagons, but stand 
and decay for higher uses—a common possession forever, for instruction and recreation.”). 
Thoreau wanted to preserve access to the symbol of a “wild” quality of mind that he 
believed inhered in relatively undisturbed natural areas. 
135.  WORSTER, supra note 79, at 319. 
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“that wildness is a necessity;”136 but his concern, far from Thoreau’s 
conception of wildness, was with the most dramatic landscapes.137 
Securing public opportunity to experience nature’s spectacular places was a 
major goal of parks management, an undertaking that seemed to unite 
Romantic goals with Progressive technique. In the 1920s, however, 
preservationists’ very success at persuading Americans of the value of 
encounters with nature seemed to threaten the future integrity, even the 
possibility, of those encounters. Wealth and mobility, especially the rise of the 
car, were creating a middle-class tourist culture eager to follow Muir’s trail and 
demanding roads to speed the journey. The National Park Service, alert to the 
benefits of increased budgets, was generally eager to comply.138 The perceived 
overcrowding and commercial degradation that followed inspired the founders 
of the Wilderness Society to advocate a new class of preservation: roadless 
lands, free of built structures, and substantially unaffected by human 
activity.139 
 
136.  MUIR, supra note 36, at 1. 
137.  Suggesting a capacity for subtler thought than his writings usually expressed, Muir paused 
to note, 
To the sane and free it will hardly seem necessary to cross the continent in search 
of wild beauty, however easy the way, for they find it in abundance wherever they 
chance to be. Like Thoreau they see forests in orchards and patches of huckleberry 
brush, and oceans in ponds and drops of dew. Few in these hot, dim, strenuous 
times are quite sane or free . . . . 
Id. at 2-3. 
138.  See ALLIN, supra note 34, at 60-68 (describing both growing tourist pressure on parks and 
interservice rivalry for funds and land); David Gerard, The Origins of the Federal Wilderness 
System, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 211 (Terry L. 
Anderson ed., 2000) (tracing the competition for funding between the National Parks 
Service and the Forest Service through the early and middle decades of the twentieth 
century). 
139.  As Bob Marshall, a founder and icon of the Wilderness Society, put it in 1930: 
I shall use the word wilderness to denote a region which contains no permanent 
inhabitants, possesses no possibility of conveyance by any mechanical means and 
is sufficiently spacious that a person in crossing it must have the experience of 
sleeping out. The dominant attributes of such an area are: first, that it requires 
any one who exists in it to depend exclusively on his own effort for survival; and 
second, that it preserves as nearly as possible the primitive environment. This 
means that all roads, power transportation and settlements are barred. But trails 
and temporary shelters, which were common long before the advent of the white 
race, are entirely permissible. 
Robert Marshall, The Problem of the Wilderness, 30 SCI. MONTHLY 141, 141 (1930). 
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2. The Wilderness Society and Its Early Arguments 
The organized response began in January 1935 with the creation of the 
Wilderness Society and, later in the year, the appearance of its journal, Living 
Wilderness.140 The Society’s platform defined wilderness as “the environment 
of solitude” and designated it “a natural mental resource . . . . a public utility  
. . . . [and] a human need rather than a luxury and plaything.”141 The value of 
solitude was distinct from, and sometimes incompatible with, the tourism that 
had come to define use of national parks: “scenery and solitude are intrinsically 
separate things . . . the motorist is entitled to his full share of scenery, but . . . 
motorway and solitude together constitute a contradiction” and car-accessible 
scenic areas, no matter how desirable, “should not be confused in mental 
conception or administration with those reserved for the wilderness.”142 Absent 
a clear definition and constituency, wilderness “is being sacrificed to the 
mechanical invasion in its various killing forms.”143 
Early efforts to establish wilderness as a viable category in public language 
were of a piece with conservationist precedents. Aldo Leopold, writing in early 
issues of Living Wilderness, described the wilderness idea as Muir had parks 
tourism: as an achievement of a mobile, prosperous, and scientific society. 
Unlike pioneers, he noted, “we can get in and out of [the wild],” making 
wilderness one of two terms in an “alternation of sociality and solitude.”144 
Early Wilderness Society arguments were attempts, perhaps paradoxical, to 
integrate the somewhat rarefied attachment to wild-lands solitude into the 
utilitarian vocabulary of public-lands management. What sort of “human 
need,” as the Society’s platform put it, did the “mental natural resource” of 
wilderness solitude answer, and was it really a general need, or the eccentricity 
of a particular class? Bob Marshall, who cofounded the Wilderness Society 
and, as the Forest Service’s Chief of the Division of Recreation and Lands, 
 
140.  The organization described itself as responding to “an emergency in conservation.” A 
Summons To Save the Wilderness, LIVING WILDERNESS, Sept. 1935, at 1. 
141.  Id. at 2. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Aldo Leopold, Wilderness Values, LIVING WILDERNESS, Mar. 1942, at 24-25. Leopold went on 
to call the “value inherent in contrasting environments . . . too obvious to need discussion” 
and to praise “the rich contrasts between wilderness and city life” in passages showing a 
basic embrace of the transient encounter with nature as especially valuable and restorative. 
Id. at 24. Leopold also noted that awareness of scarcity had increased appreciation of 
wilderness and argued that deepened scientific understanding of nature had the same effect: 
“we can (if we take the pains) perceive a little of its inner workings.” Id. 
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wrote the 1940 wilderness regulations that provided the operational foundation 
of the 1964 Wilderness Act, wrestled with these questions in a 1930 Scientific 
Monthly essay, The Problem of the Wilderness.145 The result is an unintended 
reductio of the conceit that the Wilderness Society was engaged in an essentially 
utilitarian enterprise. Marshall opened by paying obeisance to utilitarian 
management, proposing to “balanc[e] the total happiness” of preservation 
against that of development.146 He then offered a synopsis of wilderness values, 
sorting them into three sets: physical fitness and challenge, mental rest and 
restoration, and aesthetics.147 Marshall’s aesthetic category included sublimity 
and, above all, ravishment by beauty.148 The essay presents the civic values of 
Roosevelt, and the aesthetics of a Muir more intense and mystical than Muir 
himself, as ostensibly representing denominations of utilitarian currency. 
The problem was not really that the Wilderness Society lacked a neat 
utilitarian calculus, for that had been true of all conservation that went beyond 
economic considerations. The problem, rather, was political. As Marshall 
conceded, most Americans were unmoved by the strenuous solitude that 
wilderness devotees deemed uniquely important, and many lacked the health 
or means to travel on foot over wild lands.149 What could be the basis for a 
claim on millions of acres of public land by a fragment of a minority? The 
utilitarian argument was an attempt to get around this problem by way of an 
authoritative public policy discourse. In this vein, Marshall made two 
arguments: that wilderness devotees took an enormous quantum of 
satisfaction from their expeditions, swamping competing considerations; and, 
abandoning any consistent utilitarianism, that, at least in this case, government 
should provide the resources that a minority found necessary to fulfillment, on 
account of a general right to self-development and expression.150 
 
145.  Marshall, supra note 139. 
146.  Id. at 142. 
147.  Id. 
148.  The purely esthetic observer has for the moment forgotten his own soul; he has 
only one sensation left and that is exquisiteness. In the wilderness, with its entire 
freedom from the manifestations of human will, that perfect objectivity which is 
essential for pure esthetic rapture can probably be achieved more readily than 
among any other forms of beauty. 
Id. at 145. 
149.  See id. at 146. 
150.  “Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, that 
unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain 
their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral and esthetic stature 
of which their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance extend only to tastes 
and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents?” 
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These were unavailing utilitarian arguments. Indeed, they were not really 
utilitarian arguments at all. Behind both of Marshall’s claims lurked the 
argument that wilderness values were not just the pleasures of some, but higher 
satisfactions that deserved particular support. Candidly elitist expressions of 
the same attitude sometimes appeared in Living Wilderness.151 At the same time, 
however, the Wilderness Society became the center of an effort to go beyond 
both utilitarian tropes and elitism, toward a defense of wilderness with broader 
appeal. This aim pressed the Wilderness Society toward the question of how 
nature as such matters, or might. 
3. The Value of Nature as Such 
A self-questioning and experimental conversation within the wilderness 
society moved its arguments from vindicating the tastes of wilderness 
enthusiasts to making the case that nature as such was morally important and 
educative. A central figure in that conversation was Howard Zahniser, the 
longtime editor of Living Wilderness, whose importance in these developments 
has been eclipsed by the reputation of Aldo Leopold. In the winter of 1947 to 
1948, Zahniser opened Living Wilderness with an exchange between himself 
and Frederick Baker, a forestry professor at the University of California, 
Berkeley, who had written Zahniser a letter accusing wilderness advocates of 
“snobbery.”152 Zahniser denied the charge and recounted the Society’s 
utilitarian arguments, insisting on the “research values” that wilderness served 
and the “relief and inspiration” that it provided.153 Baker responded, in effect, 
 
It is of the utmost importance to concede the right of happiness also to people 
who find their delight in unaccustomed ways. 
Id. at 147 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 40 (Longman’s, Green, & Co. 1921) 
(1859)). 
151.  The journal published as an essay a letter from a reader who warned, 
We can not afford to risk destroying our wilderness by encouraging a flocking 
thereto of a multitude, only a small portion of whom would really enjoy it because 
it is a wilderness. These would be just as happy in more accessible recreation 
places. . . . Were the multitudes turned loose in primitive areas . . . we would find 
many of them failing to receive what the wilderness has to offer, though they 
would undoubtedly enjoy themselves well enough. . . . We do not with special 
emphasis urge people to visit our art galleries, our libraries or similar places. 
Olaus Maurie, Letter, Wilderness Is for Those Who Appreciate, LIVING WILDERNESS, July 1940, 
at 5, 5. 
152.  Frederick S. Baker & Howard Zahniser, We Certainly Need a Sound Philosophy: An Exchange 
of Letters, LIVING WILDERNESS, Winter 1947-1948, at 1, 1. 
153.  Id. at 2. 
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that he considered wilderness a kind of fetish, a shortcut to spiritual experience 
for those who could find it only in extremis.154 
Zahniser then changed tack and made the following claim for the benefit of 
an encounter with literal wilderness: “many [visitors to wilderness] . . . 
experience a better understanding of themselves in relation to the whole 
community of life on the earth and rather earnestly compare their civilized 
living with natural realities—to the improvement of their civilization.”155 This 
was not an instrumental argument, except in the broadest sense, in which 
enlightenment counts as a human interest. Nor was it the perfectionist account 
of an eccentric elite. Pressed past more conventional utilitarian arguments, 
Zahniser made a new type of claim for the morally educative effect of ecological 
awareness. It is revealing that Zahniser set this progression of argument in the 
opening pages of the Wilderness Society’s main public vehicle. He seems to 
have regarded it as an important moment in the organization’s advocacy for a 
new conception of preservation. 
Zahniser’s argument was close to the one Aldo Leopold advanced two years 
later in the posthumous Sand County Almanac, which concluded in favor of the 
power of outdoor experience to cultivate “perception,” advancing the “job . . . 
of building receptivity into the still unlovely human mind.”156 The receptive 
mind had been Muir’s goal, also, but in the Wilderness Society a new emphasis 
arose: less on responding rapturously to the intermingled beauty and sublimity 
of extraordinary places, such as Yosemite, than on apprehending the complex, 
interdependent character of natural systems and seeing oneself as integrated 
into them.157 Although he did not finish the book before his sudden death, 
Leopold’s arguments coalesce into something like this: we can love nature 
because it is intelligible to us, formed out of order that we can understand ever 
more richly; at the same time, it awes us because it is always more complex, 
older, and stranger than we can understand.158 Expanded knowledge and 
practiced attention enrich both parts of this experience, deepening both the 
understanding of the known and the contrasting apprehension of the 
 
154.  Id. at 3. 
155.  Id. at 4. 
156.  LEOPOLD, supra note 130, at 295. 
157.  See id. at 158-59 (describing feeling a sense of wonder at a partly unknowable world); id. at 
188-98 (arguing for ecology as a new way of thinking and seeing); id. at 201-02 (urging a 
combination of curiosity and affection as the emotional basis of a land ethic). 
158.  One exemplary passage, in a book full of praise for knowledge, curiosity, and abiding 
mystery, is Leopold’s recommendation to the reader to “sit quietly and listen for a wolf to 
howl, and think hard of everything you have seen and tried to understand . . . . [as a way to] 
hear it—a vast pulsing harmony . . . .” Id. at 158. 
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unknown. The world is a web of knowable relations set amid mystery, and it 
repays attention with deepened appreciation of both qualities. This is the 
formulation that the Wilderness Society’s spokespersons drew out of their 
struggle to find a language for the value of nature as such. 
Seeing Leopold in the context of the Wilderness Society debate in which he 
participated illuminates the real character of his work. He was not, as he is 
sometimes remembered, a literary prophet in the line of Thoreau and Muir 
(and we have already seen that Muir must be understood as a publicist and 
movement instigator), but a participant in the debate of a limited public, the 
network of wilderness advocates who together tried to create a public 
environmental language for a new preservation agenda. 
B. The Debate on the 1964 Wilderness Act 
The 1964 Wilderness Act set in motion a process by which about 107 
million acres of federal public land to date have entered a new statutory 
category of wilderness, one very close to the formula Bob Marshall set out 
shortly before founding the Wilderness Society, and which the Society 
embraced in the inaugural issue of Living Wilderness: roadless areas of at least 
five thousand acres, substantially unaffected by human activity, in which 
motorized transport and commercial activity are prohibited.159 The statute’s 
 
159.  The statute sets out the following purposes: “to assure that an increasing population, 
accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and 
modify all areas . . . , leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their 
natural condition . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006). Designated public lands shall be 
“administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people . . . as wilderness, and so as 
to provide for . . . the preservation of their wilderness character . . . .” Id. It defines a 
wilderness as being, 
in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the 
landscape, . . . an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled 
by man, . . . . an area of underdeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval 
character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation,  
. . . which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of 
nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has 
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of 
recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to 
make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) 
may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, 
scenic, or historical value. 
Id. § 1131(c). Note particularly the emphasis on “solitude,” which the Wilderness Society 
from the beginning had identified as a key value, see The Wilderness Society Platform, 
LIVING WILDERNESS, Sept. 1935, at 2, 2, and the emphasis on the integrity, or apparent 
integrity, of natural systems “untrammeled” by human activity. 
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aims tracked the agenda of the Wilderness Society: its announced purpose was 
“to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement 
and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the 
United States . . . , leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection 
in their natural condition . . . .”160 Its definition of “wilderness” included “an 
area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where 
man himself is a visitor who does not remain,” and that “has outstanding 
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation.”161 
That should be no surprise: the legislation was strongly influenced by Howard 
Zahniser, whose case for the urgency of preservation persuaded Senator 
Hubert Humphrey to become the bill’s lead sponsor in its early versions.162 
The 1964 Act emerged from eight years of congressional wrangling in 
which pro-wilderness Senators drew on the arguments that Zahniser and other 
Wilderness Society figures had developed in their internal debates. Senators 
introduced paradigms of this language into the Congressional Record. One key 
essay, Zahniser’s 1955 Our World and Its Wilderness asserted that, through 
wilderness, Americans were “keeping ourselves in touch with true reality, the 
fundamental reality of the universe” and “our primeval origin, our natural 
home.”163 Contact with this reality, Zahniser argued, underlay an ecological 
spirituality: recognition of the natural world as a site of intrinsic value, from 
which a part of the meaning of human life derives, and which we risk 
obliterating if we assert instrumental mastery over all things.164 Zahniser 
argued that “access to wilderness” upheld “the humility to see ourselves truly 
as the dependent members of this great community of all life” and thereby 
“continu[ed] hope for the survival of our culture.”165 The argument about 
 
160.  16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). 
161.  Id. § 1131(c). 
162.  See ALLIN, supra note 34, at 104-06. Zahniser’s writing, The Need for Wilderness Areas, 
directly inspired Humphrey’s decision to introduce wilderness legislation in 1956, following 
the lines of Zahniser’s proposal, which was roughly that of the Society’s program. 
Humphrey brought other organizations into the process, including the Sierra Club, the 
National Wildlife Federation, the National Parks Association, and the Council of 
Conservationists, among others. See id. at 105. 
163.  107 CONG. REC. 18,356 (1961). 
164.  See id. (“In . . . unmodified wilderness . . . . we not only can seek relief from the stress and 
strain of our civilized living but can seek also that true understanding of our past, ourselves, 
and our world, which will enable us to enjoy the conveniences and liberties of our 
urbanized, industrialized, mechanized civilization—and yet not sacrifice an awareness of our 
human existence as spiritual creatures nurtured and sustained by and from the great 
community of life on this earth.”). 
165.  Id. 
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cultural survival was a two-pronged thing and would remain that for decades. 
It referred on the one hand to the alleged spiritual threat of a world fully 
mastered, made flat by categorical obeisance to human will.166 On the other 
hand, Zahniser claimed, “[a]s a species, . . . we actually run a risk of 
annihilation if we forget conservation”; and wilderness preservation, with the 
relinquishment of mastery that it embodied, was a lesson in “a sense of 
ourselves as a responsible part of a continuing community of life.”167 
Participants in the Senate debate sounded the same themes in their own 
voices. Wayne Morse of Oregon announced that “one of the soundest reasons 
for the support of the wilderness bill is from the standpoint of what it will do 
for the spiritual needs of Americans” and echoed the Romantic-religious 
language of the early Sierra Club: 
[Y]ou cannot go into the canyons, . . . through the primeval forests, 
you cannot associate with the grandeur of this great heritage which 
God Almighty has given the American people, and not come out of such 
a trip a better man or a better woman for having come that close to the 
spirit of the Creator himself.168 
Morse even claimed, in a register of personal testimony, that primeval 
nature outdid organized religion as a path to spiritual insight. Recalling a visit 
to virgin forest, he reflected, “one knew that we were closer to the Almighty in 
that natural cathedral than probably ever again we would be in any artificial 
cathedral, . . . because we stood in God’s cathedral, in the natural beauty of that 
forest.”169 In the language of Romantic epiphany that the Sierra Club milieu 
had perfected as a mode of moral insight, Morse ascribed his confident support 
 
166.  In this spirit, Zahniser quoted Thoreau’s assertion that “we require that all things be 
mysterious and unexplorable, that land and sea be infinitely wild, unsurveyed, and 
unfathomed by us because unfathomable. . . . We need to witness our own limits 
transgressed, and some life pasturing freely where we never wander.” Id. (quoting HENRY 
D. THOREAU, WALDEN OR LIFE IN THE WOODS 333 (1899)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
167.  Id. Zahniser continued,  
From the wilderness we truly gain this sense and thus in wilderness preservation 
we see a key to all our conservation problems. From our contact with it and its 
continuing influence, comes the understanding to deal wisely with all the 
resources of the earth which we share now, but which will also be the need of 
those who come after us. 
Id. 
168.  Id. at 18,353 (statement of Sen. Morse). 
169.  Id. 
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of the Wilderness Act to such experience and suggested that opponents would 
vote differently had they shared his experience.170 Frank Church of Idaho, too, 
adopted the Wilderness Society version of Sierra Club language, praising “the 
spiritual values, the enrichment that comes from the solitude to be found in the 
wilderness.”171 Paul Douglas of Illinois declared, “Some people may laugh, but 
beauty is as much a part of life as drinking water,”172 and Church foreshadowed 
the bleak mood that would enter environmental public language in the next 
decade, warning, “without wilderness this country will become a cage.”173 
These debates show the full emergence of a public language pioneered in 
voluntary associations such as the Sierra Club and which, in earlier decades, 
activists had struggled to shoehorn into the categories of utilitarian resource 
management. In these passages, the modes of experience that turn-of-the-
century outdoor acolytes explored in their outings and publications have 
become public bases for normative claims, independent of nature’s useful 
power to produce virtuous citizens or return refreshed laborers to their jobs at 
the close of vacation. These speeches are also less beholden than earlier 
arguments to the tortuous wrestling with the status of subjective and 
idiosyncratic values that marked the writing of Bob Marshall and early issues of 
Living Wilderness.174 Instead, there is a tendency here to announce wilderness 
 
170.  If I had ever had any doubts—I have never had any, but if I had ever had any—as 
to whether I should do all I could to preserve that kind of an area for the spiritual 
benefit of future generations of American boys and girls, those doubts would have 
been resolved on that occasion. 
Id. 
Would that Members of the Senate could have been with me on the occasion to 
which I have just referred. I am satisfied that if they had been there and had 
experienced the thrill I experienced, standing on the platform in the midst of that 
natural cathedral of primeval trees, the vote in some instances would be  
different . . . . 
Id. 
171.  Id. at 18,382 (statement of Sen. Church). More nearly continuing Theodore Roosevelt’s 
rhetoric, William Proxmire of Wisconsin, known as a fitness fanatic, praised wilderness 
adventure as a “test” of “spiritual attitude . . . in a nation in danger of going soft.” Id. at 
18,365 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
172.  Id. at 18,382 (statement of Sen. Douglas). 
173.  Id. at 18,365 (statement of Sen. Church). 
174.  These strains of argument persisted, though. Senator Church acknowledged that “only a 
minority of our people are interested in the spiritual values [of the wilderness]” and 
responded, as Marshall had, that the majority should not “be entitled to trample upon the 
rights of the minority.” Id. at 18,365 (statement of Sen. Church). Church characterized 
development as “deny[ing] those people [the minority] their right” to “seek the sanctuary of 
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preservation as a self-evident national goal linked to intangible but shared 
“spiritual” values and national progress toward a less materialistic 
consciousness. 
The authors of these social-movement texts and Senate speeches presented 
themselves as continuing a canonical tradition of American nature prophets, in 
which they included Thoreau, Muir, and Aldo Leopold.175 This presentation 
was much too simple. It concealed three democratic achievements: 
transforming an often subjective body of literary evocation into a widely shared 
mode of experience of the natural world; working this experience, and the 
language that accompanied it within limited and specialized publics, into a set 
of increasingly robust programmatic commitments; and contributing this new 
set of terms to normative public language, the repertoire of arguments and 
invocations by which Americans could seek to persuade one another of the 
content and meaning of shared commitments. Wilderness advocates were 
generating, not just reciting, a moral register in which the natural world was 
increasingly understood as a source of intrinsic rather than instrumental value 
and a key to insight about the place of human beings in an interdependent 
world. 
This argument was developed and available when members of the “new” 
environmentalism of the 1960s went looking for an account of the relationship 
between environmental commitments and a broader crisis of faith in 
technocratic mastery. They brought the wilderness argument, as it were, out of 
the wilderness and into a new idea of “the environment” as an encompassing 
category of problems and political commitments. 
 
the wilderness.” Id. It is probably most accurate to say that the earlier arguments persisted 
in a cumulative body of environmental public language. 
175.  See, e.g., id. at 18,356 (crediting appreciation of wilderness values to “the influence of such 
men as Henry Thoreau, Verplanck Colvin [a cartographer and poetic publicist of the 
Adirondacks], John Muir, Stephen Mather [first head of the National Park Service], Aldo 
Leopold, and Robert Marshall” (quoting Howard Zahniser, Our World and Its Wilderness, 
LIVING WILDERNESS, Summer 1954, at 36, 37)). This text devoted particular attention to 
Thoreau and Muir, combining their tropes in the claim that, in wilderness, “We . . . propose 
to maintain our access to wildness [Thoreau’s term], to what John Muir called ‘fountains of 
life.’” Id.; see also Harold C. Anderson, The Unknown Genesis of the Wilderness Idea, LIVING 
WILDERNESS, July 1940, at 15, 15 (tracing the idea to a passage of Thoreau’s in The Maine 
Woods); Benton MacKaye, A Wilderness Philosophy, LIVING WILDERNESS, Mar. 1946, at 1, 4 
(urging readers to “emulate Thoreau” and “[i]magine ‘Henry David’ as a member of The 
Wilderness Society”). 
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iv.  the invention of the environment 
The developments set out in this Part occurred against growing anxiety 
about the fate of technocratic mastery, a mood informed foremost by the threat 
of atomic warfare. An important anchoring simile in Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring,176 nuclear destruction stood in for the larger, Faustian idea that new 
powers without corresponding moral and prudential insight could destroy 
humanity. That shadow flits through much of the public environmental 
language of the 1960s and early 1970s. The association of technology with 
moral and ecological obtuseness and looming disaster made possible a kind of 
total critique of modern life. An existing sense of something gone wrong 
created questions—what and why—that users of new environmental public 
language proposed to answer. While environmental language in this period 
carried a sense of crisis, it only partly created that sense, and in other respects 
rather gave it a distinctive expression. 
Temporal landmarks cannot quite capture the transition here, because 
there is considerable ambiguity and overlap. This era began in important ways 
in 1962, with Silent Spring. Interior Secretary Stewart Udall’s 1963 Quiet Crisis 
developed Carson’s warnings into an updated version of the Progressive story: 
Americans had long disregarded the environment in favor of a myth of 
plenitude and a civic religion of individualism, but now must arrive at a new 
moral appreciation of nature.177 Congressional hearings on the public-health 
and environmental consequences of air and water pollution set the stage for the 
public and media eruptions of the late 1960s and the legislative efflorescence of 
the early 1970s.178 Traditional civic organizations such as the League of Women 
Voters paid increasing attention to the human consequences of industrial and 
municipal effluents.179 All these currents contributed to the (nonetheless 
abrupt) appearance of new defining themes in environmental public language. 
The 1960s saw environmental language break far outside the confines of 
the traditional concern with specific acreage, land use issues, and recreational 
 
176.  RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
177.  See STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963). For a consideration of this family’s role in 
the environmental politics of the period, see HENRY B. SIRGO, ESTABLISHMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM ON THE U.S. POLITICAL AGENDA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY—THE BROTHERS UDALL (2004). 
178.  See ROBERT G. DYCK, EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY 1948-1967 
(1971) (setting out legislative developments of the 1950s and 1960s). 
179.  See YOUNG, supra note 128, at 174-77 (setting out the League’s involvement in the press for 
comprehensive national clean water legislation, which had become a consensus priority of 
the organization by the late 1950s). 
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and aesthetic values. The environmental language of this period moved 
through more diverse movements and communities than earlier developments. 
It also developed in greater abstraction from those sources, often through elite 
cultural interpreters who proposed to make sense of youth dissent, malaise, 
and a perceived crisis of technological mastery by using the environment to 
found a master narrative of explanation and evaluation.180 
A. The New Environmental Language 
Two passages exemplify this transformation in environmental public 
language, not simply in what they say, but in the fact of their existence and 
intelligibility. The first comes from Time in 1968: “The false assumption that 
nature exists only to serve man is at the root of an ecological crisis that ranges 
from the lowly litterbug to the lunacy of nuclear proliferation. At this hour, 
man’s only choice is to live in harmony with nature, not conquer it.”181 
Consider that for a moment. The claim is that tossing a bottle from a car 
window and building weapons of planet-destroying potential are more alike 
than unalike, that they are two parts of the same crisis. Today, the claim that 
environmental problems arise from an unreflectively instrumental attitude 
toward the natural world is not hard to understand, though not all will endorse 
it. But even before engaging that diagnosis, consider the concept it relies on: 
environmental problems. That category contains everything from the beauty of a 
wilderness landscape to invisible chemical pollution in an urban neighborhood, 
from the fossil fuel energy economy to the loss of a species or the extinction of 
life on earth. The environment, so conceived, was not an idea that would have 
occurred to members of the early Sierra Club as uniting their aesthetic response 
to “wild” nature, their everyday economic activity, and whatever misgivings 
they had about the industrial economy. For them, a register of moral and 
aesthetic response elevated the wild and spectacular above the settled and 
mechanical, demoting the latter as ugly and uninspiring; but that common 
thread of judgment did not make the phenomena part of one thing, an 
 
180.  Thus, one finds liberal establishment voices such as Time, The New York Times, and 
columnist Flora Lewis assessing the crisis of “technological man” and forecasting a basic 
change in modern values and identity. See The Age of Effluence, TIME, May 10, 1968, at 52, 52 
(“[T]echnological man, master of the atom and soon the moon, is so aware of his strength 
that he is unaware of his weakness—the fact that his pressure on nature may provoke 
revenge.”); Fighting To Save the Earth from Man, TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56, 62 (invoking an 
account of “technological man as the personification of Faust, endlessly pursuing the 
unattainable”). 
181.  The Age of Effluence, supra note 180, at 53. 
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“ecological crisis.” The environment had to be named, and in some measure 
invented, before it could be understood as endangered and available for saving. 
The second passage comes from the Sierra Club Bulletin in 1970, a year in 
which the Club—this time following more than leading a larger cultural 
development—moved from its traditional public-lands focus to embrace the 
rising environmentalism. It is a single paragraph, sprawled over two pages, 
titled A Fable for Our Times. It retells, as faux-naïve allegory, the fate of “a 
small, beautiful, green and graceful country called Vietnam,” which “needed to 
be saved,” though “[i]n later years no one could remember exactly what it 
needed to be saved from, but that is another story.”182 America sought to save 
Vietnam, but, 
[s]adly, America had one fatal flaw—its inhabitants were in love with 
technology and thought it could do no wrong. A visitor to America 
during the time of this story would probably have guessed its outcome 
after seeing how its inhabitants were treating their own country. The 
air was mostly foul, the water putrid, and most of the land was either 
covered with concrete or garbage. But Americans were never much on 
introspection and they didn’t foresee the result of their loving embrace 
on the small country. They set out to save Vietnam with the same 
enthusiasm and determination their forefathers had displayed in 
conquering the frontier. They bombed. . . . Thousands of herbicide and 
defoliant missions were flown before anyone seriously questioned their 
long-range effect on humans and animals as well as on plants. By the 
time deformed fetuses began appearing and signs of lasting ecological 
damage were becoming increasingly apparent success had been 
achieved. Vietnam had been saved. But the country was dead.183 
Set aside the plausibility (or otherwise) of the “fable,” its elision of 
geopolitics, domestic politics, and political ideology in favor of a single strand 
of technophile hubris.184 Consider instead its intelligibility: environmental 
 
182.  A Fable for Our Times, 55 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 16, 16 (1970). 
183.  Id. at 16-18. 
184.  The crisis and legislative response partook of deeply inconsistent perceptions of the same 
theme: Americans’ technological mastery. On one hand, from the Vietnam fable to attacks 
on instrumental reason and “technological man,” the environmental master narrative, 
particularly the portent of apocalypse, expressed a mood of discontent, even despair of 
rational, technological human mastery over nature. On the other, the major antipollution 
statutes of the 1970s reflected confidence in the capacity of government and industry to 
solve complex problems through technological innovation. Contemporary observers were 
not blind to the paradox. See Issue of the Year: The Environment, TIME, Jan. 4, 1971, at 21, 21 
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degradation had become available as a moral master narrative, able to organize 
vice and virtue, hubris and comeuppance, crisis and imperative response, 
across a variety of particulars. The Bulletin’s fable recasts the Vietnam War as a 
symptom of American technophilia, then neatly ascribes an American 
environmental crisis to the same source, linking the two in one story of the 
essential problem: runaway faith in technological instruments, in defiance of 
nature’s order, delicacy, and limits. Once invented, the environmental crisis 
could encompass many crises. 
A set of innovations emerged together in this period and remade 
environmental public language. The first two were the discovery or invention 
of the environment as a unified phenomenon and the use of environmental 
crisis as a moral master narrative of modern life. The others can be understood 
as elaborations on these two. The first subsidiary development was apocalypse: 
the claim arose suddenly from every editorial board, social-movement 
publication, and even congressional debate that an environmental crisis 
threatened the survival of the species or the planet.185 The literal warning of 
human extinction was a new theme in environmental public argument.186 
 
(“The relatively sudden passion about the environment seemed to spring from two different 
sources. On the one hand, it represented the response to a problem which American skills, 
including technology, might actually solve, unlike the immensely more elusive problems of 
race prejudice or the war in Viet Nam. On the other hand, it represented a creeping 
disillusionment with technology, an attempt by individuals to reassert control over machine 
civilization.”). That confidence found voice in media discussions, congressional debate, and 
the structure of the legislation itself. In hindsight, the legislation of the period seems to have 
arisen from a very specific, and probably paradoxical, conjunction of self-doubt and self-
confidence: on the one hand, a potentially apocalyptic crisis brought on by technological 
hubris; on the other, a rational, technological program to cleanse the country’s air and water 
within the decade. 
185.  See The Age of Effluence, supra note 180, at 52 (“[M]any scholars of the biosphere are now 
seriously concerned that human pollution may trigger some ecological disaster.”); Americans 
Rally To Make It Again Beautiful Land, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1970, at 3 (referring to “pollution 
which, according to the warnings of some scientists, threatens the very existence of life on 
this planet”); Earth Day and Space Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1970, at 174 (“[T]his flowering 
home planet . . . may become as devoid of life as are now the mountains of the moon and 
the polar regions of Mars.”); Earth Week, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1970, at A20 (“American air, 
land, and water . . . has become . . . the world’s most expensive monument to pollution . . . a 
monument that threatens to topple of its own weight. . . . [M]an is running out of soons 
faster than he runs out of issues.”); Gladwin Hill, Activity Ranges from Oratory to Legislation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1970, at 1 (referring to “ecological problems, which many scientists 
[sic] say urgently require action if the earth is to remain habitable”). 
186.  Of course, the conjoined themes of eschatological history and excoriating prophecy formed 
an old tradition in American public life. See HARRY S. STOUT, THE NEW ENGLAND SOUL: 
PREACHING AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 3-12, 67-85 (1986) 
(describing the genre of the election or fast-day sermon, which called a strayed people back 
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Second was a change in the connection between environmental problems 
and public health. This link had been a persistent but attenuated theme of both 
Sierra Club and New Nationalist strands of nineteenth-century conservation, 
and was even more badly stretched in the early efforts of the Wilderness 
Society to establish a public-health rationale for wilderness. In the 1960s, the 
environmental problem came to be understood as one of a “poisoned world,” a 
self-inflicted crisis of industrial society.187 Where earlier public-health 
arguments had focused on the restorative power of recreation, the new 
environmentalism took some of its urgency from the perception of an 
unfolding public-health disaster. 
Third was the belief—glimpsed in the fable of Vietnam—that 
environmental problems were rooted in distorted values and identity, and 
ecological renovation must work on those levels, as well as more practical 
ones.188 The editors of Time wrote in 1970, “Behind the environment crisis in 
 
to their covenant). See generally SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD (1978) 
(setting out the history of this genre more generally). Their arrival in environmentalism 
marked an important rhetorical confluence. It also contributed to a curious symmetry of 
cultural dissent. Two inheritors of this tradition, evangelical Protestants and 
environmentalists, set themselves against what they see as the materialism and human-
centered excesses of the culture, but (1) in favor of sharply different alternatives, one 
traditional theism, and the other, a blend of pantheism, paganism, and Romantic 
humanism; and (2) with quite different cultural profiles, marked for the past four decades 
by opposite responses to the efflorescence of the 1960s. Earlier activists had warned against 
the extinction of wilderness, and Howard Zahniser’s essay on untouched lands as 
synecdoche for life itself anticipated this development. Declensionist arguments had been a 
trope at least since George Perkins Marsh, and even the most pessimistic work of post-
World War II environmental writing, Fairfield Osborne’s Our Plundered Planet, did not go 
much beyond Marsh. See FAIRFIELD OSBORN, OUR PLUNDERED PLANET (1948) (arguing on 
prudential grounds that human beings must adopt rational recognition of ecological 
constraints or face shortages of critical resources). If my initial research is accurate, Osborn 
seems to have been a wealthy and prominent white supremacist and anti-Semite who 
reinvented himself as a prophet of environmental decline after World War II. The affinity of 
environmental sentiment with various forms of misanthropy, antiliberalism, and 
antimodernity presents important and difficult questions to be taken up in another setting. 
187.  See Fighting To Save the Earth from Man, supra note 180, at 56 (“What most Americans now 
breathe is closer to ambient filth than to air.”); Menace in the Skies, TIME, Jan. 27, 1967, at 
48, 52 (noting warnings that “‘all of civilization will pass away. . . . from gradual suffocation 
by its own effluents’”); “Now or Never,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1970, at 46 (“[C]ommunities 
and campuses across the nation will observe ‘Earth Day’ by committing themselves to 
reclaim an already dangerously poisoned world.”); To Clean the Nation’s  
Air . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1967, at 30 (“The United States is in serious danger of running 
out of its most important natural resource—the air that supports life.”). 
188.  See Gladwin Hill, Environmental Movement Registers Gains in 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 
1973, at 1, 28 (“[T]he whole idea of growth, social and economic, an American shibboleth, 
has undergone skeptical scrutiny and recurrent repudiation.”); . . . In an Urban Wasteland?, 
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the U.S. are a few deeply ingrained assumptions . . . . that nature exists 
primarily for man to conquer . . . [and] that nature is endlessly bountiful,” and 
ascribed “the whole environmental problem . . . [to] a dedication to infinite 
growth on a finite planet.”189 The Washington Post was harsher: 
The deep horror concerning the environment is not that we have 
ravaged and poisoned our section of the planet—but that we live with 
the horror so calmly. . . . Today America is under siege from its own 
waste, blind technology and arrogant abuse of Nature; instead of 
resisting these horrors, we have adjusted—like mule-beasts with a 
heavier and heavier load.190 
The final innovation was the claim that environmental insight offered not 
just an account of crisis, but a formula for renovating a damaged world, a new 
way of understanding problems that could produce hitherto unimagined 
solutions.191 This argument arose partly in the Wilderness Society’s arguments 
for the morally educative power of nature as such, developed from the 
Romantic and Progressive idea that specific places have revelatory or edifying 
effects. Time called for “a new way of thinking” in which “Americans must 
view the world in terms of unities rather than units” and declared, “The 
biggest need may be a change in values.”192 Their solution was “[e]cology, the 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1970, at 44 (“The end toward which this is all dangerously tending is a 
technological monstrosity, a sterile monument of concrete and steel unfit for human 
habitation. Earth Day offers an opportunity for that embattled minority . . . who are willing 
to stand up for human values against the dehumanizing demands of development for 
development’s sake.”). 
189.  Fighting To Save the Earth from Man, supra note 180, at 62-63. 
190.  Editorial, The Environment: Clean Up or Patch Up?, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1970, at A20. 
191.  See The Age of Effluence, supra note 180, at 53 (“The biggest need is for ordinary people to 
learn something about ecology, a humbling as well as fascinating way of viewing reality . . . . 
[M]odern man . . . could do with some of the humility toward animals that St. Francis tried 
to graft onto Christianity.”); Irving S. Bengelsdorf, Dear Students: Our Spaceship Earth’s in 
Trouble; So Are We, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1970, at B7 (“[T]o survive on our spaceship, we 
must learn to do as nature does . . . .”); Flora Lewis, Instant Mass-Movement, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 1970, at B7 (“The ideas themselves are so fundamentally new, so drastically 
opposed to the heritage of many centuries, they are painful to absorb. . . . Environmental 
harmony requires a much deeper review of western thought, now challenged on almost 
every level. It is becoming evident that, to begin, a new measure must be made of affluence  
. . . .”); Issue of the Year: The Environment, supra note 184, at 22 (“By changing national 
values, [concern for the environment] may well spur a profound advance in U.S. maturity 
and harmony with nature . . . .”). 
192.  Fighting To Save the Earth from Man, supra note 180, at 63. 
PURDY_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 4/27/2010 2:28:01 PM 
the yale law journal 119:1122  2010  
1180 
 
subversive science [that] enriches man’s perceptions, his vision, his concept of 
reality. In nature, many may find the model they need to cherish.”193 
B. The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts as Exemplars of Their Time 
Two environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 and the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972, are widely recognized as paradigms of the law 
that emerged from this episode of ferment. They are also widely regarded as 
models of the design failure of early antipollution statutes, often expressed in 
rubrics such as “command and control.”194 This line of criticism focuses on 
several features of the statutes. First, they were drafted with deliberate 
indifference to any comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that would set their 
environmental goals alongside economic costs in a single master-currency.195 
Instead, drafters established categorical substantive goals and noneconomic 
 
193.  Id. 
194.  Compare Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985) (arguing that 
departures from uniform technology standards impose excessive information burdens on 
administrators), with Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (rebutting Latin’s claims). See generally 
BRUCE ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974) 
(setting out the technocratic goal of maximizing net social benefit from environmental 
regulation and considering the capacity of alternative regulatory regimes to approximate this 
goal, in light of political and other constraints); WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: 
THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974) (setting out the basic economic argument that 
choices under constraints imply tradeoffs, and a decisionmaker must thus consider all goals, 
including environmental quality, in terms of their opportunity costs); Bruce A. Ackerman & 
William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 
(1980) (surveying in detail the efficiency costs of congressional selection of regulatory 
instruments and failure to direct an independent agency to engage in comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis; examining the special susceptibility of this strategy to review-proof 
legislative exacerbation by political dealmaking; engaging in a model of comprehensive cost-
benefit accounting in the manner of an ideal independent agency; and identifying the 
efficiency failure of the CAA as the fruit of a congressional decision to select instruments 
rather than goals in the course of a departure from the New Deal model of independent 
agency); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988) (arguing that 
market-based incentives would improve in both economic efficiency and political 
accountability and transparency); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and 
Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981) (setting out an 
approach to identifying and avoiding innovation costs of overly directive regulatory 
strategies). 
195.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 194, at 165-207 (considering inefficiencies arising from 
absolutist or at least underspecified statutory valuation of environmental quality). 
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standards. By 1983, all United States waterways should be clean enough for 
fishing and swimming, and by 1985, all water pollution should have come to an 
end.196 As for air pollution, the Clean Air Act directed the Environmental 
Protection Agency to create uniform national standards for six major criteria 
pollutants based on “public health” rather than cost-benefit analysis.197 Second, 
the statutes specified regulatory tools that did nothing to promote incentive-
based efficiency. The Clean Water Act’s effluent standards were insensitive to 
local variation: each facility faced the same rules, regardless of either its 
marginal environmental harm or the marginal cost of compliance, with no 
trading mechanism for reallocating pollution to reduce costs or distribute 
impacts.198 Although the Clean Air Act later became the arena for market-based 
regulatory experiments, its statutory design included no means for cost-based 
allocation of regulatory burdens. Third, as the Clean Water Act’s deadlines 
suggest, the statutes set wildly unrealistic goals for overcoming industrial 
pollution.199 Unreachable standards risked the impression of triviality and farce 
and, more important for regulators and the regulated, provided little help in 
navigating the middle ground between the existing and the impossible.200 
 
196.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
197.  See Mary Rose Kornreich, Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT HANDBOOK 11, 11-32 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998) (setting 
out the basic regulatory strategy of the CAA). For the “public health” language, see 42 
U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A), directing regulation of pollutants that “may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health”; and 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1), stating that air quality 
standards shall be designed “to protect the public health.” 
198.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 194, at 1478-88 (surveying the context-insensitivity 
of uniform technology standards under the CAA); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 194, at 
178-84 (surveying the benefits to efficiency and innovation of proposed market-based CAA 
regulation). 
199.  See, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
127-28 (2003) (noting unrealistic goals and the complaints and confusion they have 
occasioned). 
200.  The interpretative peregrinations of the Clean Air Act’s section 112, directing the EPA to set 
emission standards at a level “provid[ing] an ample margin of safety to protect the public 
health” exemplify this difficulty. Confronting a facially cost-insensitive statutory 
instruction, the EPA read into the language the authority to consider the costs of emission 
control technology. The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s interpretation, reasoning that such 
cost-benefit considerations were necessary to avert the possibility of absolutist regulation 
inducing economic disaster. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). The D.C. Circuit then reversed the ruling en banc and imposed its own 
interpretation, directing the EPA to set a level of emissions resulting in an “acceptable” level 
of risk to public health, then enforce limits no less strict than that level. See Natural Res. 
Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). That decision forced the EPA 
to revisit the foundations of its regulatory strategy for toxic pollutants. See 53 Fed. Reg. 
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Trenchant criticism of these statutes has organized more than a 
generation’s worth of scholarship and reform efforts in environmental law, 
resulting in notable theoretical and practical achievements.201 It has also 
produced a body of countercriticism focused on the limits of markets and cost-
benefit rationality, and some efforts to integrate competing perspectives.202 
This Article’s discussion of the 1970s statutes does not directly engage these 
debates. Instead, it makes two points about understanding the structure of the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. First, although the drafters of these 
statutes were aware of arguments against the approach they took, they 
regarded their approach as uniquely consistent with, even required by, the task 
of adopting environmental protection as a defining national purpose. In 
explaining this, they invoked the larger environmental themes of the time: 
ecological consciousness as a key to understanding and solving complex 
problems; public-health crises and apocalyptic danger; and a need for a change 
in national values. Whether or not the policy instruments they chose were 
dictated by, or even ultimately advanced, these goals, the choices reflected their 
idea of the undertaking. Second, the adoption of environmental values as 
national purposes was, ironically, invaluable in establishing the force of the 
criticisms that the statutes soon attracted. The argument that the statutes 
inefficiently pursued their purposes makes sense on its own terms, of course; 
 
28,496 (1988) (rulemaking). Before the EPA could complete a new rule, Congress revised 
section 112 substantially, establishing a technology-based standard. 
201.  The work cited in note 194, supra, is the anchor here. For recent developments, see generally 
DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007), which applies 
cost-benefit analysis to issues of high uncertainty and great potential cost, including climate 
change; Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 91 (2008); and James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification 
of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000), which sets out working pieces of an 
attempt to integrate unpriced “ecosystem services” into a comprehensive market fully 
incorporating environmental benefits. On the power of interest group explanations in 
accounting for the political frustration of market-based reforms, see Thomas W. Merrill, 
Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, which argues ultimately for a 
synthesis of wealth-maximization and distributional versions of interest-based accounts. 
202.  See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002) (arguing that conventional cost-
benefit analysis depends on morally unacceptable premises, particularly the fungibility of 
human lives and the discounted value of the future); Kysar, Discounting, supra note 10 
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis can encourage reckless indifference to the catastrophic 
potential of climate change and criticizing a “comprehensive rationality” that notionally 
forecloses the possibility of cultural change by seeking to account for all relevant values from 
the standpoint of the present). But see John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the 
Views of Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901 (1999). 
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but it is urgent, and not just another accountant’s reproach to shoddy 
lawmaking, because of the political and cultural status of the values being 
disserved. The same statutes that attracted so much meritorious economics-
based criticism also helped to empower that criticism by confirming the place 
of environmental protection among public values. 
1. Rejection of Comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Begin with Congress’s decision to reject comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis. Drafters took this choice in the face of a presidential veto of the Clean 
Water Act based on its projected cost and a daunting economic forecast from 
the recently formed Council on Economic Quality (CEQ).203 They also had in 
hand a CEQ analysis of the pollution crisis as a product of the failure to price 
ecosystem services, making the air and water “free dumps,” the key conceptual 
ingredient in a comprehensive accounting of environmental costs and 
benefits.204 It was no surprise when the National Water Commission, a 
bipartisan group assembled under Lyndon Johnson, denounced the Clean 
Water Act for attaching “an extravagant social value to an abstract concept of 
water purity”—that is, implying by the refusal to weigh costs and benefits that 
clean water was of infinite value.205 
Drafters of the legislation made both practical and moral arguments against 
these efforts at comprehensive cost-accounting. As a practical matter, they 
argued that the novelty of complex environmental and public-health threats 
meant vast uncertainty about the consequences of any level of pollution, 
making efforts to specify costs premature.206 Senators also argued that 
 
203.  See Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972—Veto Message, 118 CONG. REC. 36,859 
(1972). For a discussion of the CEQ cost estimate, issued under Russell Train, soon to be the 
head of EPA, see 117 CONG. REC. 38,801 (1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
204.  See 118 CONG. REC. 36,874 (1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The common property 
resources—air and water—are not included in the market exchange. They are used as free 
‘dumps’ for consumption and production residuals. But such dumping exacts social costs—
in degraded air and water, impaired health, loss of fish and wildlife, loss of recreational 
opportunities and aesthetic values, and added costs of treatment necessary for downstream 
water users. Environmental problems stem largely from this fundamental failure of the 
economic system to take into account environmental costs.”). 
205.  NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 70 (1973). 
206.  See 118 CONG. REC. 10,261 (1972) (statement of Rep. Vanik) (“[I]f we continue to allow 
harmful discharges and the waste of resources—even small amounts—we will continue to 
rapidly disrupt, in ways which we do not now understand, the natural balance of the 
world—a balance that evolved over billions of years and which supports all living things, 
including ourselves. . . . If we can destroy Lake Erie, we can destroy the sea. Similarly, we 
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projecting the cost of regulatory compliance was reckless because adopting 
strong goals established a national commitment that would alter the path of 
innovation. One could not know the cost of future compliance based on 
existing technology.207 Drafters thus rejected the CEQ’s cost projection for the 
CWA as an attempt to sow fear in Congress and the public.208 They supported 
their decision by invoking the technology-forcing precedents of World War II 
aircraft production and the Apollo Project, and even asserted that the 
environmental crisis was graver and thus potentially more transformative than 
either the Second World War or the Space Race.209 Senators also drew on the 
apocalyptic backdrop in public discussion: they contended that immediate 
threats to the survival of the species and life on earth made weighing costs and 
benefits irresponsible.210 It is arresting, from the vantage of a time accustomed 
to regarding pollution control as a matter of the expert management of costs 
and benefits, to see it repeatedly identified in congressional debate as a 
question of survival. 
The moral arguments expressed the noninstrumental conception of 
nature’s moral significance that emerged in the debates of the Wilderness 
Society and became prominent in the late 1960s. One was the claim that it was 
wrong to use waterways as waste-disposal systems, full stop. This right-or-
wrong classification was strikingly and repeatedly invoked as the basic concept 
 
can destroy the delicate balance of the world’s atmosphere. That destruction is happening 
each hour of every day.”); 117 CONG. REC. 38,801 (1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie) 
(“[W]hat we do not know, and what we cannot predict accurately, are the long-range effects 
upon man of prolonged exposure to bigger and bigger doses of pollution. Man, no less than 
the Peregrine Falcon and the Mountain Lion, is an endangered species.”). 
207.  See 117 CONG. REC. 38,300 (1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The committee recognizes 
that there are technical limits to what can be done in order to achieve the no-discharge 
objective. More importantly, the committee is concerned that program administrators and 
enforcement officers do not know what these technical limits are.”). 
208.  See id. at 38,801 (“[T]o apply a price tag . . . to a 100-percent elimination of pollutants can 
serve no purpose other than to frighten the people and intimidate the Congress.”). 
209.  See 116 CONG. REC. 32,904 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“Here, in the case of a 
national objective more serious than either [World War II or the Space Race]—the national 
health, I think that we have an obligation to lay down the standards and requirements of 
this bill. I think that the industry has an obligation to try to meet them. If, in due course, it 
cannot, then it should come to Congress and share with the Congress . . . the need to 
modify the policy. That is the philosophy of the bill.”). 
210.  See 118 CONG. REC. 36,874 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“Can we afford life itself? . . . 
If we entertain any serious hopes of preserving life on this planet, the water pollution bill 
will have to be paid—soon.”); id. at 33,693 (“These are not merely the pious declarations 
that Congress so often makes in passing its laws; on the contrary, this is literally a life or 
death proposition for the Nation.”); 117 CONG. REC. 38,801 (1971) (statement of Sen. 
Muskie) (“Man . . . is an endangered species.”). 
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of the Clean Water Act. 211 Some supporters of pollution-control legislation also 
identified it as the keystone of a new kind of moral calculus, premised on the 
idea that ecological interdependence is the condition of first importance in 
assessing human interaction with the natural world, and that it must imply a 
comprehensive revaluation of economic life.212 This point highlights the 
integral connection between the practical and moral arguments: 
comprehensive accounting seemed impossible not just because factual 
knowledge was changing fast, but also because new values were emerging, 
which would affect the assessment of environmental health and harm alike. 
These were the reasons the statutes’ drafters gave for rejecting 
comprehensive cost-benefit accounting, specifically proposals to weigh the 
projected costs of compliance and assess the marginal effects of pollution on 
public health. The drafters’ arguments reflected the broader contemporary 
sense that environmental problems formed a uniquely urgent and complex 
crisis in which important yet inchoate moral lessons resided. They understood 
their statutes in two concurrent ways: as instruments for pursuing certain 
policy ends and as existential acts committing the country to a new set of goals 
and values, whose significance was only beginning to come into focus.213 Their 
 
211.  See 118 CONG. REC. 36,873 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“These policies [of the bill] 
simply mean that streams and rivers are no longer to be considered part of the waste 
treatment process.”); id. at 10,259 (statement of Rep. Vanik) (“The basic concept of the 
Senate bill is that: ‘The use of any river, lake, stream, or ocean as a waste treatment system 
is unacceptable.’ In other words, no one has the right to pollute.”); 117 CONG. REC. 38,798 
(1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“[T]he use of any river, lake, stream, or ocean as a waste 
treatment system is unacceptable.”); id. at 38,722 (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“[T]he bill 
declares that no one has the right to use the Nation’s waters as a waste disposal mechanism; 
that there is no right to pollute, but rather an obligation to maintain the quality of those 
resources traditionally looked upon as free to all, but which we now wish to protect for 
all.”). 
212.  See 117 CONG. REC. 38,819 (1971) (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“[T]he bill and its purpose 
goes even further than asserting that a public right resides in clean water. In a way, it 
recognizes an even more fundamental condition. It asserts the primacy of the natural order, 
on which all, including man, depends. . . . [I]t does have an underlying theme, one which 
seems to me to rely on the natural order.”); id. at 38,800 (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The 
stated objective of the act reflects the committee’s decision to recognize fundamental 
principles of ecology.”). 
213.  See 118 CONG. REC. 36,874 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The whole intent of this bill 
is to make a national commitment. . . . Can we afford clean water? . . . Can we afford life 
itself? . . . Those questions were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our Nation, and 
they deserve no answers as we finally move to restore and renew them. These questions 
answer themselves. And those who say that raising the amounts of money called for in this 
legislation may require higher taxes, or that spending this much money may contribute to 
inflation simply do not understand the language of this crisis.”); 116 CONG. REC. 36,033 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“One of the most troubling aspects of our national 
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refusal to incorporate comprehensive cost-benefit accounting struck them as 
integral to the second purpose of the statutes. 
2. Unreachable Goals 
The drafters of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act were aware that the 
statutes set unattainable goals and pointed this out unprompted in floor 
debate. Their reasons have already been glimpsed in their comparisons of 
pollution control to earlier periods of innovation driven by newly adopted 
national purposes. They regarded technological constraints on their political 
goals as known unknowns: constraints whose magnitude they could assess 
only by running full force against them.214 They argued that setting goals 
already known to be attainable would only make innovation beyond those 
goals less likely. 
Another reason the drafters adopted then-unreachable goals was symbolic: 
they believed they were announcing a national commitment that would require 
civic, as well as technological, mobilization. It became a frequent refrain in 
debates on the Clean Air Act, in particular, that it would succeed only if the 
public were willing to accept new costs, reduce consumption, and take 
independent action to enforce pollution controls.215 In an echo of the civic 
themes of Theodore Roosevelt’s conservationism, some supporters described 
 
mood is the crisis in confidence which afflicts too many Americans in all walks of life. It is a 
crisis marked by self-doubt, by a fear that our problems may be greater than our capacity to 
solve them, that our public and private institutions may be inadequate at a time when we 
need them most.”); id. at 32,900 (“This legislation will be a test of our commitment and a 
test of our faith: in our institutions, in our capacity to find answers to difficult economic and 
technological problems, and in the ability of American citizens to rise to the challenge of 
ending the threat of air pollution.”). 
214.  See supra note 207. 
215.  See 116 CONG. REC. 42,394 (1970) (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“The bill will place great 
responsibilities on nearly every aspect in our society. . . . [I]t will place great burdens on the 
people generally for they will ultimately have to bear the expense and, for the first time, 
possibly experience inconvenience so that we might achieve clean and healthful air.”); id. at 
33,906 (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“This bill is going to require that the American motorist 
change his habits, his tastes, and his driving appetites. . . . The consumer must also make 
sacrifices in addition to those made by the manufacturer.”); id. at 32,918 (statement of Sen. 
Cooper) (“The bill . . . establishes a very high national priority for the goal of clean air. It 
will not succeed without a massive effort . . . by industry and through the willingness of 
citizens throughout the country to make the sacrifices necessary and to pay the price of 
accomplishing the goals of clean air . . . .”). On the background discussion, see Editorial, 
Clean Air and Autos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1973, at 26, stating that “New Yorkers are going to 
have to adjust to some possibly shocking changes in their way of life” to accommodate the 
goals of the Clean Air Act. 
PURDY_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 4/27/2010 2:28:01 PM 
the politics of nature 
1187 
 
the statutes as harbingers of a new era of personal responsibility for common 
well-being.216 The statutes of the early 1970s were thus part of a conscious 
reorientation of public commitments toward environmental protection. 
Whether or not the structure of the statutes contributed to (or impeded) that 
change, that structure arose partly from the attempt to achieve the change. 
3. Rejection of Market-Based Instruments 
In the course of floor debates on the Clean Water Act, Senator William 
Proxmire of Wisconsin proposed adding a Pigouvian tax to the statute’s 
regulatory toolkit, which he presented as providing “[t]he missing ingredient 
[for effective enforcement]—an economic incentive.”217 He also noted the 
efficiency advantages in enabling industry to choose its own means to reduce 
pollution to the level established by the tax.218 As he stressed in making the case 
for his amendment, it would have neither removed nor weakened any other 
 
216.  See 116 CONG. REC. 42,392 (1970) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (“The implementation of  
. . . this measure will test the determination in this country to achieve a livable environment, 
not only for ourselves but for future generations. In turn, the legislation will test the 
willingness of the citizens—not just the various levels of government, but the citizens of this 
country—to abate and prevent, and abate environmental pollution. And I wish to 
compliment [Senator Muskie] that he has emphasized the personal obligation which must 
be recognized—a rebirth, I should say, of responsibility on the part of the individual citizen 
of this country.”); id. (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“Completely. . . . There has to be a 
commitment to it by every citizen, not only with respect to the activities of others, but with 
respect to each citizen himself . . . .”). On the broader background perception, see Editorial, 
Earth Week, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1972, at 46, stating that “a far greater sense of urgency and 
effort is essential”; Editorial, supra note 190, arguing that “[t]o keep the politicians from 
stalling . . . to get them to see pollution not as a ‘social problem’ but as a survival problem—
that is the challenge the public must now take up . . . . with democratic outrage”; Editorial, 
Every Day an ‘Earth Day,’ L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1970, at C10, asserting that “[r]eclaiming the 
environment at this late date . . . is a task so immense and costly that only the strongest and 
broadest support can assure its accomplishment”; Editorial, The Politics of Pollution, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1969, at C6, stating that “California . . . can be saved—if the people will it. 
No pollution or politician can withstand the pressure of an aroused citizenry”; and Editorial, 
The State of the Environment, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1970, at C6, arguing that “what is also 
needed is the kind of mass understanding and commitment that is necessary to the success 
of any great enterprise.” 
217.  117 CONG. REC. 38,827 (1971) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“Give industry the incentive 
present law lacks . . . to spend the money it should on water pollution control. . . . [by] 
impos[ing] effluent charges on industrial water polluters, in proportion to the amount of 
waste discharged. This makes each polluter financially responsible for his own pollution. It 
says to industry, ‘Pay or stop polluting.’ This is a language industry understands.”). 
218.  Id. at 38,828 (“It gives industry a chance to determine how best to abate its pollution.”). 
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portion of the legislation.219 Nonetheless, the bill’s sponsors opposed the 
amendment, and the Senate defeated it.220 Part of their reasoning was the 
practical claim that it was too difficult to identify the degree of harm produced 
by any unit of pollution.221 Another set of arguments, however, had to do with 
the nature of the national commitment that the antipollution statutes 
represented. The bill’s sponsors indignantly inquired whether Proxmire meant 
to suggest that citizens were moved only by the threat of tax enforcement.222 
The Clean Water Act was a national commitment to a new way of doing 
things, not a marginal adjustment in regulation: by a kind of implicit 
crowding-out logic, its sponsors seemed to take Proxmire’s proposal as 
threatening to undermine the moral and civic commitments that they saw 
antipollution legislation as establishing. 
The claim that charging for pollution amounted to issuing a “right to 
pollute” slipped into the debate when Senator Muskie declared that approach 
unacceptable and Senator Proxmire denied that his proposed tax represented 
such a license.223 The larger debate over his proposal, and the still broader 
themes in which it was set, cast light on that argument. Rather than a simple 
charge of commodification or crowding out (though it had aspects of both), it 
was an objection to the idea that the country’s environmental commitments 
had reached a resting place from which a neat calculation of costs and benefits 
was available. The reason behind the objection was that Congress was in the 
process of implementing a new set of defining commitments in response to 
intense public ferment. It was establishing the ideas that human interests 
depend on a web of ecological interdependence; the natural world matters 
 
219.  See id. (“My amendment, I stress, is a supplement . . . . I am proposing today that effluent 
charges be used as an enforcement tool, in conjunction with the procedures [in the 
unamended bill] . . . .”); id. at 38,833 (“The amendment I am proposing would not delete 
one section of that bill. It would simply add to it.”). 
220.  Id. at 38,828-34 (transcript of debate and report of defeat of the amendment). 
221.  See id. at 38,829-30 (setting out the difficulty of quantifying the harm ascribable to any unit 
of pollution). 
222.  See id. at 38,833 (statement of Sen. Baker) (“I do not accept the implication by the Senator 
from Wisconsin that the people of the United States are more willing to abide by an Internal 
Revenue statute than by a categorical prohibition . . . . [I]t seems to me . . . that [Proxmire] 
is suggesting that the only laws the people of the United States really take seriously are the 
internal revenue laws, and that is not so.”). 
223.  See id. at 38,829 (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“We cannot give anyone the option of 
polluting for a fee. We are saying that our aim is to have no discharge . . . .”); id. at 38,829-
38,830 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“I am certainly not licensing the discharge of a 
pollutant.”). 
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morally as such and not only as a source of human convenience, and we 
disregard these complex facts at peril to both our interests and our duties. 
4. The Character and Motives of the Antipollution Statutes 
The regulatory devices of the antipollution statutes were rigid: deadlines, 
emission limits, uniform permits. The drafters and sponsors of the statutes, 
however, seem to have imagined this rigidity as a way of pressing forward a 
fluid process: the country’s adoption, definition, and pursuit of new 
commitments. This project was open-ended both empirically, engaging the 
question of just what technology and civic mobilization could accomplish, and 
normatively, asking what it meant to acknowledge the moral importance of the 
natural world. Legislators rejected more flexible instruments because they 
understood those as tending, ironically, to fix values that were in flux and as 
neglecting the novelty and importance of the commitments the country was 
undertaking. 
In hindsight, these objections seem to rest on false binaries and an 
unsophisticated sense of the reach and power of market-based instruments. In 
one sense this is plainly true: no such antimarket reservations constrain today’s 
discussions of climate change, in which environmental values and market 
instruments figure as mostly mutually reinforcing. Nonetheless, efficiency is an 
instrumental quality, necessarily relative to purposes. The public power of 
arguments that an instrument fails to achieve its ends efficiently is partly 
relative to the recognized importance of those ends. In this respect, the 
criticism of the antipollution statutes takes some of its force from the very 
features that the drafters believed they were defending in rejecting more 
market-based instruments. 
Whether the drafters were helping or hurting their own cause is not the 
question I mean to address. They were right in recognizing the importance of 
the process they supposed they were assisting: adopting a new set of 
commitments, which would make new arguments and demands forceful in 
public language. Those included the acute and productive criticisms that would 
soon attach to the antipollution statutes themselves. 
C. Summary 
In the decade plus between the publication of Silent Spring and the passage 
of the Clean Water Act, a new set of claims became available in public 
environmental language. Ideas that would previously have been parochial, 
eccentric, or even unintelligible entered into the repertoire of arguments and 
authority by which Americans could appeal to one another in disputes over the 
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use of political power, the duties of citizenship, and the character of the 
national community. These new claims, nonetheless, had real limits. They 
were not asserted, refined, and implemented against sustained opposition, nor 
did they arise from a movement commensurate to the scale of the cultural and 
conceptual ambition they expressed. A crisis and shift in values routinely 
described as transformative, even revolutionary, was not thematized and tested 
by opposition in a national election, although representatives targeted as 
unfriendly to environmental issues proved vulnerable in the early 1970s.224 The 
consequences of taking the new commitments seriously, as a matter of public 
policy or personal conduct, remain disputed at best, inspiring argument over 
whether the country has adopted them in any real sense.225 None of this 
should, however, lead us to neglect that debate over their meaning continues 
today. 
 
224.  Rather than produce a movement president, environmental politics benefited from the 
opportunistic endorsement of Richard Nixon, who for a time seized on environmental 
issues in hopes of outflanking liberals and claiming a potential consensus issue in a fractious 
country. Early in his second term, however, he gave up on claiming the issue and vetoed the 
1972 Clean Water Act, a veto which a self-confident Congress overrode. Both public 
discussion and legislative action on the issue ran somewhat ahead of any mobilized public, 
let alone a coherent movement able to produce nationally visible leaders with strong and 
widespread support. It was not until the 1980s, when public and congressional resistance 
stymied Ronald Reagan’s efforts to repudiate the environmentalist turn of the 1970s and, 
particularly, open public lands to exploitation, that a popular test emerged, and that was 
more in the nature of ordinary-politics trench warfare than thematized struggles over 
national self-definition. 
225.  From the start, the environmental crisis was perceived as a unifying challenge, even the 
occasion of a unifying change in values, for a divided country. See Editorial, Earth Week—No 
Vogue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1971, at 36 (“[The environment] has become deeply imbedded 
in politics—not in a partisan way but almost as a qualification for office.”); Issue of the Year, 
supra note 184, at 21 (“With remarkable rapidity [the environment] became a tenet in the 
American credo . . . .”). This promise seemed vindicated in broadly expressed support for 
environmental protection in the early 1970s and thereafter, largely down to the present day. 
It also, perhaps, underlies a second conservative feature of the new environmental language: 
that people proved able to adopt its radical critique, at least nominally, without changing 
their behavior in serious ways. This would be compatible with the thought that the 
“environmental crisis” and “revolution” borrowed some of their felt urgency from 
authentically divisive struggles: Vietnam abroad, race at home, and the disconcerting 
eruption of youthful dissent from norms of respectability and success. In this view, second-
generation environmental public language would be an example of the great American genre 
of cheap talk: frisson-inducing dissent that does not make itself too inconvenient in practice 
for the current arrangement of interests and ideas. See Editorial, The Good Earth, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1970, at 36 (“Is the sudden concern for the environment merely another 
‘nice, good middle-class issue,’ as one organizer put it, conveniently timed to divert the 
nation’s attention from such pressing problems as the spreading war in Indochina and 
intractable social injustice at home?”). 
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v. prospects for the next environmental politics 
A. The Case Against Environmental Language, Revisited 
This Article began by challenging two claims about environmental public 
language. One is that “environmentalism” is unsuited to the nature and scale of 
today’s problems, especially climate change, because environmental values are 
negative and defensive on the one hand, and, on the other, reliant on a naïve 
and untenable contrast between humanity and nature.226 The second 
challenged claim is that, whatever its more specific defects, such language is 
vague, motivationally weak, and thus a presumptively poor resource for 
addressing the next generation of environmental challenges.227 
The first claim depends on simplistic accounts of environmental politics, 
which are belied by the history of environmental public language. Only two 
strands of the developments treated here are at all compatible with the 
argument that environmentalism is essentially defensive and hostile toward 
human aspiration: the disdain for “materialism” in early Sierra Club culture 
and the alarm in 1960s environmentalism that industrial society might be 
headed for apocalyptic crisis.228 But even these strands do not support the 
proffered portrayal of environmentalism. The hostility toward “materialism” 
was not ascetic but precisely in favor of enriched experiences of rapture and 
awe, as well as the fellowship that Sierra Club members praised in their paeans 
to outdoor culture.229 The apocalyptic strains of 1960s environmentalism did 
sometimes express a technophobic impulse, notably in the Sierra Club’s 
Vietnam “parable”; but most environmentalists did not simply denounce 
technology. Instead, they proposed to redirect it in a more ecologically 
responsive fashion.230 The goal has nearly always been to reconcile prosperity 
with more qualitative satisfactions such as aesthetic inspiration and spiritual 
enrichment. Even the staunchest advocates of the Wilderness Society agenda 
presented their ideals as among the finest fruits of prosperity, not reasons to 
reject it.231 
Furthermore, neither the utilitarian nor the Romantic strain of American 
environmentalism has relied on an essentialized idea of undisturbed nature. 
 
226.  See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
227.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
228.  See supra notes 92-108, 185-186 and accompanying text. 
229.  See supra notes 64-108 and accompanying text. 
230.  See supra notes 194-222 and accompanying text. 
231.  See supra notes 140-158 and accompanying text. 
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This criticism ignores the centrality of expert management to all phases of 
American environmental ideas. Even the leaders of the wilderness movement, 
who would seem the most promising targets of this charge, explicitly proposed 
to manage nature for a specific kind of landscape and experience. Similarly, the 
Sierra Club’s commitment to spectacular landscapes was indeed based on an 
idea of harmony between nature’s vitality and that of the untrammeled mind, 
but this idea never depended on literally primordial nature persisting in the 
modern world.232 Muir and his cohort supported parks, readily accessible and 
cleansed of threats, as conduits from nature to the human mind. Precisely this 
tolerance for human construction of nature’s “cathedrals” spurred the creation 
of the Wilderness Society, with its own, starker agenda for human 
management of public landscapes.233 This tradition was based in the Romantic 
idea that perception importantly constitutes the world, and thus that any 
encounter with nature is also an encounter with one’s own mind, and, ideally, 
part of a process of revising it.234 
In answer to the second challenge, that environmental public language has 
negligible practical relevance, this Article recasts the problem. The question is 
not simply whether a static and discrete set of concerns called 
“environmentalism” has more or less force. Environmental public language has 
been thoroughly interwoven with other era-defining themes, around which 
citizens have sought to persuade one another of the content of their values and 
interests. To be a little too schematic about it, the persuasion has generally 
aimed at two kinds of changes. One has been to recognize substantively new 
purposes. The kind of aesthetic encounter with nature that the Sierra Club and 
Wilderness Society pioneered and moved from eccentricity to a cornerstone of 
environmental public language is exemplary of this sort of substantive 
innovation. The other kind of change involves the scope of interests outside 
one’s self that one takes into account, rather than their content. An exemplar is 
Gifford Pinchot’s case for utilitarian management of forests, which required 
not just empirical recognition of the remote effects of deforestation, but also an 
ethical and, perhaps, imaginative identification with the interests of Americans 
far away in space and time.235 In both kinds of changes, environmental public 
language has been inseparable from broader contests about national purpose, 
civic dignity, and the role and scale of government. 
 
232.  See supra notes 132-138 and accompanying text. 
233.  See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. 
234.  See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 74, at 33. 
235.  See PINCHOT, supra note 92, at 79-88 (arguing for the necessity of a broadened moral vision 
of personal obligation to the nation to uphold conservation policies). 
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B. The Politics of Anomaly 
These contests continue, which is one reason that the narrow view of 
climate politics that this Article challenges is inadequate. Consider one example 
that makes little sense through the lens of narrow self-interest, much more as 
part of an ongoing debate over environmental values: the organizing project 
that, at the time of writing, has led 1015 city governments, representing nearly 
eighty-two million Americans, to adopt the goals of the Kyoto Protocol (a 
seven percent reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2012) 
through an instrument called the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement.236 
Originally an initiative of the Seattle mayor’s office, the Agreement is now 
managed through the United States Conference of Mayors and overlaps 
substantially with the Sierra Club’s “Cool Cities” campaign.237 A 2007 survey 
(with serious selection-bias problems) of 134 then-participating cities found 
most assuming some costs to pursue the (admittedly unrealistic) Kyoto goal.238 
Seattle claims to have reduced the greenhouse gas emissions of city operations 
by sixty percent since 2005.239 While most efforts are similarly concentrated in 
city-government actions, Austin Energy, in Texas’s capital city, has set a goal of 
securing twenty percent renewable energy sources and fifteen percent of net 
supply from efficiency efforts by 2020, and cities from Fort Collins, Colorado, 
to Burlington, Vermont, have been investing in wind energy and other 
renewables.240 Residents of Marin County, California, are seeking permission 
 
236.  Mayors Climate Protection Center, List of Participating Mayors, http://www.usmayors.org/ 
climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
237.  See CITY OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A GLOBAL CITY ACTING LOCALLY 
(2007), available at http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/climatesurvey07.pdf. 
238.  Nearly ninety percent reported requiring, or moving to require, energy efficiency in new city 
buildings; almost three-quarters using alternative fuels or hybrid-electric vehicles in city 
fleets; over eighty percent either including or moving to include renewable energy sources; 
more than three-quarters “undertaking efforts to encourage” energy efficiency in private 
construction; and nearly all switching to energy-efficient lighting. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF 
MAYORS, SURVEY ON MAYORAL LEADERSHIP ON CLIMATE PROTECTION 4 (2007). 
239.  CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 237. I do not know how Seattle generated its reduction figure. 
240.  On Fort Collins, see GLEN BRAND & BRENDAN BELL, SIERRA CLUB, COOL CITIES:  
SOLVING GLOBAL WARMING ONE CITY AT A TIME 12 (2005), available at 
http://newjersey.sierraclub.org/concom/coolcities/coolcities.pdf, noting that the city has 
imposed a two percent surcharge on power bills to finance its renewable-energy effort; on 
Burlington, see ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 171-80 (2006). On Austin, see CITY OF AUSTIN, STRATEGIC PLAN 17-24 
(2003), available at http://www.austinenergy.com/about%20us/newsroom/reports/ 
strategicplan.pdf. For Austin’s latest municipal goals, see CITY OF AUSTIN, AUSTIN CLIMATE 
PROTECTION PLAN (2009), available at http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/acpp/downloads/ 
PURDY_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 4/27/2010 2:28:01 PM 
the yale law journal 119:1122  2010  
1194 
 
to give utility customers the option of paying a higher rate to tap into a 
renewable and local set of energy sources, and forty-one percent of San 
Francisco voters in November supported a ballot initiative requiring that all 
city energy come from renewable sources by 2040.241 
1. Anomaly as Persuasion 
Is this behavior merely trivial or silly?242 To be sure, it is fair to describe 
some of the efforts just sketched as low-hanging fruit and, in cases, cheap talk. 
But since the costs are not zero, and the benefits, in theory, are almost exactly 
that, the question of motivation is still fairly sharply presented. (If one says the 
benefits are to the politicians, then one must restate the problem for the voters 
who support them, who pay taxes and utility bills.) No one, of course, really 
doubts that those involved are acting from some combination of moral motive 
and self-interest as they understand it.243 The aim here is to make their action 
more intelligible by treating it as part of the same kind of public debate treated 
throughout this Article, an integral part of a story about democratic self-
interpretation, rather than an anomaly in a story about self-interest. 
In private interviews and public statements, city officials and activists 
explain their efforts in several ways. They are quick to cite the advantage 
certain regions, such as California, hope to enjoy from early adoption and 
manufacture of technologies that may later become standard (a calculation that 
predicts effective political action on climate in the future, meaning that it is not 
really consistent with a larger pessimistic view of the problem).244 They 
 
ACPP_Annual_Report_5.20.09_FINAL.pdf, setting a goal of thirty percent renewable 
energy for municipal use. 
241.  See Kate Galbraith, A Clean Energy Uprising in California, Green, Inc. Blog, Oct. 29,  
2008, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/a-clean-energy-uprising-in-california/ 
#more-399; see also Heather Knight, In S.F., Voters Defeat Prop. for City Utility, S.F.  
CHRON., Nov. 5, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/ 
article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/11/05/BATD13RC1Q.DTL. Defeat of the San Francisco measure 
involved a long-standing conflict between Pacific Gas and Electric and proponents of 
publicly owned power, which brought out Mayor Gavin Newsom and Senator Diane 
Feinstein against the proposition. 
242.  See Engel & Orbach, supra note 2, at 119-20 (expressing puzzlement). 
243.  See, e.g., id. at 129-30 (describing moral motives as producing a “warm glow” but not 
proposing to consider them further); Sunstein, Complex Climate Change Incentives, supra 
note 2, at 1696-1700 (briefly noting a hodgepodge of moral motive and empirical 
confusion). 
244.  See Telephone Interview with Steve Nicholas, Former Sustainability & Env’t Dir., Seattle 
Mayor’s Office (Nov. 14, 2008); Telephone Interview with Jeanie Boawn, Sustainability & 
Env’t Admir., Seattle Mayor’s Office (Nov. 7, 2008); Telephone Interview with Kevin 
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embrace a simple public-choice motive: city governments hope to benefit from 
green-development block grants and, in the longer term, density-friendly 
economic development, and early efforts may position them to do both.245 
They also regard themselves as engaged in political persuasion that they 
hope will induce others to take similar action.246 Whether this is plausible is 
partly endogenous to the politics itself. This politics seeks to affect the 
reasons—specifically those grounded in environmental values—that people 
understand themselves to have for joining collective undertakings. Rather than 
a specimen of an independently established logic of collective action, it is an 
engagement with that logic itself. 
What is the nature of the persuasion? In addressing this question, I am 
mainly concerned with how the leaders I spoke with understood their own 
participation and that of the people they recruited. Their opponents offered 
familiar arguments that local climate action can only be futile, and in their 
advocacy, the leaders developed a concrete sense of how to engage those 
arguments. 
First, local climate activists appreciate that they are engaged in a symbolic 
politics made possible by the country’s adoption of environmental 
commitments in the 1970s and earlier.247 Before the 2008 presidential election, 
which brought a new emphasis on climate change to the White House, their 
actions invoked those commitments when the national government was seen as 
neglecting them. The activists sought to announce that the commitments 
remained vital, and, in doing so, contribute to the truth of the assertion. These 
symbolic actions reflect the existence of environmental commitments as 
national values; by adopting nominal emission limits, cities make a public 
argument that the federal government should do the same. 
Second, these initiatives are intended as existence proofs that coordinated 
action can succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, at least within a 
locality (ignoring for the moment the prospect of emitting activities fleeing to 
other jurisdictions).248 A successful experiment is a powerful form of 
 
McCarty, Dir., U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Prot. Ctr. (Oct. 31, 2008). Nicholas was 
the lead strategist and organizer at the time the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement was 
being propagated. 
245.  See Telephone Interview with Steve Nicholas, supra note 244; Telephone Interview with 
Kevin McCarty, supra note 244. 
246.  See Telephone Interview with Steve Nicholas, supra note 244. 
247.  See sources cited supra note 244. 
248.  See Telephone Interview with Steve Nicholas, supra note 244. 
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persuasion, establishing a concrete option for others with salience that a merely 
hypothetical alternative is unlikely to command.249 
Third, local climate initiatives are attempts to reframe the cultural valence 
of climate change from an ideological flashpoint associated with left-liberal 
attitudes to a rallying point of pragmatic effort. Studies of public opinion on 
climate change show that views of both the severity of the problem and the 
human power to address it conform to the hypothesis that people assess facts 
based on whether the truth or falsehood of those facts would confirm or 
undercut the bases of their social status and moral vision of the world.250 Those 
who regard the problem as serious and profess to believe that people can do 
something about it are also proregulatory economic and political egalitarians.251 
Those who profess to think that the threat is negligible and beyond human 
influence in any case (two views that would not seem inherently aligned but for 
their affinity in the cultural-meaning register) fall on the other side of those 
larger markers of worldview. Strategists for local initiatives emphasize practical 
local vulnerability to climate change. The paradigm case is Seattle’s dependence 
on the Cascade snowpack for water and hydroelectric power, which figured 
importantly in the local argument for leading the conference of Mayors 
Agreement initiative.252 This argument is available across the snowpack-
 
249.  See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 
(2009) (arguing for the importance in public policy innovation of small-scale existence 
proofs of the viability of alternative models). Perhaps the most impressive American 
example of this strategy at the municipal level is that of Burlington, which has a well-
established program of encouraging conservation and has seen its energy use drop by one 
percent since 1990, while statewide use has risen by fifteen percent. See KOLBERT, supra note 
240, at 175. California, which has pursued an aggressive and successful energy-conservation 
policy over the last three decades, presents a similar example at a larger scale. California has 
held its per capita energy use essentially even since 1974, while nationwide per capita 
consumption has increased by fifty percent. California has also reduced its per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions by thirty percent since 1975, while national per capita emissions have 
changed little. See Steven Mufson, In Energy Conservation, California Sees Light: Progressive 
Policy Makes It a Model in Global Warming Fight, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2007, at A1. 
250.  See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (setting out a theory of cultural cognition and evidence for its 
validity); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)) (arguing for the appropriateness of considering cultural 
meaning of risks in setting and justifying public policy). 
251.  EDWARD MAIBACH, CONNIE ROSER-RENOUF & ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ, YALE PROJECT ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, GLOBAL 
WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 2009: AN AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION ANALYSIS (2009), available at 
http://environment.yale.edu/uploads/6Americas2009.pdf. 
252.  See sources cited supra note 244. 
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dependent West, as is the danger of drought for already water-stressed regions 
in the Southwest and, in some recent droughts, the Southeast.253 If it succeeds, 
like nineteenth-century arguments tying forest conservation to erosion 
prevention and future timber harvests, this effort will have made climate 
change a different kind of problem. This sort of change relies on both empirical 
knowledge and democratic self-interpretation. 
Finally, the activists aim to create new norms of climate regulation within 
small and rather insular populations at a time when such norms have little 
purchase in the larger society. Ultimately, local initiatives aim to make low-
carbon conduct conventional—part of a practice of membership and mutual 
respect.254 As a starting place, the initiatives take advantage of small and dense 
networks, such as mayors, city officials, and environmental activists. This is an 
attempt to create a practice among members of a limited public, rather as the 
Sierra Club once created a limited public in which the Romantic experience of 
nature was widely shared and explored as a public language.255 
The unifying aim of this activism is persuasion: to give a broader class of 
people reasons to believe climate change is both real and susceptible to action. 
Local climate initiatives engage the questions of: (1) what reasons exist to 
address climate change; (2) who has those reasons; and (3) what reasons 
would be sufficient to spur collective action. At least for their activist core of 
proponents, local initiatives are acts of defiance against the idea that politics is 
futile—against the pessimistic account of climate change and collective action 
sketched earlier.256 If they were merely defiant, they would count only as 
expressive, in just the vein of a chanted slogan. The burden of the argument 
 
253.  See Jon Gertner, The Future Is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 68 
(describing increasingly dire forecasts for regional water shortages under current climate 
change models). 
254.  See Telephone Interview with Steve Nicholas, supra note 244. 
255.  See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and the Law, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 71 (2003) (setting out the motivational relevance of reciprocity and nonreciprocity for 
sustaining collective action). For accounts of neuroscience studies suggesting confirmation 
of the distinct motivational character of reciprocity, see Kevin McCabe et al., A Functional 
Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Exchange, 98 PNAS 11,832 (2001); and 
James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 NEURON 395 (2002). For a 
fascinating historical argument that social cooperation was long regarded as normatively 
rational and that by this canon individuals are correct to imagine their acts as directly 
efficacious when they contribute to a social practice, see RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 119-55 
(2008). 
256.  This idea has become familiar among at least some political progressives in the last decade 
or so and is crystallized in the slogan of the World Social Forum: “Another world is 
possible.” See World Social Forum, http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/index.php?cd 
_language=2&id_menu= (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
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here is that local climate initiatives are intended rather as efforts at persuasive 
politics, bearing on the reasons for action that operate in the political 
community and its subcommunities. Those who work for local climate 
initiatives understand the argument that their action is necessarily futile. 
Proving otherwise is a project motivated precisely by an understanding of the 
argument and a wish to change the terms on which it rests. 
2. Community, Politics, Thresholds 
We have seen that throughout the history of American environmental law, 
intrinsically satisfying ways of interacting with the natural world have spurred 
instrumental political action, such as calls for conservation laws. The Sierra 
Club’s members moved into advocacy powered by a way of experiencing the 
Sierra Nevada and the California redwoods. The struggle to develop and 
express a similarly potent experience of wilderness shaped the early work of the 
Wilderness Society. These motives are particularly important because 
politically relevant communities and movements can form around them for the 
sake of a satisfying shared experience, whether or not participants expect to 
achieve political goals. As these groups grow, they become more likely to be 
politically effective, even if political efficacy is not what attracts their growing 
membership. In this way, intrinsic motives can carry communities of 
conviction across thresholds of political relevance. 
Implicit in pessimistic analyses of climate politics is a seldom-expressed 
idea that climate change presents no opportunities for intrinsic satisfactions of 
this sort—that carbon reduction, mitigation, and the rest are all cost and no 
reward, and that therefore no one would rationally undertake them without 
first solving the collective-action problems that dog climate politics. As Sarah 
Krakoff has recently argued, this may not be true.257 Local carbon-reduction 
efforts seem to be, among other things, some citizens’ effort to (1) do the 
ecologically right thing and (2) form and participate in communities that do 
the same. This development resembles both the shared aesthetic and spiritual 
experience that drove the early Sierra Club and the “new nationalist” strand of 
Progressivism, with its insistence that a share of personal meaning and worth 
comes from the goodness or greatness of one’s polity. This development differs 
from early Sierra culture, though, in being less ecstatic than deliberate, closer 
to an atmospheric land ethic than to John Muir’s aesthetic rapture. It differs 
 
257.  See Sarah Krakoff, Environmental Law, Tragedy, and Community (Aug. 29, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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from many Progressive predecessors in being, for the moment, a matter of local 
rather than national or global politics; but that may be momentary. 
C. Frames for Climate Change: Where Might Environmental Values Go Next? 
In light of the ways that Americans have drawn on and changed 
environmental values in the past, how might those same values develop in the 
politics of the coming decades? This Section moves from a specific case to 
general themes. It is an argument about some of the forms that the major 
traditions of environmental values might take in climate politics. The inquiry is 
shaped but not determined by past developments, and is an attempt to inform 
democratic activity by increasing the scope and richness of the values advocates 
and ordinary citizens alike can draw on as they argue over what we should do, 
and why. 
1. Romantic Aesthetics and the Politics of Consciousness 
As this Article has shown, it has become conventional to say that the 
conservation tradition associated with the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society 
is obsolete because it depends on naïve ideas of an unchanged and 
untrammeled nature, which, if it ever existed, is now lost to the irretrievable 
past. But this is almost entirely wrong. This tradition has always been centered 
on human values and engaged in the ever-shifting politics of democratic life. It 
has been, in fact, a politics of consciousness, aimed at enabling people to 
encounter the natural world in ways that both perceive its objective features 
more exactly and induce experiences such as sublimity and harmony. Aldo 
Leopold’s account of the purpose of public-lands management as achieving 
new levels of “receptivity” in the human mind captures exactly the human-
centered and culturally innovative character of this program.258 
What might be productive in the Romantic tradition would require making 
two elements of that tradition more explicit, basic, and thoroughgoing—in a 
word, radicalizing them. The first radicalizing development is to make explicit 
the idea that what is finally valuable in nature, according to this tradition, is 
not specific individuals, species, or places, nor even an ideal, undisturbed 
condition, but qualities of natural systems. Leopold, again, captured this idea 
when he made “integrity, stability, and beauty” the struts of the “land ethic” 
that emerged from decades of work in wilderness advocacy and other 
 
258.  See LEOPOLD, supra note 130, at 295. 
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conservation politics.259 Even though this phrase is now sixty years old, it 
repays careful attention. These are not qualities of unchanged, “wild” nature, 
but goals for active management, both of wilderness and of densely inhabited 
places, such as farming regions.260 Moreover, these qualities blend objective 
characteristics of natural systems with attitudes and experiences of the human 
beholder. Integrity here means, roughly, resilience, and describes a system that 
can persist through both endogenous and exogenous changes. Beauty, by 
contrast, is a quality made actual only in a person’s culturally mediated 
encounter with a part of nature. So understood, these qualities are not at all 
obsolete as guides in engaging climate change. Instead, they address questions 
of just the kind that managing a global atmospheric system (within the 
considerable limitations of human competence to do so) must raise: questions 
of what qualities are valuable in our eyes in such a system, and what is 
necessary to maintain those qualities. 
The second radicalizing development follows closely on the first. It is a 
sharp counterpoint to simplifying and nostalgic tendencies. It requires an 
embrace of the fact that environmental politics is centrally about a choice of 
futures. Such politics poses values to guide those choices, and so points, not 
backward to a lost idyll, but forward to human decision. It differs from more 
familiar techniques for steering toward the future, notably cost-benefit 
analysis, in that it engages not just the choice of means, but centrally the choice 
of ends, of what we value and why. Democratic politics has repeatedly changed 
both the set of viable alternatives and the metrics by which they are evaluated. 
Carrying forward the Romantic tradition into climate politics might also 
require deepened engagement with another basic theme: identification of the 
qualities of mind and experience in which encounters with the natural world 
enrich human consciousness. Two issues have often made this question 
elusive. One is the tendency to confuse the touchstones of aesthetic experience 
with the values they embody and evoke, so that conservation has seemed to be 
simply about Yosemite Valley or the blue whale, rather than an attitude toward 
the natural world that is associated, but not identical, with conservation of such 
places and species. The other difficulty is that the natural world’s meaning for 
the human mind has figured in quite diverse ways across the history of 
environmental values. For the Transcendentalists and certain early Sierra Club 
figures, including Muir, nature’s patterns revealed those of the mind, which 
participated in the same ordering principles. From the Wilderness Society 
forward, encounters with the natural world have mainly been seen as unique 
 
259.  See id. at 262. 
260.  See id. at 243-58 (discussing agriculture as a paradigm problem for a land ethic). 
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opportunities for insight, but not access points to metaphysical principle. The 
Romantic tradition itself, then, contains temptations both to lose sight of the 
issue of consciousness altogether and to dismiss it as intractably ambiguous. 
The version of this tradition with the most to offer in climate change takes 
the direction of the Wilderness Society, leaving metaphysics aside in favor of 
the quality of mind that appreciates natural systems. This approach 
concentrates on two rather opposite facts. One is that the natural world is 
deeply intelligible, composed of principles and relationships that, once 
grasped, enrich perception by making it patterned and significant. The other is 
that the world outstrips human understanding, both at its largest and smallest 
scales and at the furthest reaches of complexity, so that intelligibility is always 
bounded by mystery. Taken together, the experience is simultaneously of 
beauty—an orderly world that we can understand and in which we belong—
and of sublimity—a world beyond us, in which we are always in some degree 
alien and potentially overwhelmed. 
Recall the version of this idea that emerged from the work of Aldo Leopold 
and the Wilderness Society: that nature is at once deeply intelligible and 
basically mysterious, and appreciating this enriches the mind. This account 
may seem abstract, but just such ideas, worked into habits of perception, have 
provided key motives for the major conservation episodes of the last two 
centuries. Moreover, it may be that climate change brings home precisely this 
set of qualities in the natural world: that the earth is familiar and alien, subject 
to our mastery but also, past a certain threshold, able to overwhelm us. This 
description captures changes in which the same technology that for now makes 
the planet so serving of human ends threatens soon to make it much less 
hospitable to human life. It almost surely expresses something about 
atmospheric processes whose basic logic a child can understand, but whose 
systemic implications are beyond confident prediction by a civilization’s worth 
of computer-enhanced climate science. And, maybe most importantly, it 
resonates with the image of a planet astonishingly rich in life yet shielded from 
deadly radiative heat and endless cold by a thin layer of air that is now 
ineluctably something humans have made. 
This attitude might provide the motive for political demands to create a 
carbon-neutral economy, as earlier changes in views of human beings, 
economics, and politics spurred demands to replace slavery with free labor, and 
the rise of Sierra Club culture drove a new agenda for conservation.261 It might 
cast compliance with the strictures of such an economy as a feature of a good 
 
261.  See DAVIS, supra note 1 (discussing the changes in values and imagination that accompanied 
abolition). 
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life, not just a nest of inconveniences. It might, for instance, tilt political 
judgments between very different alternatives, such as relatively costly carbon-
neutral policies and relatively inexpensive “geo-engineering” proposals to do 
such things as launch orbiting mirrors to reduce the earth’s solar exposure or 
seed the atmosphere with sulfur particles to the same effect.262 It is one thing to 
compare the relative expenditures for these competing approaches. It is quite 
another to experience a basic discomfort in imagining a carbon-thick 
atmosphere kept cool only by mechanically fending off solar radiation, 
knowing that, if the satellites failed, the planet would almost immediately enter 
a period of drastic and unpredictable climatic instability. That prospect, of 
course, represents a bundle of probability-discounted costs; but one might also 
experience discomfort because she believed such an engineered atmosphere 
lacked beauty, integrity, and stability, or whatever parallel terms emerged as 
public language for a healthy and desirable atmosphere. This perception of the 
costs of a geo-engineering solution to climate change would extend to the 
global atmosphere a way of valuing nature that has importantly motivated 
earlier conservation and environment regimes: a marriage of ethical, 
prudential, and aesthetic regard for a complex and resilient natural system. 
2. Progressives and the Charisma of Management 
The second great theme of American conservation politics, interwoven with 
Romanticism, is the Progressive ideal of expert management in the public 
interest. These two themes have sometimes seemed at odds, and they draw on 
contrasting aspects of the modern temper: the self-transcending and rapturous 
on the one hand, and the calculating and instrumentally rational on the other. 
The contrast is easy to overdraw, though. Romantic developments have 
frequently provided the goals that Progressive management has served, while 
managerial expertise has not been narrowly instrumental, but has engaged 
such purpose-guiding questions as the character and scope of national 
community. 
Progressivism is, among other things, a tradition attached to the claim that 
economic life should serve certain qualitative values such as equal opportunity 
because those values are measures of a legitimate economic order. At least since 
Pinchot and Roosevelt put “conservation” at the center of a national program 
of economic management, environmental values have figured not just in the 
functionality of the economy, but also in its legitimacy. These values have 
 
262.  See Robert Kunzig, A Sunshade for Planet Earth, SCI. AM., Nov. 2008, at 46 (discussing these 
options); David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort Against Global 
Warming?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 64 (same). 
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included the intergenerational solidarity that Pinchot called for and the idea of 
using resources in a way that enables natural systems to reproduce themselves 
indefinitely. Regulation aimed at atmospheric health might play the same role 
as conservation-based criteria for a legitimate economy. 
To develop this distinction conceptually: markets are defined by both 
constitutive regulation, which makes them what they are, and exogenous 
regulation, which adjusts them, as it were, from outside. The contrast, however, 
is not natural or otherwise fixed. Constitutive regulation describes those 
features that we regard as intrinsic to a certain form of economy, as if they were 
“just there,” such as the prohibition on involuntary servitude and the fixed 
number of estates in real property. Political developments can change the 
domain of constitutive regulation by putting new principles, such as 
atmospheric health, at the center of legitimate markets. The Progressive 
tradition in environmental values has done this with conservation principles in 
the past, however imperfectly, and the idea of an economy constituted and 
assessed by a standard of atmospheric health would extend that tradition. 
Note that there is a basic complementarity between the Romantic and 
Progressive developments sketched here. The two traditions might coincide in 
the same set of values: systemic qualities such as beauty, health, and integrity. 
As argued earlier, these are the kinds of values that Americans might embrace 
in climate politics by drawing on the Romantic tradition. They are also the 
qualities that Progressive developments might place at the center of a new 
generation of constitutive economic regulation. 
D. Teaching Environmental Law 
Understanding environmental and natural resources law as a feature of 
ongoing political argument should affect how law professors teach these areas, 
as well as how we discuss them as scholars. Existing laws have the shape of the 
political language and values that produced them. Moreover, environmental 
laws are products of the democratic power to redefine values, often through 
fractious contests, and to open new alternatives that would once have seemed 
impossible. In teaching them, professors engage a tradition of argument, 
struggle, and change, one that inevitably contains hints of where future 
environmental politics might go. Environmental law is, of course, the structure 
and operation of statutes and regulations; but it is also a source of insight into 
environmental public language, a map of the political and cultural landscape on 
which past and future environmental challenges will play out. 
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1. Diverse Conceptions of Nature 
Various statutes have their origins in diverse conceptions of the natural 
world: how it works, what values it implicates, and what relation it has to 
human experience. In some measure, these differences simply reflect growing 
scientific knowledge: the establishment of the National Forests reflected 
increasing awareness of forest life-cycles and the effects of unchecked 
timbering; passage of the Clean Air Act expressed growing appreciation of the 
health effects of industrial emissions. To some degree, however, the different 
statutes arose from ideas about nature’s value and relation to human purposes. 
Thus the Wilderness Act enshrines a conviction that personal encounters with 
complex, healthy, and relatively undisturbed natural systems confer a unique 
benefit on the human mind. This is neither a simple question of fact (Does it or 
does it not?) nor a bare assertion of value (Wild nature is good.). Rather, it is a 
recognition of how certain aspects of the natural world have come to figure in 
the experience of some Americans. For those Americans, it is true about nature 
that it produces certain kinds of intense experiences, and it is true that those 
experiences are valuable. These facts are culturally particular: they are not true 
in all places or in all times; but they were real for those who created the statute, 
and the law’s embracing them helps to ensure that they remain true. Exactly 
the same point applies to the laws creating and governing the National Parks. 
More subtly, we have seen that the antipollution statutes of the 1970s took 
some of their impetus from burgeoning beliefs, founded in the popular 
reception of ecology, that the integrity of natural systems is both valuable in 
itself and instructive for the human mind that understands and respects it. 
In light of this point, the teaching of the major environmental statutes 
should incorporate historical materials as keys to understanding the defining 
commitments of the statutes and their significance in the development of 
American ideas of nature. Some of the material that this Article discusses can 
serve as example.263 Similarly, no account of the law of public lands would be 
complete without representative samples of what John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, 
and Aldo Leopold wrote on the topic, or of Theodore Roosevelt’s speeches on 
 
263.  For instance, two fairly short pieces discussed earlier, Time’s The Age of Effluence, and the 
Sierra Club Bulletin’s A Fable for Our Time, would frame the generation of post-1968 statutes 
in the organizing themes of the time: a new conception of “the environment” as uniting 
previously disparate issues, a perception of environmental crisis, and a moralized cultural 
interpretation in which environmental crisis arose from a crisis of values, and the two 
required a unified response. These articles are presented and discussed in Section IV.A., 
supra. 
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conservation.264 These would not be window-dressing. Instead, they would, as 
it were, form a map of changing ways of imagining and experiencing nature 
with new statutes as the outstanding features of its landscape. 
Teaching might also incorporate reflection on comparative environmental 
traditions across countries. Consider this point in light of the political 
challenge of regulating climate change. This Article’s basic argument about 
climate change is that the collective-action problem that the issue raises is even 
more complex than it at first appears. This is so because the value of nature 
within any polity is a matter of dispute, so that the structure of costs and 
benefits from cooperation or defection varies across both borders and time. 
Therefore, even a conventional rational-choice analysis of the issue may 
depend on the traditions of contest over nature’s value that obtain within any 
polity, or at regional or global scales. 
This point implies that, at a minimum, study of international 
environmental regimes and problems with a large international dimension 
should include engagement with various countries’ and religious traditions’ 
understandings of nature’s value.265 A similar point holds for study of the 
transnational social movements that now aim to affect both national and 
 
264.  The Natural Resources textbook that is particularly sensitive to these issues nonetheless 
treats them mostly as clashes of value today, with competing positions exemplified by the 
arguments of law professors and moral philosophers—the trained professionals of 
normativity. See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND POLICY 11-28 (2004) (discussing philosophical rationales for conservation); cf. id. 
at 28-34 (summarizing some of the highlights in the development of wilderness values); 6 
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 30-33 (2007) 
(excerpting LEOPOLD, supra note 130). These textbooks are not blind to history, but they do 
not set the stage for teaching these areas of law as the products of a history of politically 
contested self-interpretation. 
265.  This is, of course, a daunting assignment, and few law professors would be qualified to 
undertake it from scratch. That said, the upshot of this argument is not that everyone 
teaching a course on climate change law and policy should develop ground-up mastery of 
Confucian approaches to nature, the importance of agrarian rural landscapes in French 
political culture, or the significance of the monsoon to Indian national identity. See, e.g., 
RAMACHANDRA GUHA, ENVIRONMENTALISM: A GLOBAL HISTORY 98-124 (2000) (discussing 
the distinctive sources and meanings of environmental politics in “the global south”); 
ARUNDHATI ROY, THE COST OF LIVING 21-48 (1999) (connecting a conservation agenda with 
small-scale and humanitarian features of Indian political culture, in contrast with a 
postcolonial attachment to grand-scale development projects); Wiener, Climate Change 
Policy, supra note 2, at 1819-20 (discussing the historical interweaving of natural disaster and 
the expectation of dynastic change in Chinese political culture). Qualified scholars would be 
doing all law teachers a service in engaging these questions together and producing a strong 
set of materials on comparative cultures of nature, suited for use by law teachers. Law 
teachers, in turn, would do well to call for such materials and adopt them if they became 
available. 
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international environmental law. A growing body of literature explores the 
networked organizations that make up these movements and asks whether they 
are producing new publics at a global or transnational regional scale, and, if so, 
whether the political culture of those publics is an extension of the domestic 
environmental movements of the United States and other North Atlantic 
countries or something new.266 We have seen that the American politics of 
nature helped to create both the conception of a natural world worth protecting 
and that of a state authorized and able to protect it; teaching environmental 
law should include the question of whether similar changes are underway 
today at larger scales.267 
2. A Place for Imagination 
As the Introduction and Part I of this Article argue, the narrowing effect of 
the conventional approach to environmental questions is particularly potent in 
areas where the content of any future environmental law has yet to be 
determined, notably climate change. This is paradoxical because these may be 
the areas where the possibility of change is greatest. It was in past struggles 
over new issues that new values found sharper and more persuasive expression 
and entered into public language. Without the contest over the National Parks 
and other public lands at the end of the last century, there would likely be no 
political language of sublimity, no convention of invoking the spiritual value of 
spectacular places to justify preservation decisions. Without the subsequent 
drive to establish permanent wilderness areas, the cultural category of 
wilderness, with its connection to ecological values more generally, might 
never have entered public language. Imagining those issues as constrained by 
the public values dominant when they arose would have led to entirely wrong 
forecasts. As we have seen, the arguments available to wilderness advocates 
early in their campaign were quite ill-suited to their goals and required the 
labor of imagination and persuasion that the advocates undertook. A “realistic” 
estimate of those issues in, respectively, 1860 or 1918, would have found scant 
prospect for the preservationists’ success. Moreover, as this Article has argued, 
pessimistic forecasts can be self-fulfilling.  
 
266.  See generally 1 ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY: ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO THE 
IPE OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Peter M. Haas ed., 2003) (collecting essays on all the themes 
mentioned in the text accompanying this footnote); HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Peter Dauvergne ed., 2006) (same); MARGARET E. KECK & 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 121-63 (1998) (describing transnational environmental movements). 
267.  This note refers particularly to the discussion in Section I.C., supra. 
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The upshot is that law teachers should approach emerging issues in a 
bifocal way: both as occasions for the play of existing interests and values, and 
as places where social movements and political argument might bring new 
values into public language and rework the mutually defining relationship 
between values and interests. I would argue that we are teaching responsibly 
only when we emphasize to our students that this field is one in which once-
unthinkable ideas have become conventional, not one time only, but 
repeatedly, through imagination, argument, and politics.268 Any student who 
has completed a course in environmental or natural resources law should 
appreciate that the field is defined not only by human solutions to a consistent 
set of problems and opportunities called Nature, nor simply by a set of 
constant political impetuses and constraints called interests, but also by the 
recurrent reinvention of human ways of encountering and experiencing the 
natural world. 
conclusion 
Ideas about the value of the natural world are, and have always been, 
integral to the repertoire of arguments that Americans use to try to persuade 
one another of the character and implications of common commitments. How 
we understand nature is part of civic identity. It has developed by interacting 
with other, better-trodden themes of American public language: national 
purpose, civic dignity, and the role and appropriate scale of government, to 
name those that have figured most prominently in this Article. This 
understanding of the natural world is anything but monolithic: it is one of the 
common terms that Americans interpret differently in battling over their 
disagreements.269 The natural world has stood at various times, and for various 
constituencies, for the idea of infinite material progress, the possibility of 
 
268.  This might mean inviting students to engage in an exercise like the one modeled in this 
Part: reflecting in an open-ended fashion on how existing themes in environmental public 
language might develop in the crucible of new problems. It might simply mean insisting, in 
addressing emerging problems, that the most realistic approach is not one that projects 
existing constraints indefinitely into the future. Instead, the most realistic approach would 
take history as evidence that today’s constraints were yesterday’s seemingly unrealistic 
proposals, and so that we should look among today’s less obvious possibilities, even its 
wilder-eyed ideas, for hints of what the future might be. Teachers might develop this point 
in a mainly historical fashion, as this Article does. A case study on the development of 
Wilderness Society arguments, for instance, would convey the key role of imagination in 
making new kinds of arguments possible, without any need for more open-ended classroom 
exercises. 
269.  See Post & Siegel, supra note 1. 
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rational resource management in the public interest, and the need to redefine 
human flourishing beyond material mastery of nature toward a heightened 
aesthetic awareness and spiritual response to it. The politics of nature has 
contributed to the civic dignity of the free labor idea, in which the public 
domain must be open to citizens’ settlement and exploitation; to that of 
Progressive reformers, in which the citizen should do her part in maintaining a 
social order that manages its complex and interdependent systems for health 
and mutual benefit; and to that of the Romantic, whose loyalty to the political 
community is paradoxically conditioned on its enabling him to leave its 
constraints from time to time, escaping into solitude, reflection, and perhaps 
mystical ecstasy. 
More than a century of development in these themes contributed to the rise 
of modern environmentalism, sometimes inaptly described as an event without 
a history. These themes contributed mightily to the specific shape that early 
environmentalism gave to the anxieties of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Environmentalism, in turn, gave ideas of nature’s intrinsic value and moral 
instructiveness new reach in American public language. Understanding that era 
as one in which legislators joined movements and commentators in adopting 
this new account of the natural world casts light on the peculiarities and limits 
of their landmark legislation. In turn, understanding today’s politics as a 
continuation of the politics of nature casts light on a signal anomaly of climate 
politics, the proliferation of local initiatives to control greenhouse-gas 
emissions. In a broader spirit, it also suggests the value of imaginative 
forecasting like that attempted in Part V, which connects today’s emerging 
environmental problems with the themes of environmental public language. 
The developments that this Article explores were acts of democratic self-
interpretation. Social movements, political leaders, and public commentators 
repeatedly adapted ideas of the natural world to the needs of their times, and in 
turn recast those needs in light of new understandings of the meaning and 
value of nature. The philosophical and literary canon of American 
conservationism—Thoreau, Muir, Leopold—is badly miscast when taken as a 
line of prophets or an intergenerational seminar in environmental ethics. These 
touchstone expositors were, rather, parts of their respective worlds and times, 
and their intelligibility to us is partly a product of the politics of nature 
between then and now. Thoreau and Muir were sources of material for the self-
interpretation of individuals and movements, Thoreau perhaps diffidently, 
Muir deliberately, as he turned his role as publicist of Romantic aesthetics into 
that of social-movement impresario. Leopold, for his part, was a product of the 
intensely practical, public-oriented argument-making of a movement culture, 
and his work was a response to the challenges of justifying wilderness in the 
terms available in the 1920s through the 1940s. None of this makes their 
conviction less real or reduces their literary or theoretical interest. But it does 
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set their meaning for environmental law and politics just where it belongs: in 
relation to the self-interpreting democratic community that they addressed and 
to which they belonged—along with millions of mostly forgotten people who 
gave their ideas form and life, from the weekend sojourners of the Sierra Club 
and the uncharismatic Wilderness Society editor, Howard Zahniser, to the 
federal legislators of the 1960s and mayors in the last decade. That larger 
community and the limited publics within it are the ultimate actors in this 
story. 
They—we—will choose which strands of the inheritance set out here will 
remain a living tradition in the environmental politics of our time. Climate 
change comes draped in claims of apocalypse, national mission, and market-
friendly technological optimism—a culturally overdetermined phenomenon if 
ever we have faced one. Which accounts will prevail is partly a political choice, 
one made of old materials in new circumstances. The choice will be the work of 
the next generation of the cultural innovation, political argument, and social 
movements that have produced American environmental public language so 
far. 
